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PREFACE 
This thesis examines absence from work due to sickness in Spain. The first chapter reviews the 
current state of knowledge related to theory, as well as empirical evidence relating to sickness 
absence in an economic context. The economic literature has stressed that labour supply factors 
such as gender and age are important in determining sickness absence, but, according to the 
empirical evidence, the effect of these two variables is uncertain. Chapters 2 and 3 aim to shed 
light on this debate by providing empirical evidence regarding the effect of gender and age, 
respectively, on sickness absence from work. Finally, Chapter 4 examines the contribution of 
government intervention in occupational health and safety (OSH) in giving rise to spatial 
differences in the incidence of workplace accidents.  
In particular, Chapter 2 focuses on explaining gender differences in work absence behaviour. 
The data come from the 2006 wave of the Continuous Sample of Working Histories, which was 
expanded with information on all sick leave spells covered by the Spanish sickness insurance 
scheme for the period 2005-2006. The empirical analysis in this chapter is divided into two parts. 
First, competing risk models are used to measure the time from the start of an employment 
contract to the first sickness absence spell in relation to each worker’s characteristics. Second, a 
single event duration model is estimated to examine how these characteristics affect the time to 
return to activity after a period of sick leave. The results reveal that both incidence and duration 
of sick leave are higher for women than for men. More specifically, the presence of children 
under 3 years old in the household is one of the most important variables explaining the 
differences in sickness absence between women and men.  
Chapter 3 examines the impact of worker’s age on the consequences of occupational injuries. 
Using data from the Spanish Statistics on Accidents at Work for 2004-2010, a multinomial model is 
estimated in order to analyse the impact of the age on the probability of suffering a severe or 
fatal accident. Further, a duration model is used to assess the effect of worker’s age on the length 
of sick leave caused by occupational injuries. The analysis shows that the probability of suffering 
a severe or fatal accident, as well as the duration of the sick leave, increases with the worker’s age 
once personal, job, and accident characteristics are controlled for. From a policy perspective, the 
results point out the importance of a proper match between the capabilities of the worker and 
the demands of the job. Therefore, decisions about delaying the retirement age require additional 
measures, such as the occupational reallocation of these older workers to tasks with lower 
incidence rates, in order to minimise these effects.  
Finally, Chapter 4 analyses the regional distribution of the incidence of workplace accidents in 
Spain, as well as its dynamics over the last two decades. It also analyses the contribution of 
socioeconomic factors and government prevention measures in giving rise to spatial differences 
in the incidence of workplace accidents. The results call for a modification of the legal 
framework as regards the intensity of inspection and sanction regimes, given that such changes 
would reduce the magnitude of regional disparities. 
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CHAPTER  1 Sickness absence from work: Theoretical issues and previous literature from an economic perspective 
Sickness absence from work: Theoretical issues and previous 
literature from an economic perspective 
1. Introduction 
The analysis of sickness absence from work has been carried out within several different 
scientific disciplines such as medicine, psychology, sociology, etc. Thus, economics has also 
contributed to the study of absenteeism due to sickness. The purpose of this chapter is to review 
the current state of knowledge and issues related to theory and empirical evidence of sickness 
absence from work according to an economic perspective.  
Traditionally, economic theories on sickness absence are usually rooted in the perception of 
humans as individuals who make rational choices and, therefore, seek to maximise their welfare 
or utility. Section 2 describes how, facing a choice between labour supply and leisure, individuals 
maximize their utility given budget and time constraints. However, several factors have an 
impact on this decision. Economic literature has highlighted that characteristics of the worker, 
such as health, gender and age, can influence his or her valuation of free time and consumption 
(Section 3). Likewise, empirical work has stressed the crucial role played by flexible working 
arrangements in the determination of absence decisions (Section 4). Salary levels also influence 
absence, but Section 5 illustrates that the direction of this association is uncertain. In most 
countries, the government and/or the employers provide employees with insurance against the 
loss of income due to sickness. A central theme in economic research concerns the negative 
effects of such insurance systems, especially when moral hazard arises (Section 6). As Section 7 
shows, workers not only face costs in terms of forgone income, which depend on the generosity 
of the insurance system, but also the possibility of sanctions by employers, ranging from slow 
career progression to dismissal. Labour demand factors also play a crucial role. The costlier 
absence is to employers, the more likely they are to respond. As Section 8 suggests, if absence is 
clearly connected with the working environment or the type of contract, the employer may 
attempt to improve it. Finally, Section 9 presents issues for future research and introduces the 
rest of the thesis. 
.   
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2. The income-leisure choice framework 
Economic theories on sickness absence have generally been analysed within the traditional 
income-leisure choice model (Allen, 1981; Leigh, 1985). Within this framework, individuals are 
assumed to maximize utility, which is a function of two components: consumption (which 
requires work) and leisure. Thus, an individual has a utility function of the form: 
ܷ ൌ ܷሺݔ, ݈ሻ           (1) 
where ݔ is a vector of consumption goods and ݈ is leisure time. 
The budget constraint of the worker is represented by: 
ݔ ൑ ܴ ൅ ݓ݄           (2) 
where ܴ is non-labour income, ݓ is real wage and ݄ is actual hours worked. 
Workers also face a time constraint, which assumes that total hours are the sum of leisure time 
(݈) and actual hours worked (݄): 
ܶ ൌ ݄ ൅ ݈           (3) 
The individual’s problem is to maximise equation (1) subject to constraints (2) and (3). Assuming 
positive but declining marginal utilities, the first-order equilibrium condition is:  
డ௎ሺ௫,௟ሻ/డ௟
డ௎ሺ௫,௟ሻ/డ௫ ൌ
௨೗ሺ௫∗,௟∗ሻ
௨ೣሺ௫∗,௟∗ሻ ൌ ݓ         (4) 
so that the marginal rate of substitution between consumption and leisure equals the economic 
rate of substitution (ݓ). Graphically, the individual maximises utility by moving to the point on 
the budget constraint that is tangential to his or her indifference curve. Thus, equilibrium 
appears as ܧ∗ ൌ ሺݔ∗, ݈∗ሻ, where both ݈∗ ൌ ܶ െ ݄∗ and ݄∗ represent the individual’s optimal 
labour supply decision (see Figure 1.1). 
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Further, as Johansson and Palme (1996) indicate, omitting the risk at the workplace may lead to 
biased estimates of the relationship between wages and absence. Indeed, when people accept a 
job, they not only accept a wage and a contracted number of work hours, but also a number of 
non-wage characteristics such as a higher level of risk at the workplace. The worker may accept 
these risks if he or she is rewarded by a higher wage. Thus, the compensating wage differential 
hypothesis predicts a positive relationship between wage rates and absence. This is because 
workers who choose a higher risk level at the workplace and receive, as a result, a compensating 
wage, are likely to have a higher rate of work absence for two reasons. First, the worker will try 
to minimize the exposure time to risk and hence he or she has greater incentives to be absent1. 
Secondly, workers who are exposed to higher risks also have a higher probability of being absent 
due to work-related illnesses or injuries.  
Empirical estimates of compensating differentials relied on a standard wage equation in which 
the wage rate is regressed on the fatality risk and a set of demographic and job characteristics of 
the worker – the so-called hedonic wage equation. This trade-off that workers make between job 
risks and additional pay has been interpreted as the value of a statistical life (VSL). Thus, the VSL 
is defined as the amount that the worker is willing to receive for accepting a job with a risk of 
death. Since Thaler and Rosen (1976) published the first estimation of the VSL based on the 
hedonic wage methodology, a wide body of literature has found a positive relationship between 
job risk and wage (Marin and Psacharopoulos, 1982; Viscusi, 1993; Albert and Malo, 1995; 
Viscusi and Aldy, 2003). 
6. Sickness insurance system and moral hazard 
The labour supply model can be expanded on building in compensation during absence. Such 
compensation can be seen as a form of insurance, which means that the employee does not have 
to bear the entire cost of absence. In most countries, the government and/or the employer 
provides employees with insurance against the loss of income owing to sickness. The effect of a 
simple sick pay scheme on the individual’s absence decision is illustrated in Figure 1.7. 
According to Brown and Sessions (1996), if we assume that the individual receives sick pay at the 
rate ݏ ൏ ݓ when he or she is on sick leave, then the individual faces two budget constraints: the 
conventional wage line increasing from right to left and then new sick pay line increasing from 
left to right. If the individual is on sick leave, then he or she moves to ܧଵ, where ݔ௦ െ ܴ is the 
sick payment. If the individual takes only a portion of his or her total time allocation as absence, 
then he or she moves along the budget constraint ሾܶ, ܧଵ, ܧ௖, ݈௖ሿ, with slope ݓ െ ݏ (Figure 1.7-
Panel A). 
Figure 1.7 shows how the provision of sick pay raises the incentive of the worker to be absent. 
With the introduction of a sick pay scheme at the rate ݏ ൏ ݓ the budget constraint of the 
individual will pivot at ܧ௖ to become ሾܶ, ܧଵ, ܧ௖, ݈௖ሿ. The introduction of a sick payment creates 
                                                            
1 The fact that risk-seekers may select themselves into risky occupations may partially reduce this effect (Viscusi, 
1998).  
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German reform in 19962 increased the overall share of private sector employees without any 
absence days between 6 and 8 per cent. Similarly, Puhani and Sonderhof (2010) estimated that 
the reduction in sick pay from 100 to 80 per cent of the wage decreased absence days by about 2 
days per annum on average – i.e. one per cent of annual working days in Germany.  
Likewise, several empirical studies have analysed the effects of changes in insurance 
compensation on workplace accident rates or on recovery time (Butler and Worral, 1983; 
Johnson and Ondrich, 1990; Bolduc et al., 2002; and Boden and Ruser, 2003). Most of the extant 
literature agrees that workers respond to economic incentives provided by workers’ 
compensation payments. In fact, several studies from the United States have shown that 
increases in the workers’ compensation insurance in the 80s were accompanied by an increase in 
work-related illnesses or injuries claims (Meyer et al. 1995; Butler et al., 1996). As Butler et al. 
(1998) indicated, these additional claims would be due to moral hazard since, in the absence of 
moral hazard, a change in benefits would not cause a systematic change in the claims. Indeed, 
using data from the National Council on Compensation Insurance available for 15 states from 
1980 to 1989, Butler et al. (1996) found evidence that moral hazard response explains most of 
the 30 per cent of the increase in the proportion of soft tissue injuries during the 1980s. 
In this vein, characteristics of labour market institutions can also lead to moral hazard behaviour 
by workers. For instance, Frick and Malo (2008) analysed the impact of institutions such as job 
protection legislation and sickness benefit systems on individual absenteeism. Using data for 14 
European countries, they found that employment protection does not influence the number of 
absence days while sickness benefits increase absenteeism. Likewise, the economic literature has 
analysed the link between sickness or workers’ compensation insurance and unemployment 
insurance. In particular, Lusinyan and Bonato (2007) stressed that the Swedish case is a good 
example of how the interaction of sickness insurance with unemployment insurance creates a 
perverse incentive for the unemployed to be listed as sick. Likewise, Fortin et al. (1999) showed, 
using data on more than 30,000 workers in the Canadian construction industry for the period 
1976-1986, that a reduction in the unemployment insurance replacement ratio is associated with 
an increase in the duration of claims due to severe accidents that are difficult to diagnose. 
Moreover, they also found that the duration of spells is much higher when an accident occurs in 
December, a month which corresponds to the beginning of the lay-off season in the 
construction sector.  
7. Non-economic or more long-term costs of absence 
The model depicted in last section assumes that the individual receives a sick pay at the rate 
ݏ ൏ ݓ, i.e. below his or her salary. Figure 1.8 plots this scenario where, assuming ݓ ൌ ݏ, the 
individual’s budget would be given by a rectangle ሾܶ, ܧଵᇱ , ܧ௖, ݈௖ሿ and, under standard convex 
preferences, the worker would have an incentive to absent himself/herself fully (Brown and 
Sessions, 1996).  
                                                            
2 The German Employment Promotion Act, which went into effect October 1, 1996, reduced the sick pay 
employees are entitled to claim from 100 to 80 per cent of gross wages during the first six weeks per sickness 
episode (see Ziebarth and Karlsson (2010) for more details). 
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system tend to coincide in time with economic recessions. As Henrekson and Persson (2004) 
indicates, the deep Swedish recession at the beginning of the 1990s, which caused 
unemployment to rise sharply and public-sector finances to deteriorate, forced the government 
to cut down on various welfare schemes, including sickness insurance.  
Likewise, it has been argued that workplace accident rates also exhibit a pro-cyclical nature. 
There are two explanations to this fact. Terrés de Ercilla et al. (2004) and Martín-Román (2006) 
argue that during economic upturns workers increase their effort level, which makes them less 
cautious regarding job safety. This fact would increase the total number of accidents as well as 
the incidence. On the other hand, Boone and van Ours (2006) argue that during the upturns 
workers are more likely to report job accidents because it would be easier to find a new job if 
they are fired for absenteeism. This increases reporting rates, and therefore incidence indexes. 
8. Labour demand considerations: costs to employers 
So far, this review has interpreted sickness absence exclusively from a labour supply perspective. 
However, just focusing on the behaviour of workers is only half the story and, therefore, the 
exclusion of labour demand considerations would lead to a poorly specified model. Indeed, as 
with all economic behaviour, it is the mutual interaction of supply and demand that is relevant. 
Nevertheless, to our knowledge, there is only one study that analyses work absence within a 
model that combines labour supply and labour demand, namely Lusinyan and Bonato (2007). 
Thus, following these authors, labour demand aspects could be incorporated in the analysis.  
So far, we have taken into consideration the worker’s maximization problem given by: 
max 	ܷ ൌ ܷሺݔ, ݈ሻ          (6) 
subject to: 
ݔ ൌ ܴ ൅ ܲሺ݈௔, ݒሻݓሺ݈௖ െ ߚ݈௔ሻ ൅ ሾ1 െ ܲሺ݈௔, ݒሻሿሾܤ ൅ ܩሿ     (7) 
ܶ ൌ ݈௖ ൅ ݈௔ ൅ ݄          (8) 
where ݔ is a vector of consumption goods; ݈ is leisure time; ܴ is non-labour income; ݓ is real 
wage; ݈௖ is contractual hours of work; ݈௔ is absence hours due to sickness; ߚ is the inverse of the 
sickness benefit replacement rate (ratio of sick pay to wage) such that ߚ ∈ ሾ0,1ሿ, with ߚ ൌ 0 
corresponding to the case when sickness absence is fully compensated (100 per cent replacement 
rate) and ߚ ൌ 1 when there is no compensation. ܤ is unemployment benefits; ܩ is firing-related 
entitlements and ܲሺ݈௔, ݒሻ is the probability of keeping the job –i.e. the inverse of the penalty for 
being absent. 	ܲሺ݈௔, ݒሻ is a function of absence behaviour (݈௔) and some business cycle 
characteristics (ݒ).  
Further, the firm chooses its desired input of hours of work maximising its profit function given 
by: 
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∏ 	 ൌ ܻ െ ܲሺ݈௔, ݒሻݓሺ݈௖ െ ߠߚ݈௔ሻ െ ሾ1 െ ܲሺ݈௔, ݒሻሿܩ      (9) 
where 
ܻ ൌ ܣ݇ଵିఈሺ݈௖ െ ݈௔ሻఈ          (10) 
is the production function, which depends on actual hours worked, ሺ݈௖ െ ݈௔ሻ, with the labour 
share being ߙ. Moreover, ߠ indicates if the sick pay is paid by the firm (ߠ ൌ 1) or by the 
government (ߠ ൌ 1/ߚ). From the first-order conditions of the optimization problems in 
equations (6)-(8) and (9)-(10) with respect to the absence hours (݈௔), the optimal wages for the 
worker and the firm are respectively: 
ݓௐ ൌ ௉೗ೌሺ஻ାீሻି
ೆ೗
ೆೣ
௉೗ೌሺ௟೎ିఉ௟ೌሻି௉ఉሻ
          (11) 
and 
ݓி ൌ ௒ೌ ି	௉೗ೌீ௉೗ೌሺ௟೎ିఏఉ௟ೌሻି௉ఏఉሻ         (12) 
In terms of the above model, the market mechanism will determine not only the observed 
absence, but also the system of absence control employed by the firm. As a result, observed 
variations in absence may be due to the behaviour of both the firm’s management, as well as its 
employees. Thus, a firm that faces high absence rates will likely respond with control 
mechanisms such as monitoring, fines, threats of dismissal, or increasing contractual flexibility. 
Likewise, if absence is clearly connected with the working environment, the employer may 
attempt to improve it. In fact, a number of studies show that firms that take a more proactive 
stance toward the development of comprehensive workplace risk prevention are more likely to 
have lower absence rates due to workplace accidents or occupational diseases (see inter alia 
Viscussi, 1979; McCaffrey, 1983; Curington, 1986; Gray and Scholz, 1993) 
There is extensive literature providing empirical evidence for the significance of contract type for 
absence decisions. Indeed, a number of studies have focused on the effect of temporary 
contracts on job accidents. Amuedo-Dorantes (2002) and Hernanz and Toharia (2006) find that 
fixed-term workers show a greater probability of having an accident due to the type of job they 
are undertaking, but not due to the fixed-term characteristic of their contract. Guadalupe (2003), 
on the contrary, finds that there exists a systematic difference between the accident rates of 
temporary and permanent workers which is not due to a composition effect. Finally, García-
Serrano et al. (2010) find that after controlling for a set of personal and professional 
characteristics, those workers working through a Temporary Help Agency (THAs) show lower 
probabilities of suffering from a severe accident, and exhibit a smaller duration of absence 
compared to their counterparts on non-THA temporary and open-ended contracts.  
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9. Moving forward 
Until very recently, sickness absence has received less attention than other areas of labour 
economics. However, there has been an upsurge of research both theoretical and empirical on 
the factors determining worker absenteeism. Given the socioeconomic costs of sickness absence, 
further research in this area is expected in the near future.  
As this chapter has shown, the traditional approach to explaining absenteeism is based on the 
conventional income-leisure choice model, where the difference between the number of 
contractual working hours and the number of desired working hours by workers at the going 
wages provides the motivation for absence. This traditional approach interprets sickness absence 
exclusively from a labour supply perspective. However, the exclusion of labour demand 
considerations leads to a poorly specified model. Indeed, the costlier absence is to employers, the 
more likely they are to respond. Though some progress has been made in incorporating demand 
side aspects to the analysis, this approach is still somewhat underdeveloped. Labour market 
institutions also play a crucial role: job security provisions and unemployment insurance reduce 
the expected cost of absenteeism to workers either by making it more difficult to sanction or by 
reducing the effective cost of the sanction. Only a reduced number of recently published studies 
look at the impact of the institutional framework on sickness absenteeism behaviour. Therefore, 
there are many avenues of research on worker absenteeism left to explore. 
This thesis aims to contribute to this growing body of knowledge on sickness absenteeism. As 
Section 2 of this chapter illustrated, the economic literature has stressed that labour supply 
factors such as gender and age are important in determining sickness absence, but, according to 
the empirical evidence, the effect of these two variables is uncertain. Chapter 2 and 3 aim to shed 
light on this debate by providing empirical evidence regarding the effect of gender and age, 
respectively, on sickness absence from work. In particular, Chapter 2 focuses on explaining 
gender differences in the incidence of sickness absence, as well as in the duration of sick leave, 
while Chapter 3 examines the impact of worker’s age on the consequences of occupational 
injuries. Furthermore, Sections 6, 7 and 8 of this chapter have described how demand side 
aspects, macroeconomic factors and labour market institutions also affect sickness absence. In 
this vein, Chapter 4 examines the contribution of socioeconomic factors and government 
intervention in occupational health and safety (OSH) in giving rise to spatial differences in the 
incidence of workplace accidents.  
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CHAPTER  2 Sickness absence from work in Spain: Are there gender differences? 
Sickness absence from work in Spain: Are there gender 
differences? 
1. Introduction 
Like most European countries, Spain’s public sickness insurance scheme is a major component 
of its social security system. In 2012, expenditure on public sickness benefits amounted to 
around 6 billion Euros, which accounted for 0.55 per cent of GDP4. But the cost of sick leave is 
larger than the amount paid to the sick worker while he or she is absent from work; production 
losses and health care outlays are also socioeconomic costs of sickness absence. Furthermore, we 
should bear in mind that some temporary sick or injured workers could become permanently 
disabled and hence leave the labour force. But surprisingly and despite its relevance for public 
policy, there appears to be a dearth of empirical consensus regarding the determinants of 
incidence and duration of absence from work due to illness.   
This chapter aims to shed light on gender differences in the incidence and duration of sickness 
absence. Previous studies have shown that, on average, women are more prone to be absent 
from work than men (Leigh, 1983; Paringer, 1983; Vistnes, 1997; Ichino and Moretti, 2009). One 
of the most plausible explanations for this fact is that women to a greater extent than men are 
exposed to the “double burden” of combining paid work with family responsibilities 
(Mastekaasa, 2000). However, there is not agreement in the literature on how this double burden 
–in particular, the presence of children in the household– affects the incidence and duration of 
sickness absence among women. While some studies found that the presence of children 
increased female absenteeism (Leigh, 1983; Scott and McClellan, 1990; Vistnes, 1997), others 
found that women with dependants were less likely to be absent (Paringer, 1983; VandenHeuvel 
and Wooden, 1995). 
In this chapter we take another look at gender differences in absenteeism, but we also add to the 
literature in several respects. First, unlike many previous studies we have distinguished between 
sickness absence due to common illness or non-work-related injury and occupational disease or 
work-related injury. Second, the empirical analysis in this study uses data on absence spells from 
work that are strictly certified by a physician, based on evidence of injury or illness. Other 
important advantages of the present data include: 1) the dataset is designed to be representative 
of the whole universe of workers and employers in Spain; 2) the database generates matched 
employer-employee information, so the analysis makes use of variables related to both the 
worker’s (labour supply) and the employer’s (labour demand) characteristics; 3) the matched 
                                                            
4 In 2006, the year for which this study was carried out, expenditure on public sickness benefits amounted to around 
8 billion Euros, which accounted for 0.8 per cent of GDP.  
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nature of the data and the fact that, for each individual in the sample, only one spell of 
employment with a specific employer is considered allows us to take into account unobserved 
firm heterogeneity; and 4) the longitudinal nature of the data (individuals are followed from the 
beginning of the employment relationship until the first sick leave spell starts and ends) allows us 
to take into account unobserved worker heterogeneity.  
We examine microdata from a sample of 294,316 individuals obtained from the 2006 wave of the 
Continuous Sample of Working Histories (CSWH), which was expanded with information on all 
sick leave spells covered by the Spanish sickness insurance scheme for the period 2005-2006. 
Thus, our research on the topic has been encouraged by the availability of data that take into 
account institutional settings and include labour supply and demand variables.  
The empirical analysis in this chapter is divided in two parts. First, we use a competing risk 
model approach to measure the time from the start of an employment contract to the first 
sickness absence spell in relation to each worker’s characteristics, i.e. we model the incidence of 
worker absence spells. Second, we estimate a single event duration model to examine how the 
worker’s characteristics affect the time to return to activity after a period of sick leave. We find 
that the presence of children under 3 years old in the household is one of the most important 
variables explaining the differences in sickness absence between women and men. Indeed, when 
there are children under 3 years in the household, the probability of sick leave due to common 
illness or injury for open-ended workers aged 25 to 39 within first 400 days of employment is 
roughly 10 per cent for men, but increases to 15 per cent in the case of women. Furthermore, we 
find that 8 per cent of the open-ended male workers aged 25 to 39 with children less than 3 years 
old return to work after a sick leave spell due to common illness or injury before the 5th day, 
while this percentage decreases to less than 6 per cent in the case of women.  
The chapter is organized as follows. In Section 2, we briefly describe the statutory sickness 
insurance system in Spain. Section 3 presents the data and how the sample was selected. Section 
4 presents empirical evidence on gender differences in the probability of sickness absence. 
Finally, Section 5 examines gender differences in the time to return to work after a period of sick 
leave. Conclusions are presented in Section 6. 
2. The Spanish sickness insurance scheme 
Spain has a compulsory sickness insurance scheme, which replaces lost earnings resulting from 
temporary health problems that prevented the insured worker from doing his or her regular job. 
The Spanish sickness insurance distinguishes between common disease or non-work-related 
injury and work-related injury or occupational disease. Indeed, sickness benefit in the case of 
non-work-related illness or accident and occupational sickness or injury differ with respect to 
their requirements; the recognition and duration of the right to sickness benefit; the entity in 
charge of the payment; and the amount of the compensation. Figure 2.1 summarizes the main 
characteristics of the Spanish compulsory sickness insurance and distinguishes between common 
diseases or non-work-related injury and work-related injury or occupational disease.  
25 
 
Figure 2.1   Main characteristics of the Spanish compulsory sickness insurance scheme 
Note: According to its initials in Spanish, INSS is the National Institute of the Social Security and MATEPSS is 
the Social Security Mutual Society for Work-Related Injuries and Occupational Diseases.  
Source: Own elaboration based on Ministry of Labour and Social Security. 
In Spain, all workers are entitled to benefits during sickness. Although no prior contribution 
periods are required in the case of occupational sickness or accident (regardless of being work-
related or not), the worker must have contributed for at least 180 days within the previous 5 
years in the case of common diseases. 
According to the Spanish system, absence from work due to sickness or injury requires 
certification by a physician. If an employee falls ill due to a common illness or non-work-related 
accident, the certificate needs to be reissued the 4th day of sick leave and every 7 days thereafter. 
On the other hand, in the case of occupational disease or injury, a medical confirmation report is 
required as of the 7th day in a spell and every 7 days thereafter.  
Benefit is calculated as a percentage of the worker’s daily contribution base in the month prior to 
the start date of sick leave. People who are sick due to a common illness or non-work-related 
accident are entitled to 60 per cent of the daily contribution base from day 4 to day 20, inclusive, 
and to 75 per cent from the 21st day on. During the first 3 days, the worker is not entitled to 
sickness insurance payments or salary, unless a relevant collective agreement establishes a 
workers' compensation or equivalent. In the case of work-related injury or occupational disease, 
the compensation level is 75 per cent from the day after the worker is on leave from work and 
throughout the sickness spell5, and is paid the first day by the employer as a normal working day.  
                                                            
5 In the case of work-related injury or occupational disease, the replacement level is calculated as a percentage of the 
worker’s daily contribution base for professional contingencies in the previous month and the daily contributions 
for overtime in the last 12 months.  
Days of sick leave 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 … 15 16 … 20 21 … 365
Who pays? Employer INSS or MATEPSS
Amount paid 60% of worker's daily contribution base 75%
Medical confirmation report X (Every 7 days from the 4th)
Days of sick leave 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 … 15 16 … 20 21 … 365
Who pays? INSS or MATEPSS
Amount paid
Medical confirmation report X (Every 7 days from the 7th)
Common illness or non‐work‐related injury
Work‐related injury or occupational disease
75% of worker's daily contribution base
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In the case of common illness or non-work-related accident, the employer is required to pay 
from day 4 to day 15, both inclusive; beyond that time, the National Institute of the Social 
Security (i.e., the public health insurance system) compensates absences for up to a year. If the 
cause of sickness is a work-related accident or an occupational injury, sickness compensation is 
provided by National Institute of the Social Security (INSS, according to its initials in Spanish) 6 
for a maximum period of one year. Thus, the maximum period of duration of sick leave is 365 
days, regardless of the cause. This period could be extended by 180 days when it is believed that 
the worker could be discharged from medical care during this time. Nevertheless, when the sick 
leave ends at the absolute maximum period of 545 days, the condition of the disabled individual 
must be examined within a maximum period of 3 months in order to determine their degree of 
permanent disability. In any case, the worker must return to work the day after medical 
discharge.  
It is important to note that some employees are subject to more generous sick pay rules as per 
collective bargaining agreements. For example, some workers are covered by collective 
bargaining contracts that guarantee them sick pay of 100 per cent of their wage during the first 
three days in the case of a non-work-related illness or injury. Moreover, there are special schemes 
for public-sector workers, domestic employees, self-employed workers, coal miners, and 
maritime workers.  
In the context of this study, it is important to mention that there are other social security 
provisions and benefits related to sick leave, namely maternity leave, risk pregnancy benefits, and 
risk during breastfeeding benefits. In Spain, women who have covered a minimum contribution 
period7 are entitled to paid maternity leave. In general, the maternity leave period will have an 
uninterrupted duration of 16 weeks, of which 6 weeks must be taken immediately after the 
child’s birth. Maternity benefits are 100 per cent of the worker’s daily contribution base. 
Likewise, women who are unable to work due to either risk during pregnancy or when 
breastfeeding a child under 9 months old are entitled to 100 per cent of the worker’s daily 
contribution base from the first day in the spell. In both cases, there is not required minimum 
contribution period.  
Our data on sick leave do not include information on either of these other situations. Since a 
woman who is unable to work may choose the best way to protect herself and the child, there 
may be a substitution among schemes in certain cases. This is important to bear in mind when 
interpreting the results of this study since the existence of these three schemes mentioned above 
reduces the probability that many of our recorded absence spells are directly related to child 
births.  
                                                            
6 Actually, payment is the responsibility of the National Institute of the Social Security or the Social Security Mutual 
Society for Work-Related Injuries and Occupational Diseases (MATEPSS, according to its initials in Spanish), 
depending on which is the competent Managing Body. 
7 The minimum contribution period depends on worker’s age. Thus, there is not required minimum contribution 
period for workers aged 21 or less. Nevertheless, workers aged 21 to 26 must have contributed for at least 90 days 
within the previous 7 years or 180 days over the entire working life. Finally, workers aged 27 or more must have 
contributed for at least 180 days within the previous 7 years or 360 days over the entire working life.  
27 
 
3. Data 
The individual data used in this study are obtained from the 2006 wave of the Continuous 
Sample of Working Histories (CSWH, Muestra Continua de Vidas Laborales in Spanish), which 
contains a sample of approximately 4 per cent of all those individuals who have been affiliated to 
the Spanish Social Security during the reference year (1,170,895 observations in 2006). The 
CSWH consists of data extracted from administrative records from the Social Security, the 
Municipal Registry of Inhabitants and the Spanish Tax Agency8.  
The CSWH provides information on personal characteristics of each individual in the sample –
such as gender, age, nationality and place of birth, as well as some additional information about 
the composition of his or her household, such as the number of children and their dates of birth. 
Moreover, the CSWH also contains information related to the professional characteristics of the 
individual, such as length of the employment period, type of contract, occupation, type of 
working day (part-time versus full-time) and monthly earnings. Finally, the CSWH provides 
information on employer’s characteristics, such as industry, sector (public versus private), and 
the number of workers in the firm. Therefore, the CSWH provides information on aspects of 
both labour supply and labour demand.  
To be able to observe the worker’s sick leave behaviour, the database was expanded with sick 
leave spell data for the period 2005-2006 from administrative records from Spanish Social 
Security System. Thus, this unique dataset contains information about all sick leave spells 
covered by the Spanish sickness insurance scheme. For each individual in the sample, we know 
the number of sick leave spells, the dates of entry and exit in sick leave, the type of sickness or 
injury (common or non-work-related versus occupational or work-related) and the entity 
responsible for the payment (National Institute of the Social Security or the Social Security 
Mutual Society for Work-Related Injuries and Occupational Diseases). 
Regarding the sample selection we perform for our analysis, we focus, for each individual, on the 
longest employment spell that started in 2005 within the Social Security General Regime. 
Focusing on a single spell of employment with a specific firm allows us to reduce the 
heterogeneity associated with the labour demand side. More importantly, however, job duration 
plays a crucial role in identifying the factors associated with the incidence of sick leave. Self-
employed workers are excluded from the sample because they are likely to have different 
incentives and possibilities to use (or not use) sick leave compensated by the Social Security 
system. The final sample consists of 294,316 individuals (161,218 male and 133,098 female), 
where 58,055 of them experienced at least one sickness absence spell during 2005-2006. 
Individuals are followed from their entry into employment until their first sick leave event, the 
end of the contract, or upon censoring (right censoring occurs when the study period ends on 
the last of December 2006.) The duration of the spells is measured in days. Background variables 
such as gender, age and place of birth, as well as information about the composition of the 
household are registered at the beginning of the spell. Spell characteristics are reported in Table 
                                                            
8 For a more detailed description about CSWH, see Durán (2007).  
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2.1. We see that out of 294,316 individuals, 43,017 experienced a sick leave due to common 
illness or non-work-related injury (14.6 per cent), 15,038 experienced a sick leave due to 
occupational illness or work-related injury (5.1 per cent), 180,972 experienced an exit due to the 
end of their contract (61.5 per cent) and the remaining 55,289 (18.8 per cent) were lost to follow-
up before any sick leave or end of contract. As Table 2.1 shows, 17.3 per cent of the spells in 
sick leave due to non-work-related illness or accident last less than 4 days, 55.2 per cent 
terminate in the following 26 days, and 27.5 per cent last more than 30 days. In the case of sick 
leave spells due to occupational disease or injury, 8.3 per cent last less than 4 days, 73.3 per cent 
end from day 4 to day 30, and 18.3 per cent last more than a month. However, there are 
differences across genders. Indeed, women have longer sick leave spells than men. In particular, 
the average number of non-working days due to common illness or non-work-related injury 
among women is 6.3 days higher than for men. Regarding occupational diseases or injuries, the 
average duration of the sick leave is also longer for women, but the difference is only in 0.8 days.  
Table 2.1   Spell characteristics 
Total Women Men 
Employment spell characteristics: 
Mean duration (days) 249.3 239.9 257.0
Proportion of spells ending in:  
Sick leave due to common illness or non-work-related injury 14.6% 16.5% 13.0%
Sick leave due to occupational illness or work-related injury 5.1% 2.7% 7.1%
End of contract 61.5% 63.3% 60.0%
Censored 18.8% 17.4% 19.9%
Sick leave spell characteristics: 
Sick leave due to common illness or non-work-related injury    
Mean duration (days) 44.0 47.1 40.8
Proportion of spells lasting:  
Less than 4 days 17.3% 16.9% 17.7%
From 4 to 30 days 55.2% 53.4% 57.2%
More than 30 days 27.5% 29.7% 25.1%
Censored 0.17% 0.17% 0.16%
Sick leave due to occupational illness or work-related injury    
Mean duration (days) 24.3 24.9 24.1
Proportion of spells lasting:  
Less than 4 days 8.3% 5.3% 9.3%
From 4 to 30 days 73.3% 74.5% 73.0%
More than 30 days 18.3% 20.2% 17.7%
Censored 0.03% 0.00% 0.04%
Source: Own elaboration based on CSWH.      
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4. Does being a woman increase the risk of sickness absence? 
4.1. Empirical strategy  
We are interested in measuring the time from the beginning of a job to the first spell of sickness 
absence and the type of sickness absence in relation to factors, such as being a woman. However, 
instead of a sick leave spell, we could observe the end of the contract. Thus, the end of the 
contract acts as a competing event that impedes the occurrence of the event of interest, i.e. 
sickness absence. This must not be confused with the usual right-censoring found in survival 
data, since, while subjects lost to follow-up are still at risk of sick leave, the end of a contract is a 
permanent condition that prevents future sick leave spells.  
Another important feature of our empirical strategy is the distinction between common disease 
or non-work-related injury and occupational illness or work-related injury. We explore 
empirically the different causes of sick leave in a dependent competing risk framework. When 
analysing the probability of sick leave due to common illness or non-work-related accident, the 
end of contract and sick leave due to occupational disease or injury will act as competing events. 
By contrast, when the probability of failure towards sick leave due to occupational disease or 
injury is the event of interest, end of contract and sick leave due to common illness or injury will 
treated as competing events.   
In our analysis, we are interested in estimating the cumulative incidence function for failure from 
each cause conditional on the covariates. In a competing risk setting9, cumulative incidence for a 
particular cause of failure is the probability of experiencing this cause of failure until time ݐ, in 
the presence of all the other possible causes. Thus, the cumulative incidence for the failure type 
݇ is estimated as follows: 
ܨ௞ሺݐሻ ൌ ∑ ߣ௞ሺݐ௜ሻܵሺݐ௜ିଵ௜|௧೔ஸ௧ ሻ         (1) 
where ߣ௞ሺݐ௜ሻ is the cause-specific hazard function defined as: 
ߣ௞ሺݐ௜ሻ ൌ ௗೖ೔௡೔            (2) 
i.e., the proportion of subjects at risk that fail due to cause ݇; and  ܵሺݐ௜ିଵሻ is the survival 
function defined as: 
ܵሺݐሻ ൌ 	∏ ቀ1 െ ∑ ௗೖ೔௡೔
௄௞ୀଵ ቁ ൌ௜|௧೔ஸ௧ ∏ ሺ1 െ ∑ ߣ௞ሺݐ௜ሻ௄௞ୀଵ ሻ௜|௧೔ஸ௧      (3) 
i.e., the probability of being event-free at ݐ௜. 
                                                            
9 The Kaplan-Meier (KM) method has been a widely used tool for estimating cumulative incidence function. 
However, as Gooley et al. (1999) stressed, in a competing risk framework, the KM estimates are biased. Indeed, KM 
overestimates the true failure probability because assumes that all events are independent and hence, censors events 
other than the event of interest.   
30 
 
The proportional hazards model based on the method of Fine and Gray (1999) provides a useful 
alternative to Cox regression (Cox, 1972) for survival data in the presence of competing risks. 
This method makes use of the hazard of subdistribution, which is a function of the cumulative 
incidence for the corresponding cause of failure and can be defined as:  
ߣ௞ሺݐ, ܺሻ ൌ lim୼௧→଴ ௉௥௢௕	ሺ௧	ஸ்ழ௧ା∆௧,ఌୀ௞	|்ஹ௧∪ሺ்ஸ௧∩ఌஷ௝ሻ,௑ሻ∆௧ ൌ
೏ಷೖሺ೟,೉ሻ
೏೟
ሺଵିிೖሺ௧,௑ሻሻ ൌ െ
ௗ	୪୭୥	ሺଵିிೖሺ௧,௑ሻ
ௗ௧  (4) 
where ܶ is the failure time; ߝ	 ∈ 	 ሺ1,…ܭሻ is the cause of failure (for which the ܭ causes are 
assumed to be observable) and ܺ is a ݌ ൈ 1 bounded time-independent covariate vector. 
This hazard function permits the calculation of the conditional probability that a subject with 
covariates ܺ fails in the interval ሺݐ ൅ ∆ݐሻ due to cause ݇-th, given that the subject was at risk just 
before time	ݐ௜; but also conditional to subjects who have failed from other causes before time ݐ, 
who are not really at risk at that time. 
Furthermore, Fine and Gray (1999) imposed a proportional hazards assumption on the 
subdistribution hazards: 
̅ߣ௞ሺݐ|ܺሻ ൌ 	 ̅ߣ௞,଴ሺݐሻ	݁ݔ݌ሼ்ܺሺݐሻߚ଴ሽ        (5) 
Therefore, the cumulative incidence function has the form:  
ܨ௞ሺݐ|ܺሻ ൌ 1 െ ݁ݔ݌ ቂെ׬ ߣ௞,଴ሺݏሻ݁ݔ݌ሼ்ܺሺݏሻߚ଴ሽ௧଴ ݀ݏቃ      (6) 
According to Fine and Gray (1999), the partial likelihood function is: 
ࣦሺߚሻ ൌ ∏ ቈ ఒೖ,బሺ்೔ሻ	௘௫௣൛௑೔೅ሺ்೔ሻఉൟ∆்೔∑ ఒೖ,బሺ்೔ሻ	௘௫௣ቄ௑ೕ೅ሺ்೔ሻఉቅ∆்೔ೕ∈ೃ೔ ቉
ூሺࣟ೔ୀ௜ሻ
ൌ	௡௜ୀଵ ∏ ቈ ௘௫௣൛௑೔
೅ሺ்೔ሻఉൟ
∑ ௘௫௣ቄ௑ೕ೅ሺ்೔ሻఉቅೕ∈ೃ೔
቉
ூሺࣟ೔ୀ௜ሻ
	௡௜ୀଵ   (7) 
and the logarithm of partial likelihood is 
݈݋݃ሼࣦሺߚሻሽ ൌ ∑ ܫሺߝ௜ ൌ ݅ሻ ൈ ൫ ௜்ܺ ሺ ௜ܶሻߚ െ ݈݋݃ൣ∑ ݁ݔ݌൛ ௝்ܺ ሺ ௜ܶሻߚൟ௝∈ோ೔ ൧൯௡௜ୀଵ    (8) 
We obtain ߚመ  by maximising ݈݋݃ሼࣦሺߚሻሽ.  
4.2. Descriptive analysis 
The descriptive analysis shows clear patterns in the data. A first glance at the data can be made 
using cumulative incidence curves of sickness absence. Figure 2.2 illustrates that there are strong 
differences in the cumulative incidences of each type of sickness absence. Indeed, the probability 
of sick leave due to common illness or non-work-related injury is always higher than that of sick 
leave due to occupational disease or injury. Looking at the graph, we immediately notice that 
being a woman increases the odds of sick leave due to common illness or non-work-related 
injury, but that men have a higher incidence of sickness absence due to occupational disease or 
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injury. Moreover, age also seems to play a crucial role explaining sickness absence. In fact, in 
Figure 2.2-Panel A, we observe that women older than 55 years have the highest incidence of 
sickness absence due to common illness or injury, followed by women aged 25 to 39. The high 
incidence of sick leave due to common illness or injury among women aged 25 to 39 may likely 
be due to the fact that this group accounts for most of the women with family responsibilities. 
On the other hand, age has the opposite effect on sick leave due to occupational disease or 
injury. Indeed, the youngest men (16-39) have the highest incidence of this type of sickness 
absence.  
Figure 2.2   Cumulative incidence curves of sickness absence by cause, gender and age 
Panel A.   Sickness absence due to common illness or non‐work‐related injury 
 
Panel B.   Sickness absence due to occupational illness or work‐related injury 
 
Source: Own elaboration based on CSWH. 
Women 16‐24
Women 25‐39
Women 40‐54
Women 55+
Men 16‐24
Men 25‐39
Men 40‐54
Men 55+
0%
6%
12%
18%
24%
0 5 10 15 20 25 30 35 40 45 50 55 60 65 70 75 80 85 90 95 100
Cu
m
ul
at
iv
e in
ci
de
nc
e
Follow‐up time (weeks)
Women 16‐24
Women 25‐39
Women 40‐54
Women 55+
Men 16‐24
Men 25‐39
Men 40‐54
Men 55+
0%
2%
4%
6%
8%
0 5 10 15 20 25 30 35 40 45 50 55 60 65 70 75 80 85 90 95 100
Cu
m
ul
at
iv
e in
ci
de
nc
e
Follow‐up time (weeks)
32 
 
Figure 2.3 depicts how the incidence of sick leave varies according to the age of the youngest 
person in the household. In fact, the presence of children under 3 years old is strongly correlated 
with female sick leave due to common disease or non-work-related injury. The relationship 
appears to be the opposite for the incidence of sick leave of men, namely, the presence of 
younger children reduces the probability of absence from work due to common illness or non-
work-related injury. In fact, among men, those who live in households where the youngest 
person is older than 20 have the highest probability of sick leave due to common disease or non-
work-related injury (Figure 2.3-Panel A). By contrast, for both women and men, the presence of 
children under 3 years old does not seem to have an impact on the incidence of sick leave due to 
occupational sickness or injury (Figure 2.3-Panel B).  
Figure 2.3   Cumulative incidence curves of sickness absence by cause, gender and group of age of the 
youngest person in the household 
Panel A.   Sickness absence due to common illness or non‐work‐related injury
Panel B.   Sickness absence due to occupational illness or work‐related injury 
Source: Own elaboration based on CSWH. 
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Figure 2.4 shows that, until a certain time of job tenure, the probability of sickness absence is 
higher in the case of fixed-term contracts and, from that moment on, the likelihood of sickness 
absence is greater in workers with open-ended contracts. After a year on the job, the probability 
of sickness absence of a fixed-term employee does not increase much because most temporary 
workers do not preserve their job under a fixed-term contract over a year. The exception is 
female sickness absence due to common illness or injury. In this case, we observe that the 
probability of absence is clearly higher in women with an open-ended contract than in the case 
of their counterparts with a fixed-term contract, regardless of the time that the worker has been 
in the job. This indicates that accounting for the type of contract is crucial when analysing the 
incidence of sick leave in Spain. For this reason, as we explain below, we estimate the cumulative 
incidence function according to the type of contract held by the worker. Indeed, the relationship 
between sickness absence and the type of contract is a question that extends beyond the scope of 
this study, but it does appear to deserve a study in its own right.  
Figure 2.4   Cumulative incidence curves of sickness absence by cause, gender and type of contract 
Panel A.   Sickness absence due to common illness or non‐work‐related injury 
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Panel B.   Sickness absence due to occupational illness or work‐related injury
 
Source: Own elaboration based on CSWH. 
4.3. Econometric analysis 
This section summarizes the main results of the econometric analysis carried out. An aggregate 
analysis is useful for the knowledge of general determinants of sickness absence, but it could 
hide particularities of determined groups. For this reason, we have estimated the model for 
different classifications. First, we have split up the workers between fixed-term and open-ended 
employees. Secondly, for each group, we have made the regressions for the total sample, as well 
as separately for male and female workers. As we show below, the outcomes confirm the 
relevance of these differentiations and therefore permit us to know the particular characteristics 
associated with the highest probability of occurrence of sickness absence. 
The explanatory variables in the empirical analysis include several individual’s personal and job 
characteristics: 
■ Gender and age 
As discussed in Chapter 1, the economic literature has stressed that variables such as gender and 
age are important in determining sickness absence. However, while a common finding in many 
of the studies on sickness absence is that females exhibit higher absence rates than males (Leigh, 
1983; Paringer, 1983; Vistnes, 1997), there is a debate in the literature about the effect of age on 
absenteeism. Indeed, some studies suggest that sickness absence increases with age (Paringer, 
1983; Dionne and Dostie, 2007) and others, in contrast, find a negative relationship between 
both variables (Allen, 1981).  
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To isolate the importance of worker’s gender and age as factors to explain sickness absence, we 
consider the interaction of both variables in the estimation of models for the total sample. The 
interactions are captured with the inclusion of seven dummy variables: women aged 16-24, 
women aged 25-39, women aged 40-54, women aged 55 or more, men aged 16-24, men aged 40-
54 and men aged 55 or more. The omitted category for comparisons is men aged 25-39.  
Nevertheless, when we do the estimation for both women and men separately, we introduce nine 
dummy variables of group of age: aged 16-19, aged 20-24, aged 25-29, aged 30-34, aged 40-44, 
aged 45-49, aged 50-54, aged 55-59 and aged 60-64. The omitted category in this case is aged 35-
3910.  
■ Family responsibilities 
The aim of this research is to study differences in sickness absence across genders. For this 
reason, it is important to have a measure of the household composition of the worker. We use as 
measure of family responsibilities the age of the youngest person who lives with the worker. We 
include five binary variables: workers who live alone, workers whose youngest household 
member is under 3 years old, workers whose youngest household member is aged 4 to 6, 
workers whose youngest household member is aged 7 to 11, and workers whose youngest 
household member is aged 12 to 19. The comparison category is those workers whose youngest 
cohabitant is aged 20 or more.  
With the aim of capturing possible differences between male and female in sickness absence 
which are linked directly with the presence of children in the household, we create the next two 
dummy variables: males aged 25-39 whose youngest household member is under 3 years old and 
females aged 25-39 whose youngest household member is under 3 years old.  
■ Health 
A deterioration in an individual’s overall health status is expected to increase the probability of 
sickness absence. Indeed, the estimation of those authors who introduce health variables in their 
absence models (Allen, 1981; Leigh, 1983; Paringer, 1983) show that these variables have usually 
been the most important variables in explaining absenteeism. We use the level of disability of the 
worker as a proxy of the health status. We have added two dummy variables: people with a level 
of disability between 33 and 64 per cent and people with a level of disability of 65 per cent or 
more. The comparison category is those workers without a disability.  
■ Social Security contribution group 
In our database, we do not have available information about education level and occupation. 
Rather, we use the Social Security contribution group as a proxy for both. The contribution 
group is created on the basis of professional category and the education level attained. We have 
                                                            
10 While we introduce nine dummy variables of group of age when we do the estimation for both women and men 
separately, we only take into account four groups of age when we estimate the model for the total sample. The 
reason for consider fewer groups of age in the estimation for the total sample is that the interaction of gender and 
age divided in nine intervals would lead to some categories with only a few number of observations and, therefore, 
with a high probability of being insignificant.  
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created ten dummy variables, one for each one of the Social Security contribution groups: 
engineers and other university graduates, engineering technicians and other skilled workers, 
administrative chiefs and managers, assistants and other semi-skilled workers, skilled clerks, 
assistant clerks, skilled labourers, semi-skilled labourers, and unskilled labourers. The omitted 
category for comparison is skilled clerks.  
■ Firm size 
With regard to how the firm size influences sickness absence, Vistnes (1997) suggests that 
workers in larger firms feel a sense of alienation and may be more likely to be absent from work 
than workers in small firms. There are more personal employer-employee relationships in a small 
business that could promote a higher identification with the goals of the company and could 
thereby reduce the workers’ absenteeism. However, the impact of firm size on sickness absence 
due to occupational diseases or work-related injuries could be completely different. Small 
companies usually have a lower number of resources to use in training and labour security. On 
the other hand, the law establishes how employees have to participate in the decisions of 
prevention of workplace risks. This legislation does not include firms with less than six 
employees. We have created six dummy variables to describe the size of the company: 0-50 
employees, 51-100 employees, 101-300 employees, 301-600 employees, 601-1,000 employees and 
more than 5,000 employees. The group of reference is 1,001-5,000 employees.  
■ Earnings11 
As indicated in Chapter 1, the impact of wages on absenteeism is ambiguous due to the income 
and substitution effects. When the paid sick leave represents 100 per cent of the wage, the 
substitution effect disappears and, so, the effect of wage on sick leave is positive. However, in 
the Spanish system the paid sick leave does not represent 100 per cent of the wage (as described 
in Section 2). In order to study whether the income or substitution effect has a higher impact, we 
have introduced a dummy variable for each one of the five salary quintiles with quintile 3 as the 
omitted category.  
■ Working hours 
Empirical work has stressed the crucial role played by working time flexibility – measured, for 
instance, by the share of part-time employment – in the determination of absence decisions. For 
example, Dionne and Dostie (2007) found that workers who worked on a reduced work week 
had a lower incidence of absenteeism. Moreover, when the number of weekly hours of work is 
high, the probability of work and family conflict will be higher. For this reason, it is necessary to 
take into account the differences between workers in the number of working hours. So, when we 
study the probability of sick leave appears, we introduce a binary variable that is coded 1 if the 
worker has part-time work. 
■ Labour-market experience  
                                                            
11 The variable earnings used in this analysis is the workers’ contribution base, which generally corresponds to real 
monthly wages without overtime.  
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There are two sets of variables to account for the previous experience of the worker. To study 
sick leave, the first set of variables was obtained by dividing actual experience (days worked) by 
potential experience (days since the date of first job) up to the first day of the job in question. 
There are three qualitative cases: 1) The job studied is the first one (the ratio of actual to 
potential experience does not apply); 2) the job that precedes the one studied is too short to be 
considered but is close to the one studied; and 3) the prior job is short and ended more than 
three years before the one studied. Five additional cases are based on intervals of the percentage 
calculated as indicated: 4) 1-25; 5) 26-50; 6) 51-75; 7) 76-100; 8) 101-200+. The omitted case is 
76-100. 
The second set is simply the number of contracts that the worker had held before the job in our 
analysis: 0-10 (omitted); 11-20; and 21 or more.  
We have also introduced a set of control variables such as worker’s place of birth, the region 
where the worker lives, the economic activity and the legal form of the company, and the day 
and month of entry into employment.  
Table 2.2 presents the competing risk regression results separated by type of contract and cause 
of sick leave. The values in the table represent the change in the odds of being absent from work 
due to sickness for a one-unit change in the explanatory variable. A value below 1 means that the 
likelihood of sickness absence is lower than that of a worker in the comparison group with all 
other factors held constant. A value above 1 means that the likelihood of sickness absence of 
workers who fall into that category is higher than those in the comparison group with all other 
factors held constant. The greater the difference between the indicated value and 1 is, the 
stronger the effect of the variable. Estimates that reach a significant probability level are denoted 
by asterisks; the standard errors are shown in parentheses. As evidenced by the large values on 
the likelihood ratio tests (as shown on the bottom of the tables), the overall explanatory power 
of the models is highly significant. The first four columns are estimates based on the full sample, 
the following four columns offer the results for female workers, and the last four columns for 
male workers. To preserve space, Table 2.2 reports the results involving only our main variables 
of interest (the full results are shown in Table A2.1  of the Appendix).  
Considering the separate analyses of sickness absence by cause, we can quickly observe that the 
effects of worker’s characteristics do indeed vary significantly between sick leave due to common 
illness or injury and sick leave due to occupational disease or accident. Thus, the general finding 
in the literature suggesting that women are more prone to absence (Leigh, 1983; Paringer, 1983; 
Vistnes, 1997) only holds for sick leave due to common illness or injury. In fact, women have 
lower risk of sick leave due to occupational disease or injury than men.  
In the case of sick leave due to common illness or injury, differences in the type of contract are 
found to influence sickness absence behaviour of women in particular. Indeed, the risk of 
sickness absence due to common illness or injury of a woman with an open-ended contract is 
about four times higher than that of a woman with a fixed-term contract. We also find that the 
effects of age on sickness absence vary significantly between women and men. While we observe 
a U-shaped relationship of age with sickness absence due to common illness or injury in the case 
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of women with open-ended contract (a result consistent with Allen (1984) and Leigh (1991)), the 
risk of sick leave decreases with the worker’s age for men, regardless of the type of contract.  
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Table 2.2   Estimation results of competing risk models on the probability of suffering a sickness absence. Main variables   
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Gender and age (ref. Men aged 25-39)               
Women aged 16-24 1.18 (0.03)** 
0.68 
(0.03)** 
1.72 
(0.06)** 
0.88 
(0.06) 
          
Women aged 25-39 1.21 (0.03)** 
0.66 
(0.03)** 
1.43 
(0.04)** 
0.66 
(0.04)** 
          
Women aged 40-54 1.17 (0.03)** 
0.62 
(0.03)** 
1.58 
(0.05)** 
0.61 
(0.04)** 
          
Women aged 55 or more 1.12 (0.07) 
0.61 
(0.09)** 
1.93 
(0.11)** 
0.62 
(0.08)** 
          
Men aged 16-24 1.21 (0.03)** 
1.08 
(0.03)** 
1.45 
(0.05)** 
1.29 
(0.06)** 
          
Men aged 40-54 0.90 (0.02)** 
0.86 
(0.03)** 
1.00 
(0.03) 
0.76 
(0.04)** 
          
Men aged 55 or more 1.03 (0.05) 
0.76 
(0.05)** 
1.11 
(0.06) 
0.80 
(0.07)* 
          
Age of the youngest cohabitant (ref. 
Aged 20 or more) 
              
Missing 1.01 (0.04) 
1.02 
(0.05) 
0.90 
(0.05) 
1.05 
(0.09) 
 1.09 
(0.07) 
0.84 
(0.12) 
0.99 
(0.08) 
1.08 
(0.20) 
 0.97 
(0.05) 
1.05 
(0.06) 
0.85 
(0.07) 
1.05 
(0.11) 
Live alone 1.05 (0.02)* 
1.02 
(0.03) 
1.03 
(0.03) 
1.06 
(0.05) 
 1.05 
(0.03) 
1.09 
(0.08) 
1.03 
(0.04) 
1.05 
(0.10) 
 1.05 
(0.03) 
1.00 
(0.04) 
1.02 
(0.04) 
1.08 
(0.06) 
Aged 0-3 1.37 (0.05)** 
1.13 
(0.06)* 
1.35 
(0.06)** 
1.01 
(0.09) 
 1.85 
(0.05)** 
0.91 
(0.07) 
1.87 
(0.06)** 
0.90 
(0.09) 
 1.08 
(0.03)** 
1.13 
(0.04)** 
1.09 
(0.04)* 
1.07 
(0.06) 
Aged 4-6 1.14 (0.03)** 
1.08 
(0.05) 
1.15 
(0.04)** 
1.17 
(0.07)* 
 1.23 
(0.05)** 
1.03 
(0.09) 
1.27 
(0.06)** 
1.08 
(0.13) 
 1.08 
(0.04) 
1.08 
(0.05) 
0.98 
(0.06) 
1.22 
(0.09)* 
Aged 7-11 1.09 (0.03)** 
1.17 
(0.04)** 
1.10 
(0.03)** 
1.08 
(0.06) 
 1.09 
(0.04)* 
1.13 
(0.09) 
1.13 
(0.05)** 
1.17 
(0.13) 
 1.12 
(0.04)** 
1.17 
(0.05)** 
1.04 
(0.05) 
1.06 
(0.08) 
Aged 12-19 1.01 (0.02) 
1.05 
(0.03) 
1.09 
(0.03)** 
1.21 
(0.05)** 
 0.99 
(0.03) 
1.02 
(0.06) 
1.13 
(0.04)** 
1.26 
(0.10)** 
 1.04 
(0.03) 
1.03 
(0.04) 
1.01 
(0.04) 
1.20 
(0.07)** 
People aged 25-39 with children aged 
under 3 
              
Female 1.35 (0.06)** 
0.73 
(0.07)** 
1.44 
(0.08)** 
0.83 
(0.11) 
          
Male 0.79 (0.04)** 
1.01 
(0.07) 
0.83 
(0.05)** 
1.09 
(0.12) 
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Degree of disability (ref. No disability)               
From 33% to 64% 1.95 (0.09)** 
1.32 
(0.11)** 
1.87 
(0.11)** 
1.27 
(0.15)* 
 2.14 
(0.17)** 
1.73 
(0.32)** 
2.10 
(0.19)** 
1.23 
(0.29) 
 1.86 
(0.10)** 
1.28 
(0.12)** 
1.71 
(0.13)** 
1.31 
(0.18)* 
65% or more 2.59 (0.29)** 
0.91 
(0.29) 
1.80 
(0.27)** 
0.73 
(0.33) 
 2.59 
(0.44)** 
0.40 
(0.40) 
1.51 
(0.37) 
1.26 
(0.91) 
 2.58 
(0.37)** 
1.12 
(0.38) 
2.05 
(0.38)** 
0.63 
(0.37) 
Social Security contribution group (ref. 
Skilled clerks) 
              
Engineers and other university graduates 0.80 (0.04)** 
0.49 
(0.08)**
0.61 
(0.03)**
0.41 
(0.06)**
 0.87 
(0.05)*
0.41 
(0.10)** 
0.67 
(0.04)**
0.80 
(0.16)
 0.69 
(0.06)**
0.69 
(0.14)
0.57 
(0.04)**
0.29 
(0.06)**
Engineering technicians and other skilled 
workers 
1.00 
(0.05) 
0.70 
(0.09)** 
0.81 
(0.04)** 
0.54 
(0.08)** 
 1.03 
(0.05) 
0.69 
(0.11)* 
0.83 
(0.05)** 
0.73 
(0.15) 
 0.89 
(0.08) 
0.77 
(0.15) 
0.83 
(0.07)* 
0.41 
(0.10)** 
Administrative chiefs and managers 0.60 (0.05)** 
0.93 
(0.14) 
0.72 
(0.04)** 
0.64 
(0.09)** 
 0.62 
(0.07)** 
0.63 
(0.19) 
0.65 
(0.05)** 
0.44 
(0.13)** 
 0.60 
(0.07)** 
1.33 
(0.24) 
0.79 
(0.06)** 
0.83 
(0.13) 
Assistants and other semi-skilled workers 0.80 (0.05)** 
1.24 
(0.15) 
0.86 
(0.05)** 
1.19 
(0.15) 
 0.83 
(0.06)* 
0.90 
(0.18) 
0.91 
(0.07) 
0.73 
(0.17) 
 0.77 
(0.08)** 
1.70 
(0.27)** 
0.85 
(0.06)* 
1.61 
(0.24)** 
Semi-skilled clerks 1.03 (0.05) 
1.70 
(0.16)**
1.16 
(0.07)**
1.88 
(0.18)**
 1.01 
(0.05)
1.44 
(0.18)** 
1.18 
(0.08)*
1.37 
(0.20)*
 1.07 
(0.09)
2.04 
(0.28)**
1.18 
(0.09)*
2.42 
(0.32)**
Assistant clerks 1.05 (0.04) 
0.91 
(0.08) 
0.97 
(0.03) 
1.06 
(0.09) 
 1.00 
(0.04) 
0.79 
(0.08)* 
0.95 
(0.04) 
0.87 
(0.09) 
 1.11 
(0.08) 
0.95 
(0.13) 
1.00 
(0.07) 
1.14 
(0.16) 
Skilled labourers 1.10 (0.04)** 
2.28 
(0.16)** 
1.18 
(0.04)** 
2.73 
(0.19)** 
 1.01 
(0.05) 
1.47 
(0.16)** 
1.13 
(0.06)* 
1.66 
(0.19)** 
 1.17 
(0.07)* 
3.01 
(0.32)** 
1.21 
(0.06)** 
3.47 
(0.34)** 
Semi-skilled labourers 1.16 (0.04)** 
2.19 
(0.16)** 
1.30 
(0.05)** 
2.49 
(0.19)** 
 1.05 
(0.04) 
1.51 
(0.15)** 
1.16 
(0.06)** 
1.67 
(0.19)** 
 1.26 
(0.08)** 
2.95 
(0.32)** 
1.46 
(0.08)** 
3.23 
(0.34)** 
Unskilled labourers 1.16 (0.04)** 
2.28 
(0.16)**
1.28 
(0.05)**
2.87 
(0.21)**
 1.03 
(0.04)
1.72 
(0.16)** 
1.14 
(0.05)**
1.85 
(0.20)**
 1.27 
(0.08)**
2.96 
(0.32)**
1.38 
(0.08)**
3.73 
(0.39)**
Wage quintile (ref. Quintile 3)               
Quintile 1 1.09 (0.03)** 
0.99 
(0.04) 
0.92 
(0.03)** 
0.73 
(0.04)** 
 1.11 
(0.04)** 
1.08 
(0.08) 
0.95 
(0.04) 
0.76 
(0.07)** 
 1.08 
(0.04)* 
0.99 
(0.05) 
0.83 
(0.05)** 
0.66 
(0.06)** 
Quintile 2 1.09 (0.02)** 
0.96 
(0.03)
1.06 
(0.03)*
0.92 
(0.04)
 1.17 
(0.04)**
1.24 
(0.08)** 
1.08 
(0.04)*
0.93 
(0.07)
 1.03 
(0.03)
0.88 
(0.03)**
1.04 
(0.04)
0.89 
(0.05)*
Quintile 4 0.95 (0.02)** 
1.02 
(0.03) 
1.07 
(0.03)* 
1.01 
(0.04) 
 0.94 
(0.03) 
1.03 
(0.08) 
1.02 
(0.04) 
0.85 
(0.08) 
 0.96 
(0.02) 
1.02 
(0.03) 
1.10 
(0.04)* 
1.07 
(0.05) 
Quintile 5 0.88 (0.02)** 
0.93 
(0.03)* 
1.03 
(0.03) 
0.89 
(0.05)* 
 0.85 
(0.03)** 
0.79 
(0.08)* 
0.99 
(0.04) 
0.53 
(0.06)** 
 0.90 
(0.03)** 
0.96 
(0.04) 
1.06 
(0.04) 
1.02 
(0.06) 
Number of observations 206,068 87,991  91,389 41,570  114,679 46,421 
Log-likelihood value -315,081.8 -122,399.6 -183,624.4 -51,163.1  -140,908.2 -24,953.6 -95,285.1 -14,196.0  -155,753.3 -91,869.3 -76,761.1 -33,999.0 
Notes: Standard Errors in parentheses. Significance levels: *significant at 5 per cent; **significant at 1 per cent. 
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Regarding sick leave due to occupational disease or accident, although differences in the risk of 
sickness absence by type of contract are less pronounced, workers with an open-ended contract 
have a higher risk of sickness absence. This finding is in greater agreement with García-Serrano 
et al. (2010), than with Guadalupe (2003). Furthermore, we observe that the probability of sick 
leave due to occupational accident or illness decreases with the worker’s age, regardless of gender 
and type of contract. Thus, open-ended employees aged 16-24 are the workers with the highest 
risk of sick leave due to occupational disease or injury.  
One of the largest effects we found for female sickness absence due to common illness or injury 
is the presence of children in the household. In fact, the presence of children under 3 years old 
increases the risk of female sickness absence in more than 85 per cent, regardless of the type of 
contract. However, the presence of children younger than 3 years old does not have a significant 
impact on female sickness absence due to occupational disease or accident. We can affirm that 
this result is in contradiction with the role conflict or overload theories (Verbrugge, 1983; Arber 
et al., 1985), which affirm that the presence of family responsibilities has a negative impact on 
women’s health. If this hypothesis were true, it would be expected that the presence of children 
in the household would also have an impact on the probability of sick leave due to occupational 
illness or injury.  
While the presence of children under 3 in the household has a substantial impact on the average 
probability of women being absent from work, the effect of this presence is barely significant for 
men, suggesting little substitution across the sexes in caring for children. Further, when we 
consider only individuals aged 25 to 39, women whose youngest child is younger than 3 are 
between 35 to 44 per cent –depending on they held a fixed-term or an open-ended contract, 
respectively– more likely to be absent. By contrast, men aged 25 to 39 with children aged under 3 
are about 20 per cent less likely to be sickness absent, regardless of the type of contract.  
With respect to the measure of health status, disability significantly increases the probability of 
sickness absence for both sexes, though more so for women than for men. In addition, a 
disability also increases more the likelihood of sickness absence due to common illness or injury 
than as a result of occupational disease or accident.  
Regarding the Social Security contribution group, we observe that high-skilled workers are less 
likely to be absent due to common illness or injury than their low-skilled counterparts. This gap 
remains in the results from the separate analyses of absence by gender, although this is less 
accentuated among women. This highest probability of low-skilled workers to be absent due to 
common illness or injury could be due to a number of factors. First, we could conclude that 
high-skilled workers usually have leading positions in the firm, which may make them feel a 
greater sense of alienation than their counterparts in non-leading positions. However, the results 
could also reflect differences in sickness absences explained by different socioeconomic statuses. 
In fact, the Social Security contribution group is closely related to socioeconomic status, and 
there is a large body of evidence showing that lower socioeconomic status is associated with 
higher mortality and sickness absence (Diderichsen, 1990; North et al., 1993).  
Nevertheless, where there is a dramatic difference between high- and low-skilled workers is in 
the probability of sickness absence due to occupational disease or illness, particularly for men. In 
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5. Gender differences in the duration of sick leave 
Another important aspect of this study in addition to the incidence of sickness absence is its 
duration. Under some probability of sickness absence, if the average duration of these periods is 
higher or lower, their quantitative impact and their consequences on public policies for reducing 
the problem will be different. In the previous section, we observed that some workers’ 
characteristics have an impact on the probability of sickness absence. If the workers who are 
more prone to suffer a sickness absence also have a higher duration of absence, we can assert 
that the relevance of the problem multiplies. So, an exhaustive analysis of the relevance of 
sickness absence needs to take into account both its incidence and its duration. In order to 
explore this issue, we examine here the time to return to activity after a period of sick leave.  
In the first step, a preliminary descriptive analysis of the sick leave spells is produced using 
hazard functions. The hazard ratio, or the probability of failure at a certain time, is the 
conditional probability of returning to job after sick leave at that time, given that an individual 
has not had this event just prior to that time. Figure 2.6 and Figure 2.7 plot these hazard rates, 
taking into account different worker’s characteristics.  
Looking at Figure 2.6, we can observe that institutional settings play a crucial role on the 
duration of sickness absence. In fact, Figure 2.6 reveals that many exits from activity occur at 
seven-day intervals (starting on 5th day in the case of sick leave due to common illness or injury 
and on 8th day in the case of sick leave due to occupational disease or accident), corresponding to 
the day after the medical certificate needs to be reissued. On the other hand, most sick leave 
spells end within the first 10 days, as overall sick leave spells due to occupational disease or 
injury are typically longer. Given the shapes of these estimated baseline hazards, it seems clear 
that fitting a Weibull hazard would be appropriate12.  
Further, Figure 2.6 shows that there are differences across causes of sickness absence, and also 
between women and men. In fact, for each moment in time, the hazard rate of return to work 
after sick leave is higher for men than for women, especially in the case of sickness absence due 
to common illness or injury. This means that the duration of sick leave spells, in general, is 
longer for women. 
                                                            
12 The Weibull distribution is suitable for modelling data with monotone hazard rates that either increase or decrease 
exponentially with time.  
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Figure 2.6   Hazard rates of returning to work by cause of sick leave and gender 
Panel A.   Sickness absence due to common illness or non‐work‐related injury 
 
Panel B.   Sickness absence due to occupational illness or work‐related injury 
 
Source: Own elaboration based on CSWH. 
As regards how family responsibilities can affect the sickness absence duration, we also observe 
important differences across genders. Figure 2.7 depicts that for men the presence of children 
reduces the duration of sickness absences due to common illness or injury in comparison with 
men who live alone. In the case of women, while the presence of children between ages 4 and 6 
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reduces the duration of sickness absence, the presence of children aged between 0 and 3 
increases it. 
Figure 2.7     Hazard  rates of returning  to work after sick  leave due to common  illness or non‐work‐
related injury by gender and age group of the youngest person in the household 
Source: Own elaboration based on CSWH. 
5.1. Empirical Strategy 
This study applies a duration model to estimate the hazard of ending the spell of sickness 
absence. Specifically, we study how a set of covariates has an impact on the probability of 
returning to the workplace when a worker has a sickness absence.  
We express the hazard rate as a function of both time and the explanatory variables, following 
the proportional hazard model: 
ߣሺݐ, ܺሻ ൌ 	 ߣ଴ሺݐሻ expሺݔߚሻ         (10) 
where ߣ଴ሺݐሻ is the baseline hazard. We choose the Weibull model, where the baseline hazard is: 
ߣ଴ ൌ ݌ݐ௣ିଵ expሺߚ଴ሻ          (11) 
So, the hazard function in the Weibull model can be expressed as following: 
ߣሺݐ, ܺሻ ൌ 	݌ݐ௣ିଵ expሺߚ଴ ൅ ݔߚሻ        (12) 
Now, we introduce the unobserved heterogeneity in the model (“frailty”). The frailty hazard rate 
may be written as: 
ߣሺݐ, ܺ|ݒሻ ൌ 	ߣሺݐ, ܺሻ. ݒ ൌ ߣ଴ሺݐሻ expሺݔߚሻ . ݒ ൌ ߣ଴ሺݐሻ expሺݔߚ ൅ ݑሻ    (13) 
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Where ݒ is a random variable of positive values, with the mean normalised to one and finite 
variance	ߪଶ; ߣ଴ሺݐሻ is the baseline hazard function; and ݑ ≡ ln	ሺݒሻ is a random variable with a 
mean of zero. A crucial assumption in these models is that ݒ is distributed independently of ܺ 
and ݐ. 
Taking this into account, the frailty hazard function in the Weibull model is: 
ߣሺݐ, ܺ|ݒሻ ൌ 	݌ݐ௣ିଵ expሺߚ଴ ൅ ݔߚ ൅ ݑሻ       (14) 
As Allison (1982) indicated, the problem in these models is that ܶ is not observed for the 
censored cases. However, the method of maximum likelihood allows the full use of the 
information available for these cases. The general likelihood equation for censored data is: 
ࣦ ൌ ∏ ሾ݂ሺݐ௜ሻሿఋ೔	௡௜ୀଵ ሾ1 െ ܨሺݐ௜ሻሿଵିఋ೔        (15) 
In this likelihood equation, we observe that each individual contributes with the density function 
if the duration is complete and with the survival function (1 minus the cumulative distribution 
function) if the duration is censored. Because the function depends on the vector of covariates, 
we can express the earlier equation as: 
ࣦ ൌ ∏ ሾߣሺݐ௜, ݔ௜|ݒሻሿఋ೔	௡௜ୀଵ ሾ1 െ ܨሺݐ௜, ݔ௜|ݒሻሿଵିఋ೔      (16) 
Taking that into account, the survival function can be expressed as: 
ܵሺݐ, ܺ|ݒሻ ൌ ݁ݔ݌ ቀെ׬ ߣሺݏ, ݔ௜|ݒሻ	݀ݏ௧଴ ቁ ൌ ݁ݔ݌ ቀെݒ ׬ ߣሺݏ, ݔ௜ሻ	݀ݏ
௧
଴ ቁ    (17) 
We can observe that, as the hazard is a function of the frailties, so too is the survival function 
conditional on both the covariates and the frailty term. 
To derive the expected value of the survival function, we need to specify a probability 
distribution for ݒ௜ [݃ሺݒሻ]. We consider that frailty follows a Gamma distribution. Now, the 
expected survival function can be derived from the hazard rate as follows: 
ܵሺݐሻ ൌ ܧሾܵሺݐ, ܺ|ݒሻሿ ൌ ܧ ቂ݁ݔ݌ ቀെݒ ׬ ߣሺݏ, ݔ௜ሻ	݀ݏ௧଴ ቁቃ ൌ ܮ ቂ݁ݔ݌ ቀ׬ ߣሺݏ, ݔ௜ሻ	݀ݏ
௧
଴ ቁቃ  (18) 
where ܮ is the Laplace transformation. The use of the Laplace transformation is required to 
integrate out the distribution of the unobserved frailty.  
So, the cumulative distribution function is: 
ܨሺݐ௜, ݔ௜|ݒሻ ൌ 1 െ ܵሺݐሻ ൌ 1 െ ܮ ቂ݁ݔ݌ ቀ׬ ߣሺݏ, ݔ௜ሻ	݀ݏ௧଴ ቁቃ     (19) 
This allows the likelihood function to be expressed entirely in terms of the frailty hazard rate: 
ࣦ ൌ ∏ ሾߣሺݐ௜, ݔ௜|ݒሻሿఋ೔	௡௜ୀଵ ܮ ቂ݁ݔ݌ ቀ׬ ߣሺݏ, ݔ௜ሻ	݀ݏ௧଴ ቁቃ      (20) 
Finally, we obtain the estimated parameters maximising ࣦ. 
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As before, we have estimated the model for the total sample, as well as for women and men 
separately. Basically, we have included the same explanatory variables as those in the model for 
analysing the probability of sick leave. Nevertheless, instead of controlling for the day of the 
week and the month of entry into employment, we have introduced dummy variables for each 
day of the week and month in which the sick leave spell starts. Moreover, we have also 
controlled for the tenure in employment before the sick leave event, as well as the entity in 
charge of the payment (i.e. National Institute of the Social Security or the Social Security Mutual 
Society for Work-Related Injuries and Occupational Diseases).  
5.2. Summary of results 
The regression results for the total sample and for men and women separately, can be found in 
Table 2.3. This table contains the estimated hazard ratios. Hazard ratios at each survival time are 
related to absolute differences in characteristics: 
௛ሺ௧,௑భሻ
௛ሺ௧,௑మሻ ൌ ݁ݔ݌ሾߚ′ሺ ଵܺ െ ܺଶሻሿ         (21) 
Hazard ratios are interpreted as follows. A value below (above) 1 means that the likelihood of 
transit from sick leave back to work is lower (higher) than that of a worker in the comparison 
group with all others covariates held constant.  
In this section, we present the main results. As in the previous section, we will focus exclusively 
on the main variables affecting gender differences on sick leave duration, and omit the effects of 
other explanatory variables. The full estimation results for all variables are available in Table A2.2 
of the Appendix.  
From the estimation results, we find that overall sick leave spells due to occupational disease or 
injury are longer than those due to common illness or accident for women, but not so for men. 
However, sick leave spells due to common illness or injury for older women (40 years old or 
more) are longer than those due to occupational disease or work-related accident.   
Our empirical results further suggest that the duration of sick leave increases clearly with age. 
The hazard rate of return to the workplace after sick leave is higher for younger workers than for 
older ones. Older workers remain absent from work more days for every type of cause, common 
or occupational.  
As for the probability of incidence, the presence of children under 3 years old in the household 
is very significant for explaining the duration of the sickness absence due to common disease or 
accident, but not for occupational contingency. We find that the presence of children under 3 
years old in the household prolongs the duration of sick leave spells due to common illness or 
injury in the case of women. However, the relationship is the opposite for men; namely, the 
presence of younger children has a large and significant effect on men’s hazard rate of return to 
the workplace after sick leave. In the case of people aged 25 to 39, while the presence of children 
reduces the duration of sick leave spells due to common illness or injury by 34 per cent for men, 
it increases the time away from work by 35 per cent in the case of women. 
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Table 2.3   Estimation results of models on the duration of sick leave. Main variables 
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Gender and age (ref. Men aged 25-39)         
Women aged 16-24 1.08 (0.05) 
0.82 
(0.07)* 
      
Women aged 25-39 0.70 (0.03)**
0.66 
(0.05)**
      
Women aged 40-54 0.38 (0.02)** 
0.52 
(0.06)** 
      
Women aged 55 or more 0.19 (0.02)** 
0.33 
(0.09)** 
      
Men aged 16-24 1.30 (0.05)** 
1.31 
(0.08)** 
      
Men aged 40-54 0.55 (0.03)**
0.70 
(0.05)**
      
Men aged 55 or more 0.23 (0.02)** 
0.46 
(0.06)** 
      
Age (ref. Aged 35-39)         
16-19    2.02 (0.17)** 
1.20 
(0.21) 
 1.64 
(0.14)** 
1.83 
(0.21)** 
20-24    1.66 (0.10)** 
1.28 
(0.18) 
 1.55 
(0.10)** 
1.62 
(0.15)** 
25-29    1.25 (0.07)** 
1.05 
(0.15) 
 1.35 
(0.08)** 
1.36 
(0.12)** 
30-34    1.06 (0.06) 
1.12 
(0.16) 
 1.24 
(0.08)** 
1.16 
(0.10) 
40-44    0.74 (0.05)** 
0.87 
(0.14) 
 0.70 
(0.05)** 
1.04 
(0.11) 
45-49    0.62 (0.05)** 
1.01 
(0.19) 
 0.57 
(0.05)** 
0.69 
(0.09)** 
50-54    0.46 (0.04)** 
0.61 
(0.13)* 
 0.53 
(0.05)** 
0.69 
(0.09)** 
55-59    0.36 (0.05)** 
0.56 
(0.16)* 
 0.27 
(0.04)** 
0.55 
(0.09)** 
60-64    0.27 (0.05)** 
0.31 
(0.30) 
 0.19 
(0.04)** 
0.51 
(0.13)* 
Age of the youngest cohabitant (ref. Aged 20 
or more) 
        
Missing 0.87 (0.06)* 
1.12 
(0.12) 
 0.87 
(0.09) 
1.06 
(0.22) 
 0.86 
(0.08) 
1.17 
(0.15) 
Live alone 0.94 (0.04) 
0.90 
(0.06) 
 0.92 
(0.05) 
0.93 
(0.12) 
 0.98 
(0.05) 
0.89 
(0.07) 
Aged 0-3 0.83 (0.05)** 
1.21 
(0.12) 
 0.55 
(0.03)** 
1.05 
(0.13) 
 1.17 
(0.06)** 
1.08 
(0.08) 
Aged 4-6 1.05 (0.05) 
1.07 
(0.09) 
 0.97 
(0.07) 
1.10 
(0.17) 
 1.18 
(0.09)* 
1.07 
(0.11) 
Aged 7-11 0.90 (0.04)* 
0.94 
(0.07) 
 0.79 
(0.05)** 
0.94 
(0.13) 
 1.04 
(0.07) 
0.93 
(0.09) 
Aged 12-19 0.98 (0.04) 
1.11 
(0.07) 
 0.94 
(0.05) 
1.11 
(0.13) 
 0.99 
(0.05) 
1.07 
(0.08) 
People aged 25-39 with children aged under 3         
Female 0.65 (0.05)** 
0.88 
(0.15) 
      
Male 1.34 (0.11)** 
0.86 
(0.11) 
      
Degree of disability (ref. No disability)         
From 33% to 64% 0.48 (0.05)** 
0.62 
(0.10)** 
 0.56 
(0.09)** 
1.19 
(0.28) 
 0.45 
(0.07)** 
0.54 
(0.12)** 
65% or more 0.43 (0.10)** 
0.78 
(0.53) 
 0.47 
(0.16)* 
0.12 
(0.25) 
 0.46 
(0.15)* 
1.25 
(0.91) 
Social Security contribution group (ref. Skilled 
clerks) 
        
Engineers and other university graduates 0.72 (0.06)** 
0.76 
(0.23) 
 0.68 
(0.06)** 
1.40 
(0.60) 
 0.85 
(0.12) 
0.37 
(0.14)** 
Engineering technicians and other skilled workers 0.90 (0.06) 
1.01 
(0.25) 
 0.84 
(0.07)* 
1.06 
(0.32) 
 1.00 
(0.14) 
0.79 
(0.32) 
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Administrative chiefs and managers 0.64 (0.07)** 
1.19 
(0.28) 
 0.58 
(0.08)** 
1.51 
(0.55) 
 0.84 
(0.15) 
0.90 
(0.28) 
Assistants and other semi-skilled workers 0.73 (0.07)** 
1.34 
(0.29) 
 0.71 
(0.08)** 
2.04 
(0.77) 
 0.82 
(0.14) 
0.92 
(0.27) 
Semi-skilled clerks 0.78 (0.06)** 
1.17 
(0.18) 
 0.78 
(0.07)** 
1.65 
(0.32)* 
 0.84 
(0.11) 
0.81 
(0.19) 
Assistant clerks 1.13 (0.07)* 
1.12 
(0.16) 
 1.04 
(0.06) 
1.21 
(0.20) 
 1.22 
(0.15) 
0.84 
(0.21) 
Skilled labourers 0.79 (0.05)** 
1.43 
(0.17)** 
 0.67 
(0.05)** 
1.56 
(0.27)* 
 1.01 
(0.10) 
1.16 
(0.22) 
Semi-skilled labourers 0.83 (0.05)** 
1.46 
(0.18)** 
 0.73 
(0.05)** 
1.67 
(0.26)** 
 1.08 
(0.12) 
1.15 
(0.23) 
Unskilled labourers 0.83 (0.05)** 
1.47 
(0.18)** 
 0.67 
(0.04)** 
1.56 
(0.24)** 
 1.13 
(0.12) 
1.20 
(0.24) 
Wage quintile (ref. Quintile 3)         
Quintile 1 0.89 (0.04)**
1.04 
(0.08)
 0.96 
(0.05)
0.93 
(0.12)
 0.84 
(0.06)* 
1.13 
(0.12)
Quintile 2 0.94 (0.04) 
1.08 
(0.06) 
 0.96 
(0.05) 
1.15 
(0.13) 
 0.95 
(0.05) 
1.07 
(0.08) 
Quintile 4 1.07 (0.04) 
1.01 
(0.06) 
 1.06 
(0.07) 
0.94 
(0.13) 
 1.10 
(0.06) 
1.02 
(0.07) 
Quintile 5 1.01 (0.05) 
1.00 
(0.07) 
 1.08 
(0.07) 
1.02 
(0.18) 
 0.99 
(0.06) 
1.00 
(0.08) 
Number of observations 43,017 15,038  21,988 3,621  21,029 11,417 
Log-likelihood value -74,943.2 -20,833.4  -38,749.3 -4,853.5  -35,976.5 -15,882.4 
Notes: Standard Errors in parentheses. Significance levels: *significant at 5 per cent; **significant at 1 per 
cent. 
We find, very much as expected, that health status has a large and significant effect on sick leave 
duration. The larger the worker’s degree of disability is, the larger the duration of sick leave 
spells, especially those due to common illness or accident. This holds for both women and men.  
Regarding the Social Security contribution group, we observe that this variable is significant for 
explaining the duration of sick leave in both the total sample and the female population, but not 
in the case of men. Thus, high-skilled female workers have shorter sickness absences than their 
low-skilled counterparts.  
Finally, we find that wage levels are relatively unimportant in determining the length of time 
spent in sick leave for both women and men, and regardless of the cause of sick leave. Wages are 
only important in encouraging those workers situated in the first wage quintile to remain in sick 
leave due to common illness or injury for longer periods of time. We can think that substitution 
effect implies that those workers with higher salaries return to work earlier. 
In Figure 2.8 the estimation results have been applied to calculate the risk of return to activity 
after a sick leave spell for women and men with family responsibilities. The individuals are 
assumed to be between 25 and 39 years old, have children under 3 years in the household, and 
hold an open-ended contract. According to the estimation results, the risk of returning to activity 
before the 5th day of sick leave is clearly higher for men than women. Indeed, we find that after 
controlling for the other worker’s characteristics, 8 per cent of the open-ended male workers 
aged 25 to 39 with children under 3 years old return to activity after a sick leave spell due to 
common illness or injury before the 5th day, while this percentage decreases to less than 6 per 
cent in the case of women. In other words, the presence of young children in the household 
increases the duration of female sick leave and provokes men to return to activity earlier. 
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However, we conjecture that our empirical evidence lends little support to the view that the 
presence of children has a negative impact on women’s health (Verbrugge, 1983; Arber et al., 
1985). Although the presence of children under age 3 increases the probability of sick leave due 
to common illness or accident, it reduces the probability of absence due to occupational illness 
or injury. If the presence of children had a negative impact on female health (because of stress, 
lack of rest, etc.), we would expect women to have a higher probability of sick leave due to 
occupational illness or injury too.  
Moreover, our findings also indicate that the presence of children under age 3 increases the 
duration of sick leave due to common illness or accident in the case of women and reduce it in 
the case of men. We do not find that the presence of children is significant in the duration of 
sick leave due to an occupational disease or work-related accident. 
We acknowledge that these results have some caveats. For instance, information on the clinical 
aspect of the disease or injury will be very useful to discriminate between the health and role 
conflict explanations. More fundamentally, knowing the impairing characteristics of the disease 
or injury will help to clarify the effect of children on sick leave.  
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Appendix	
Table A2.1   Estimation results of competing risk models on the probability of suffering a sickness absence. All variables 
 Total  Women  Men 
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Gender and age (ref. Men aged 25-39)               
Women aged 16-24 1.18 (0.03)** 
0.68 
(0.03)** 
1.72 
(0.06)** 
0.88 
(0.06) 
          
Women aged 25-39 1.21 (0.03)** 
0.66 
(0.03)** 
1.43 
(0.04)** 
0.66 
(0.04)** 
          
Women aged 40-54 1.17 (0.03)** 
0.62 
(0.03)** 
1.58 
(0.05)** 
0.61 
(0.04)** 
          
Women aged 55 or more 1.12 (0.07) 
0.61 
(0.09)** 
1.93 
(0.11)** 
0.62 
(0.08)** 
          
Men aged 16-24 1.21 (0.03)** 
1.08 
(0.03)** 
1.45 
(0.05)** 
1.29 
(0.06)** 
          
Men aged 40-54 0.90 (0.02)** 
0.86 
(0.03)** 
1.00 
(0.03) 
0.76 
(0.04)** 
          
Men aged 55 or more 1.03 (0.05) 
0.76 
(0.05)** 
1.11 
(0.06) 
0.80 
(0.07)* 
          
Age (ref. Aged 35-39)               
16-19      0.97 (0.05) 
0.99 
(0.10) 
1.50 
(0.10)** 
1.43 
(0.24)* 
 1.38 
(0.06)** 
1.34 
(0.07)** 
1.91 
(0.13)** 
1.61 
(0.15)** 
20-24      0.96 (0.04) 
1.00 
(0.08) 
1.12 
(0.05)** 
1.51 
(0.17)** 
 1.23 
(0.04)** 
1.15 
(0.05)** 
1.36 
(0.07)** 
1.24 
(0.08)** 
25-29      1.01 (0.03) 
0.88 
(0.07) 
1.00 
(0.04) 
1.17 
(0.12) 
 1.08 
(0.04)* 
1.17 
(0.05)** 
1.01 
(0.05) 
1.10 
(0.07) 
30-34      1.04 (0.04) 
0.92 
(0.07) 
1.05 
(0.04) 
1.12 
(0.12) 
 1.03 
(0.04) 
1.11 
(0.05)* 
0.99 
(0.04) 
0.96 
(0.06) 
40-44      0.93 (0.04) 
0.87 
(0.08) 
1.03 
(0.05) 
1.03 
(0.12) 
 0.95 
(0.04) 
0.93 
(0.05) 
0.99 
(0.05) 
0.81 
(0.06)** 
45-49      1.05 (0.05) 
0.88 
(0.09) 
1.16 
(0.06)** 
0.99 
(0.13) 
 0.87 
(0.04)** 
0.97 
(0.05) 
1.08 
(0.06) 
0.69 
(0.06)** 
50-54      1.09 (0.06) 
0.91 
(0.12) 
1.14 
(0.07)* 
1.24 
(0.17) 
 1.01 
(0.05) 
0.90 
(0.06) 
1.02 
(0.06) 
0.81 
(0.08)* 
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55-59      0.98 (0.08) 
0.93 
(0.16) 
1.31 
(0.08)** 
1.38 
(0.21)* 
 1.09 
(0.06) 
0.82 
(0.07)* 
1.09 
(0.08) 
0.80 
(0.09)* 
60-64      0.86 (0.12) 
0.71 
(0.24) 
1.54 
(0.15)** 
0.43 
(0.17)* 
 1.02 
(0.09) 
0.83 
(0.10) 
1.26 
(0.13)* 
0.81 
(0.14) 
Age of the youngest cohabitant (ref. 
Aged 20 or more) 
              
Missing 1.01 (0.04) 
1.02 
(0.05) 
0.90 
(0.05) 
1.05 
(0.09) 
 1.09 
(0.07) 
0.84 
(0.12) 
0.99 
(0.08) 
1.08 
(0.20) 
 0.97 
(0.05) 
1.05 
(0.06) 
0.85 
(0.07) 
1.05 
(0.11) 
Live alone 1.05 (0.02)* 
1.02 
(0.03) 
1.03 
(0.03) 
1.06 
(0.05) 
 1.05 
(0.03) 
1.09 
(0.08) 
1.03 
(0.04) 
1.05 
(0.10) 
 1.05 
(0.03) 
1.00 
(0.04) 
1.02 
(0.04) 
1.08 
(0.06) 
Aged 0-3 1.37 (0.05)** 
1.13 
(0.06)* 
1.35 
(0.06)** 
1.01 
(0.09) 
 1.85 
(0.05)** 
0.91 
(0.07) 
1.87 
(0.06)** 
0.90 
(0.09) 
 1.08 
(0.03)** 
1.13 
(0.04)** 
1.09 
(0.04)* 
1.07 
(0.06) 
Aged 4-6 1.14 (0.03)** 
1.08 
(0.05) 
1.15 
(0.04)** 
1.17 
(0.07)* 
 1.23 
(0.05)** 
1.03 
(0.09) 
1.27 
(0.06)** 
1.08 
(0.13) 
 1.08 
(0.04) 
1.08 
(0.05) 
0.98 
(0.06) 
1.22 
(0.09)* 
Aged 7-11 1.09 (0.03)** 
1.17 
(0.04)** 
1.10 
(0.03)** 
1.08 
(0.06) 
 1.09 
(0.04)* 
1.13 
(0.09) 
1.13 
(0.05)** 
1.17 
(0.13) 
 1.12 
(0.04)** 
1.17 
(0.05)** 
1.04 
(0.05) 
1.06 
(0.08) 
Aged 12-19 1.01 (0.02) 
1.05 
(0.03) 
1.09 
(0.03)** 
1.21 
(0.05)** 
 0.99 
(0.03) 
1.02 
(0.06) 
1.13 
(0.04)** 
1.26 
(0.10)** 
 1.04 
(0.03) 
1.03 
(0.04) 
1.01 
(0.04) 
1.20 
(0.07)** 
People aged 25-39 with children aged 
under 3 
              
Female 1.35 (0.06)** 
0.73 
(0.07)** 
1.44 
(0.08)** 
0.83 
(0.11) 
          
Male 0.79 (0.04)** 
1.01 
(0.07) 
0.83 
(0.05)** 
1.09 
(0.12) 
          
Place of birth (ref. Spain)               
EU-15 0.89 (0.04)* 
0.98 
(0.07) 
0.84 
(0.05)** 
0.90 
(0.10) 
 0.89 
(0.06) 
0.97 
(0.16) 
0.90 
(0.07) 
0.72 
(0.16) 
 0.89 
(0.06) 
0.99 
(0.08) 
0.79 
(0.07)* 
1.00 
(0.13) 
Rest of Europe 0.78 (0.04)** 
0.79 
(0.05)** 
0.83 
(0.05)** 
1.07 
(0.10) 
 0.78 
(0.06)** 
0.85 
(0.14) 
0.91 
(0.08) 
1.38 
(0.25) 
 0.77 
(0.05)** 
0.79 
(0.06)** 
0.80 
(0.07)* 
1.02 
(0.11) 
Latin America 0.98 (0.03) 
1.07 
(0.04) 
1.03 
(0.04) 
1.23 
(0.07)** 
 1.06 
(0.04) 
1.32 
(0.11)** 
1.08 
(0.05) 
1.35 
(0.14)** 
 0.90 
(0.04)** 
1.01 
(0.05) 
1.03 
(0.05) 
1.22 
(0.09)** 
Africa 0.76 (0.03)** 
0.90 
(0.04)*
1.01 
(0.06)
1.29 
(0.11)**
 0.90 
(0.07)
1.37 
(0.20)*
1.22 
(0.12)*
1.31 
(0.31)
 0.73 
(0.03)**
0.86 
(0.05)**
0.93 
(0.07)
1.28 
(0.12)**
Rest of the world 0.45 (0.05)** 
0.51 
(0.08)** 
0.45 
(0.05)** 
0.47 
(0.09)** 
 0.44 
(0.09)** 
0.52 
(0.24) 
0.32 
(0.07)** 
0.10 
(0.10)* 
 0.47 
(0.06)** 
0.52 
(0.09)** 
0.57 
(0.08)** 
0.57 
(0.11)** 
Degree of disability (ref. No disability)               
From 33% to 64% 1.95 (0.09)** 
1.32 
(0.11)**
1.87 
(0.11)**
1.27 
(0.15)*
 2.14 
(0.17)**
1.73 
(0.32)**
2.10 
(0.19)**
1.23 
(0.29)
 1.86 
(0.10)**
1.28 
(0.12)**
1.71 
(0.13)**
1.31 
(0.18)*
65% or more 2.59 (0.29)** 
0.91 
(0.29) 
1.80 
(0.27)** 
0.73 
(0.33) 
 2.59 
(0.44)** 
0.40 
(0.40) 
1.51 
(0.37) 
1.26 
(0.91) 
 2.58 
(0.37)** 
1.12 
(0.38) 
2.05 
(0.38)** 
0.63 
(0.37) 
Social Security contribution group 
(ref. Skilled clerks) 
              
Engineers and other university graduates 0.80 (0.04)** 
0.49 
(0.08)** 
0.61 
(0.03)** 
0.41 
(0.06)** 
 0.87 
(0.05)* 
0.41 
(0.10)** 
0.67 
(0.04)** 
0.80 
(0.16) 
 0.69 
(0.06)** 
0.69 
(0.14) 
0.57 
(0.04)** 
0.29 
(0.06)** 
Engineering technicians and other skilled 
workers 
1.00 
(0.05) 
0.70 
(0.09)**
0.81 
(0.04)**
0.54 
(0.08)**
 1.03 
(0.05)
0.69 
(0.11)*
0.83 
(0.05)**
0.73 
(0.15)
 0.89 
(0.08)
0.77 
(0.15)
0.83 
(0.07)*
0.41 
(0.10)**
Administrative chiefs and managers 0.60 (0.05)** 
0.93 
(0.14) 
0.72 
(0.04)** 
0.64 
(0.09)** 
 0.62 
(0.07)** 
0.63 
(0.19) 
0.65 
(0.05)** 
0.44 
(0.13)** 
 0.60 
(0.07)** 
1.33 
(0.24) 
0.79 
(0.06)** 
0.83 
(0.13) 
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Assistants and other semi-skilled workers 0.80 (0.05)** 
1.24 
(0.15) 
0.86 
(0.05)** 
1.19 
(0.15) 
 0.83 
(0.06)* 
0.90 
(0.18) 
0.91 
(0.07) 
0.73 
(0.17) 
 0.77 
(0.08)** 
1.70 
(0.27)** 
0.85 
(0.06)* 
1.61 
(0.24)** 
Semi-skilled clerks 1.03 (0.05) 
1.70 
(0.16)** 
1.16 
(0.07)** 
1.88 
(0.18)** 
 1.01 
(0.05) 
1.44 
(0.18)** 
1.18 
(0.08)* 
1.37 
(0.20)* 
 1.07 
(0.09) 
2.04 
(0.28)** 
1.18 
(0.09)* 
2.42 
(0.32)** 
Assistant clerks 1.05 (0.04) 
0.91 
(0.08) 
0.97 
(0.03) 
1.06 
(0.09) 
 1.00 
(0.04) 
0.79 
(0.08)* 
0.95 
(0.04) 
0.87 
(0.09) 
 1.11 
(0.08) 
0.95 
(0.13) 
1.00 
(0.07) 
1.14 
(0.16) 
Skilled labourers 1.10 (0.04)** 
2.28 
(0.16)** 
1.18 
(0.04)** 
2.73 
(0.19)** 
 1.01 
(0.05) 
1.47 
(0.16)** 
1.13 
(0.06)* 
1.66 
(0.19)** 
 1.17 
(0.07)* 
3.01 
(0.32)** 
1.21 
(0.06)** 
3.47 
(0.34)** 
Semi-skilled labourers 1.16 (0.04)** 
2.19 
(0.16)** 
1.30 
(0.05)** 
2.49 
(0.19)** 
 1.05 
(0.04) 
1.51 
(0.15)** 
1.16 
(0.06)** 
1.67 
(0.19)** 
 1.26 
(0.08)** 
2.95 
(0.32)** 
1.46 
(0.08)** 
3.23 
(0.34)** 
Unskilled labourers 1.16 (0.04)** 
2.28 
(0.16)** 
1.28 
(0.05)** 
2.87 
(0.21)** 
 1.03 
(0.04) 
1.72 
(0.16)** 
1.14 
(0.05)** 
1.85 
(0.20)** 
 1.27 
(0.08)** 
2.96 
(0.32)** 
1.38 
(0.08)** 
3.73 
(0.39)** 
Economic activity (ref. Manufacturing)               
Primary sector 0.66 (0.06)** 
0.88 
(0.09) 
0.82 
(0.10) 
1.04 
(0.13) 
 0.79 
(0.14) 
1.11 
(0.32) 
0.91 
(0.18) 
1.84 
(0.55)* 
 0.60 
(0.06)** 
0.83 
(0.09) 
0.84 
(0.11) 
0.95 
(0.13) 
Construction 0.86 (0.02)** 
1.14 
(0.04)**
1.00 
(0.04)
1.21 
(0.06)**
 0.69 
(0.05)**
0.76 
(0.12)
1.05 
(0.09)
0.67 
(0.17)
 0.82 
(0.02)**
1.06 
(0.04)
0.92 
(0.04)
1.16 
(0.07)**
Wholesale and retail trade 0.93 (0.03)* 
0.85 
(0.04)** 
1.06 
(0.04) 
0.91 
(0.05) 
 1.01 
(0.04) 
1.06 
(0.09) 
1.13 
(0.05)** 
1.00 
(0.10) 
 0.90 
(0.03)** 
0.79 
(0.04)** 
1.00 
(0.04) 
0.87 
(0.05)* 
Hotels, restaurants and transport 0.79 (0.02)** 
0.67 
(0.03)** 
0.98 
(0.03) 
0.84 
(0.04)** 
 0.90 
(0.04)* 
1.04 
(0.09) 
1.04 
(0.05) 
0.96 
(0.10) 
 0.73 
(0.03)** 
0.57 
(0.03)** 
0.95 
(0.05) 
0.83 
(0.05)** 
Finance and other business activities 0.62 (0.02)** 
0.60 
(0.03)** 
0.97 
(0.04) 
0.67 
(0.04)** 
 0.72 
(0.03)** 
0.73 
(0.06)** 
1.10 
(0.05)* 
0.75 
(0.08)** 
 0.55 
(0.03)** 
0.59 
(0.03)** 
0.85 
(0.05)** 
0.65 
(0.05)** 
Other services 0.79 (0.03)** 
0.68 
(0.04)**
1.24 
(0.06)**
0.85 
(0.06)*
 0.89 
(0.04)*
0.90 
(0.09)
1.33 
(0.07)**
1.02 
(0.11)
 0.69 
(0.03)**
0.57 
(0.04)**
1.19 
(0.08)**
0.79 
(0.07)*
Type of employer (ref. Limited 
corporation (S.L)) 
              
Corporation (S.A.) 1.01 (0.02) 
1.03 
(0.03) 
1.09 
(0.03)** 
1.00 
(0.04) 
 1.01 
(0.03) 
1.01 
(0.06) 
1.19 
(0.04)** 
1.00 
(0.07) 
 1.03 
(0.03) 
1.05 
(0.04) 
1.01 
(0.04) 
1.00 
(0.05) 
NGO or association 1.06 (0.04) 
0.95 
(0.06) 
1.01 
(0.05) 
0.64 
(0.08)** 
 1.01 
(0.05) 
1.04 
(0.11) 
1.03 
(0.06) 
0.75 
(0.12) 
 1.15 
(0.07)* 
0.90 
(0.07) 
1.01 
(0.07) 
0.58 
(0.09)** 
Local government 0.99 (0.04) 
0.62 
(0.04)**
1.07 
(0.14)
1.05 
(0.18)
 0.97 
(0.06)
0.70 
(0.08)**
0.93 
(0.13)
0.69 
(0.23)
 1.15 
(0.07)*
0.70 
(0.06)**
1.33 
(0.23)
1.36 
(0.25)
Public organization 1.25 (0.06)** 
0.65 
(0.07)** 
1.27 
(0.11)** 
0.66 
(0.11)* 
 1.19 
(0.07)** 
0.55 
(0.09)** 
1.33 
(0.12)** 
0.84 
(0.18) 
 1.50 
(0.12)** 
0.81 
(0.13) 
1.17 
(0.13) 
0.55 
(0.12)** 
Central or regional government 1.52 (0.09)** 
0.72 
(0.11)* 
1.06 
(0.11) 
0.45 
(0.10)** 
 1.40 
(0.09)** 
0.74 
(0.14) 
0.91 
(0.11) 
0.49 
(0.14)* 
 1.98 
(0.19)** 
0.68 
(0.16) 
1.40 
(0.17)** 
0.41 
(0.14)* 
Other kind of organization 0.90 (0.04)* 
0.86 
(0.05)* 
0.92 
(0.05) 
0.75 
(0.08)** 
 0.95 
(0.06) 
0.90 
(0.11) 
0.99 
(0.06) 
0.79 
(0.12) 
 0.87 
(0.05)* 
0.85 
(0.06)* 
0.84 
(0.07)* 
0.72 
(0.10)* 
Physical person 0.77 (0.02)** 
0.71 
(0.03)**
0.77 
(0.03)**
0.65 
(0.04)**
 0.86 
(0.03)**
0.77 
(0.07)**
0.77 
(0.03)**
0.61 
(0.07)**
 0.72 
(0.02)**
0.70 
(0.03)**
0.78 
(0.04)**
0.67 
(0.05)**
Number employees of the firm (ref. 
1,001 – 5,000) 
              
0-50 0.62 (0.03)** 
0.89 
(0.07) 
0.56 
(0.03)** 
0.74 
(0.07)** 
 0.59 
(0.03)** 
0.63 
(0.07)** 
0.59 
(0.04)** 
0.49 
(0.06)** 
 0.67 
(0.05)** 
1.09 
(0.11) 
0.55 
(0.04)** 
1.03 
(0.14) 
51-100 0.74 (0.04)** 
1.16 
(0.09) 
0.68 
(0.04)** 
0.96 
(0.10) 
 0.73 
(0.05)** 
0.97 
(0.11) 
0.72 
(0.05)** 
0.81 
(0.10) 
 0.78 
(0.06)** 
1.35 
(0.14)** 
0.65 
(0.05)** 
1.20 
(0.17) 
101-300 0.77 (0.04)** 
1.11 
(0.09)
0.72 
(0.05)**
0.92 
(0.09)
 0.75 
(0.04)**
0.95 
(0.10)
0.78 
(0.05)**
0.72 
(0.09)**
 0.80 
(0.06)**
1.28 
(0.13)*
0.69 
(0.06)**
1.20 
(0.17)
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301-600 0.85 (0.05)** 
1.09 
(0.09) 
0.83 
(0.06)** 
1.00 
(0.11) 
 0.89 
(0.06)* 
1.12 
(0.13) 
0.91 
(0.07) 
0.85 
(0.12) 
 0.80 
(0.06)** 
1.10 
(0.12) 
0.77 
(0.07)** 
1.26 
(0.19) 
601-1,000 0.95 (0.07) 
1.02 
(0.10) 
0.97 
(0.07) 
0.99 
(0.13) 
 0.99 
(0.07) 
0.94 
(0.13) 
1.02 
(0.08) 
0.92 
(0.14) 
 0.89 
(0.08) 
1.10 
(0.15) 
0.90 
(0.09) 
1.11 
(0.20) 
More than 5,000 0.83 (0.13) 
0.66 
(0.14)* 
0.90 
(0.16) 
1.02 
(0.25) 
 0.84 
(0.11) 
0.55 
(0.14)* 
0.83 
(0.15) 
0.56 
(0.19) 
 0.78 
(0.19) 
0.78 
(0.18) 
1.06 
(0.21) 
1.62 
(0.47) 
Wage quintile (ref. Quintile 3)               
Quintile 1 1.09 (0.03)** 
0.99 
(0.04)
0.92 
(0.03)**
0.73 
(0.04)**
 1.11 
(0.04)**
1.08 
(0.08)
0.95 
(0.04)
0.76 
(0.07)**
 1.08 
(0.04)*
0.99 
(0.05)
0.83 
(0.05)**
0.66 
(0.06)**
Quintile 2 1.09 (0.02)** 
0.96 
(0.03) 
1.06 
(0.03)* 
0.92 
(0.04) 
 1.17 
(0.04)** 
1.24 
(0.08)** 
1.08 
(0.04)* 
0.93 
(0.07) 
 1.03 
(0.03) 
0.88 
(0.03)** 
1.04 
(0.04) 
0.89 
(0.05)* 
Quintile 4 0.95 (0.02)** 
1.02 
(0.03) 
1.07 
(0.03)* 
1.01 
(0.04) 
 0.94 
(0.03) 
1.03 
(0.08) 
1.02 
(0.04) 
0.85 
(0.08) 
 0.96 
(0.02) 
1.02 
(0.03) 
1.10 
(0.04)* 
1.07 
(0.05) 
Quintile 5 0.88 (0.02)** 
0.93 
(0.03)* 
1.03 
(0.03) 
0.89 
(0.05)* 
 0.85 
(0.03)** 
0.79 
(0.08)* 
0.99 
(0.04) 
0.53 
(0.06)** 
 0.90 
(0.03)** 
0.96 
(0.04) 
1.06 
(0.04) 
1.02 
(0.06) 
Working day (ref. Full-time)               
Part-time 0.79 (0.02)** 
0.56 
(0.02)** 
0.80 
(0.02)** 
0.61 
(0.03)** 
 0.83 
(0.02)** 
0.61 
(0.04)** 
0.87 
(0.03)** 
0.65 
(0.05)** 
 0.70 
(0.03)** 
0.50 
(0.03)** 
0.66 
(0.03)** 
0.58 
(0.04)** 
Missing   0.75 (0.06)** 
0.60 
(0.08)** 
   0.92 
(0.08) 
0.52 
(0.11)** 
   0.57 
(0.06)** 
0.63 
(0.10)** 
Region of residence (ref. Andalucía)               
Aragón 0.95 (0.05) 
1.07 
(0.07) 
0.76 
(0.05)** 
0.83 
(0.09) 
 0.84 
(0.06)* 
0.99 
(0.14) 
0.69 
(0.05)** 
0.76 
(0.15) 
 1.05 
(0.07) 
1.08 
(0.08) 
0.86 
(0.08) 
0.83 
(0.10) 
Asturias 1.22 (0.06)** 
1.00 
(0.08) 
0.88 
(0.07) 
1.06 
(0.15) 
 1.01 
(0.08) 
0.89 
(0.14) 
0.79 
(0.08)* 
1.05 
(0.27) 
 1.41 
(0.09)** 
0.99 
(0.09) 
0.99 
(0.10) 
1.01 
(0.15) 
Baleares 1.23 (0.05)** 
1.20 
(0.07)**
0.90 
(0.06)
1.05 
(0.10)
 1.27 
(0.08)**
1.11 
(0.14)
0.78 
(0.07)**
0.96 
(0.15)
 1.18 
(0.07)**
1.23 
(0.09)**
1.11 
(0.09)
1.10 
(0.12)
Canarias 1.69 (0.05)** 
0.87 
(0.05)** 
1.35 
(0.06)** 
0.80 
(0.07)* 
 1.60 
(0.07)** 
0.92 
(0.10) 
1.23 
(0.07)** 
0.85 
(0.14) 
 1.77 
(0.07)** 
0.87 
(0.05)* 
1.53 
(0.10)** 
0.78 
(0.08)* 
Cantabria 1.36 (0.09)** 
0.90 
(0.09) 
1.16 
(0.10) 
0.87 
(0.14) 
 1.24 
(0.13)* 
0.90 
(0.18) 
1.16 
(0.11) 
0.90 
(0.27) 
 1.43 
(0.11)** 
0.88 
(0.10) 
1.17 
(0.15) 
0.85 
(0.16) 
Castilla y León 0.93 (0.04) 
1.08 
(0.06) 
0.78 
(0.04)** 
0.97 
(0.08) 
 0.81 
(0.05)** 
1.02 
(0.12) 
0.68 
(0.05)** 
1.05 
(0.17) 
 1.03 
(0.05) 
1.08 
(0.06) 
0.89 
(0.07) 
0.95 
(0.10) 
Castilla- La Mancha 1.03 (0.04) 
1.31 
(0.06)**
0.98 
(0.05)
1.03 
(0.09)
 1.04 
(0.07)
1.25 
(0.14)*
1.01 
(0.07)
0.92 
(0.16)
 1.02 
(0.05)
1.32 
(0.07)**
0.94 
(0.07)
1.06 
(0.11)
Cataluña 1.30 (0.04)** 
1.02 
(0.04) 
1.00 
(0.04) 
1.01 
(0.06) 
 1.23 
(0.05)** 
0.94 
(0.07) 
0.95 
(0.04) 
0.89 
(0.09) 
 1.34 
(0.05)** 
1.05 
(0.04) 
1.04 
(0.05) 
1.04 
(0.07) 
Valencia 0.93 (0.03)* 
1.07 
(0.04) 
0.81 
(0.03)** 
0.98 
(0.06) 
 0.89 
(0.04)** 
0.96 
(0.08) 
0.80 
(0.04)** 
0.95 
(0.11) 
 0.96 
(0.04) 
1.10 
(0.05)* 
0.83 
(0.05)** 
0.98 
(0.07) 
Extremadura 0.71 (0.05)** 
0.84 
(0.07)* 
0.75 
(0.07)** 
1.03 
(0.14) 
 0.76 
(0.06)** 
0.59 
(0.11)** 
0.77 
(0.09)* 
0.81 
(0.24) 
 0.69 
(0.05)** 
0.93 
(0.08) 
0.73 
(0.09)* 
1.12 
(0.18) 
Galicia 1.08 (0.04)* 
1.10 
(0.05)*
0.98 
(0.07)
0.93 
(0.08)
 0.93 
(0.05)
0.81 
(0.09)*
0.93 
(0.08)
0.86 
(0.14)
 1.24 
(0.05)**
1.20 
(0.06)**
1.01 
(0.08)
0.94 
(0.10)
Madrid 1.13 (0.04)** 
1.20 
(0.05)** 
0.86 
(0.04)** 
1.10 
(0.06) 
 1.08 
(0.05) 
0.96 
(0.08) 
0.82 
(0.04)** 
1.14 
(0.12) 
 1.16 
(0.05)** 
1.28 
(0.05)** 
0.91 
(0.05) 
1.07 
(0.07) 
Murcia 1.13 (0.05)** 
0.99 
(0.06) 
0.88 
(0.06) 
0.89 
(0.08) 
 1.01 
(0.06) 
1.10 
(0.14) 
0.75 
(0.06)** 
0.91 
(0.15) 
 1.24 
(0.06)** 
0.95 
(0.06) 
1.08 
(0.11) 
0.89 
(0.10) 
Navarra 1.43 0.86 1.19 0.88  1.29 0.63 1.12 0.74  1.57 0.93 1.29 0.94 
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(0.08)** (0.08) (0.09)* (0.14) (0.11)** (0.14)* (0.11) (0.21) (0.12)** (0.10) (0.13)* (0.16) 
País Vasco 1.26 (0.05)** 
1.22 
(0.06)** 
1.21 
(0.06)** 
1.22 
(0.10)* 
 1.12 
(0.06)* 
0.99 
(0.11) 
1.17 
(0.07)* 
1.22 
(0.19) 
 1.40 
(0.07)** 
1.26 
(0.08)** 
1.24 
(0.09)** 
1.19 
(0.12) 
La Rioja 1.05 (0.10) 
0.86 
(0.13) 
0.89 
(0.10) 
1.12 
(0.18) 
 1.03 
(0.13) 
0.53 
(0.21) 
0.74 
(0.10)* 
1.24 
(0.36) 
 1.08 
(0.13) 
0.96 
(0.15) 
1.12 
(0.18) 
1.02 
(0.21) 
Actual to potential experience ratio 
(ref. 0.76-1)     
          
Current job is the first one 0.63 (0.02)** 
0.66 
(0.03)**
0.74 
(0.03)**
0.77 
(0.05)**
 0.58 
(0.03)**
0.65 
(0.07)**
0.69 
(0.04)**
0.74 
(0.11)*
 0.68 
(0.03)**
0.66 
(0.04)**
0.75 
(0.04)**
0.78 
(0.06)**
One job before and close to the current 
one 
0.92 
(0.03)** 
0.97 
(0.05) 
0.91 
(0.04)* 
0.96 
(0.07) 
 0.95 
(0.04) 
0.89 
(0.09) 
0.85 
(0.05)** 
0.93 
(0.13) 
 0.87 
(0.04)** 
0.97 
(0.05) 
0.90 
(0.06) 
0.92 
(0.09) 
One short job and ended more than 3 
years before the current one 
0.92 
(0.03)* 
0.93 
(0.05) 
0.82 
(0.04)** 
0.88 
(0.08) 
 0.93 
(0.04) 
0.84 
(0.09) 
0.80 
(0.05)** 
0.83 
(0.14) 
 0.92 
(0.05) 
0.99 
(0.07) 
0.90 
(0.07) 
0.93 
(0.11) 
Less than 0.25 0.60 (0.02)** 
0.60 
(0.03)** 
0.73 
(0.04)** 
1.08 
(0.11) 
 0.59 
(0.02)** 
0.65 
(0.06)** 
0.75 
(0.05)** 
1.12 
(0.15) 
 0.59 
(0.03)** 
0.57 
(0.04)** 
0.67 
(0.08)** 
1.07 
(0.17) 
From 0.26 to 0.5 0.93 (0.02)** 
0.95 
(0.03)
0.94 
(0.03)*
1.04 
(0.06)
 0.88 
(0.02)**
0.93 
(0.06)
0.92 
(0.03)*
1.03 
(0.09)
 1.00 
(0.03)
0.97 
(0.04)
1.04 
(0.06)
1.08 
(0.09)
From 0.51 to 0.75 1.02 (0.02) 
1.00 
(0.03) 
0.99 
(0.02) 
1.08 
(0.04)* 
 0.95 
(0.02) 
1.03 
(0.06) 
0.98 
(0.03) 
1.05 
(0.08) 
 1.08 
(0.02)** 
0.99 
(0.03) 
1.03 
(0.03) 
1.12 
(0.05)* 
From 1.1 to 2 or more 0.62 (0.02)** 
0.62 
(0.03)** 
0.95 
(0.03) 
0.86 
(0.06)* 
 0.65 
(0.03)** 
0.59 
(0.06)** 
0.95 
(0.04) 
0.78 
(0.10) 
 0.61 
(0.03)** 
0.65 
(0.04)** 
0.96 
(0.05) 
0.90 
(0.07) 
Number of contract signed before 
current one (ref. from 0 to 10)     
          
From 11 to 20 1.14 (0.02)** 
1.15 
(0.03)**
1.16 
(0.02)**
1.28 
(0.05)**
 1.15 
(0.03)**
1.10 
(0.06)
1.18 
(0.03)**
1.34 
(0.09)**
 1.14 
(0.03)**
1.18 
(0.04)**
1.16 
(0.03)**
1.27 
(0.06)**
More than 20 contracts 1.17 (0.02)** 
1.17 
(0.03)** 
1.15 
(0.03)** 
1.41 
(0.06)** 
 1.16 
(0.03)** 
1.20 
(0.08)** 
1.15 
(0.04)** 
1.31 
(0.12)** 
 1.16 
(0.03)** 
1.19 
(0.04)** 
1.20 
(0.05)** 
1.47 
(0.08)** 
Day of entry into employment (ref. 
Wednesday)     
          
Saturday, Sunday and Monday 1.00 (0.02) 
1.09 
(0.03)** 
1.03 
(0.03) 
1.05 
(0.05) 
 0.98 
(0.03) 
1.00 
(0.07) 
1.05 
(0.04) 
1.07 
(0.10) 
 1.00 
(0.03) 
1.11 
(0.04)** 
1.01 
(0.04) 
1.05 
(0.06) 
Tuesday 1.00 (0.02) 
1.11 
(0.04)**
1.02 
(0.03)
0.99 
(0.05)
 1.00 
(0.03)
1.17 
(0.09)*
1.00 
(0.04)
0.98 
(0.10)
 0.98 
(0.03)
1.09 
(0.04)*
1.04 
(0.05)
1.00 
(0.06)
Thursday 0.99 (0.02) 
1.02 
(0.04) 
1.02 
(0.03) 
1.07 
(0.06) 
 1.00 
(0.03) 
0.91 
(0.07) 
1.04 
(0.05) 
1.07 
(0.12) 
 0.99 
(0.03) 
1.06 
(0.04) 
0.99 
(0.05) 
1.06 
(0.07) 
Friday 0.93 (0.02)** 
0.99 
(0.04) 
1.06 
(0.04) 
1.01 
(0.06) 
 0.93 
(0.03)* 
0.98 
(0.08) 
1.07 
(0.05) 
1.08 
(0.12) 
 0.94 
(0.03) 
0.99 
(0.05) 
1.05 
(0.05) 
0.99 
(0.07) 
Month of entry into employment (ref. 
March)     
          
January 0.95 (0.03)* 
1.00 
(0.05)
0.92 
(0.04)
1.14 
(0.08)
 0.90 
(0.04)**
0.94 
(0.09)
0.93 
(0.05)
1.09 
(0.14)
 0.99 
(0.04)
1.01 
(0.05)
0.92 
(0.06)
1.16 
(0.09)
February 0.87 (0.03)** 
0.97 
(0.04) 
0.84 
(0.04)** 
1.10 
(0.07) 
 0.85 
(0.03)** 
0.92 
(0.09) 
0.88 
(0.05)* 
1.02 
(0.12) 
 0.90 
(0.04)* 
0.99 
(0.05) 
0.82 
(0.05)** 
1.13 
(0.09) 
April 0.84 (0.02)** 
0.97 
(0.04) 
0.82 
(0.03)** 
0.93 
(0.06) 
 0.77 
(0.03)** 
0.91 
(0.09) 
0.81 
(0.04)** 
0.92 
(0.12) 
 0.90 
(0.04)** 
0.99 
(0.05) 
0.85 
(0.05)** 
0.94 
(0.08) 
May 0.80 (0.02)** 
0.91 
(0.04)* 
0.86 
(0.03)** 
0.93 
(0.06) 
 0.74 
(0.03)** 
0.76 
(0.07)** 
0.85 
(0.04)** 
0.95 
(0.12) 
 0.86 
(0.03)** 
0.96 
(0.05) 
0.87 
(0.05)* 
0.91 
(0.07) 
June 0.69 (0.02)** 
0.81 
(0.04)**
0.86 
(0.04)**
1.00 
(0.07)
 0.62 
(0.02)**
0.69 
(0.06)**
0.90 
(0.05)*
0.91 
(0.12)
 0.75 
(0.03)**
0.85 
(0.04)**
0.82 
(0.05)**
1.03 
(0.08)
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July 0.60 (0.02)** 
0.79 
(0.04)** 
0.83 
(0.04)** 
0.88 
(0.07) 
 0.53 
(0.02)** 
0.71 
(0.07)** 
0.81 
(0.05)** 
0.76 
(0.11)* 
 0.67 
(0.03)** 
0.81 
(0.04)** 
0.84 
(0.05)** 
0.92 
(0.08) 
August 0.64 (0.02)** 
0.76 
(0.04)** 
0.81 
(0.04)** 
0.86 
(0.07) 
 0.59 
(0.03)** 
0.57 
(0.06)** 
0.82 
(0.05)** 
0.75 
(0.12) 
 0.69 
(0.03)** 
0.81 
(0.04)** 
0.80 
(0.05)** 
0.89 
(0.08) 
September 0.77 (0.02)** 
0.77 
(0.03)** 
0.76 
(0.03)** 
0.89 
(0.06) 
 0.74 
(0.03)** 
0.60 
(0.06)** 
0.73 
(0.04)** 
0.69 
(0.08)** 
 0.79 
(0.03)** 
0.81 
(0.04)** 
0.79 
(0.05)** 
0.96 
(0.08) 
October 0.70 (0.02)** 
0.70 
(0.03)** 
0.81 
(0.03)** 
0.89 
(0.06) 
 0.64 
(0.03)** 
0.60 
(0.06)** 
0.76 
(0.04)** 
0.85 
(0.10) 
 0.77 
(0.03)** 
0.73 
(0.04)** 
0.89 
(0.05)* 
0.90 
(0.07) 
November 0.66 (0.02)** 
0.68 
(0.03)** 
0.70 
(0.03)** 
0.84 
(0.06)* 
 0.60 
(0.03)** 
0.58 
(0.06)** 
0.72 
(0.04)** 
0.76 
(0.10)* 
 0.72 
(0.03)** 
0.70 
(0.04)** 
0.69 
(0.04)** 
0.86 
(0.08) 
December 0.62 (0.02)** 
0.65 
(0.04)** 
0.76 
(0.04)** 
0.73 
(0.06)** 
 0.54 
(0.03)** 
0.58 
(0.06)** 
0.73 
(0.05)** 
0.78 
(0.12) 
 0.70 
(0.03)** 
0.67 
(0.04)** 
0.79 
(0.06)** 
0.70 
(0.07)** 
Number of observations 206,068 87,991  91,389 41,570  114,679 46,421 
Log-likelihood value -315,081.8 -122,399.6 -183,624.4 -51,163.1  -140,908.2 -24,953.6 -95,285.1 -14,196.0  -155,753.3 -91,869.3 -76,761.1 -33,999.0 
Notes: Standard Errors in parentheses. Significance levels: *significant at 5 per cent; **significant at 1 per cent. 
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Table A2.2   Estimation results of models on the duration of sick leave. All variables 
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Gender and age (ref. Men aged 25-39)         
Women aged 16-24 1.08 (0.05) 
0.82 
(0.07)* 
      
Women aged 25-39 0.70 (0.03)**
0.66 
(0.05)**
      
Women aged 40-54 0.38 (0.02)** 
0.52 
(0.06)** 
      
Women aged 55 or more 0.19 (0.02)** 
0.33 
(0.09)** 
      
Men aged 16-24 1.30 (0.05)** 
1.31 
(0.08)** 
      
Men aged 40-54 0.55 (0.03)**
0.70 
(0.05)**
      
Men aged 55 or more 0.23 (0.02)** 
0.46 
(0.06)** 
      
Age (ref. Aged 35-39)         
Aged 16-19    2.02 (0.17)** 
1.20 
(0.21) 
 1.64 
(0.14)** 
1.83 
(0.21)** 
Aged 20-24    1.66 (0.10)** 
1.28 
(0.18) 
 1.55 
(0.10)** 
1.62 
(0.15)** 
Aged 25-29    1.25 (0.07)** 
1.05 
(0.15) 
 1.35 
(0.08)** 
1.36 
(0.12)** 
Aged 30-34    1.06 (0.06) 
1.12 
(0.16) 
 1.24 
(0.08)** 
1.16 
(0.10) 
Aged 40-44    0.74 (0.05)** 
0.87 
(0.14) 
 0.70 
(0.05)** 
1.04 
(0.11) 
Aged 45-49    0.62 (0.05)** 
1.01 
(0.19) 
 0.57 
(0.05)** 
0.69 
(0.09)** 
Aged 50-54    0.46 (0.04)** 
0.61 
(0.13)* 
 0.53 
(0.05)** 
0.69 
(0.09)** 
Aged 55-59    0.36 (0.05)** 
0.56 
(0.16)* 
 0.27 
(0.04)** 
0.55 
(0.09)** 
Aged 60-64    0.27 (0.05)** 
0.31 
(0.30) 
 0.19 
(0.04)** 
0.51 
(0.13)* 
Age of the youngest cohabitant (ref. Aged 20 
or more) 
        
Missing 0.87 (0.06)* 
1.12 
(0.12) 
 0.87 
(0.09) 
1.06 
(0.22) 
 0.86 
(0.08) 
1.17 
(0.15) 
Live alone 0.94 (0.04) 
0.90 
(0.06) 
 0.92 
(0.05) 
0.93 
(0.12) 
 0.98 
(0.05) 
0.89 
(0.07) 
Aged 0-3 0.83 (0.05)** 
1.21 
(0.12) 
 0.55 
(0.03)** 
1.05 
(0.13) 
 1.17 
(0.06)** 
1.08 
(0.08) 
Aged 4-6 1.05 (0.05) 
1.07 
(0.09) 
 0.97 
(0.07) 
1.10 
(0.17) 
 1.18 
(0.09)* 
1.07 
(0.11) 
Aged 7-11 0.90 (0.04)* 
0.94 
(0.07) 
 0.79 
(0.05)** 
0.94 
(0.13) 
 1.04 
(0.07) 
0.93 
(0.09) 
Aged 12-19 0.98 (0.04) 
1.11 
(0.07) 
 0.94 
(0.05) 
1.11 
(0.13) 
 0.99 
(0.05) 
1.07 
(0.08) 
People aged 25-39 with children aged under 3         
Female 0.65 (0.05)** 
0.88 
(0.15) 
      
Male 1.34 (0.11)** 
0.86 
(0.11) 
      
Place of birth (ref. Spain)         
EU-15 1.05 (0.08) 
0.77 
(0.11) 
 1.04 
(0.11) 
1.13 
(0.32) 
 1.07 
(0.12) 
0.74 
(0.12) 
Rest of Europe 1.01 (0.08) 
0.99 
(0.12) 
 1.22 
(0.14) 
1.12 
(0.30) 
 0.89 
(0.09) 
1.03 
(0.15) 
Latin America 1.31 (0.06)**
1.26 
(0.09)**
 1.44 
(0.09)**
1.21 
(0.15)
 1.26 
(0.09)** 
1.35 
(0.13)**
Africa 1.20 (0.09)* 
1.49 
(0.14)** 
 1.14 
(0.16) 
1.81 
(0.41)** 
 1.23 
(0.11)* 
1.49 
(0.16)** 
Rest of the world 1.32 (0.22) 
1.55 
(0.43) 
 1.12 
(0.41) 
2.12 
(1.71) 
 1.37 
(0.27) 
1.59 
(0.50) 
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Degree of disability (ref. No disability)         
From 33% to 64% 0.48 (0.05)** 
0.62 
(0.10)** 
 0.56 
(0.09)** 
1.19 
(0.28) 
 0.45 
(0.07)** 
0.54 
(0.12)** 
65% or more 0.43 (0.10)** 
0.78 
(0.53) 
 0.47 
(0.16)* 
0.12 
(0.25) 
 0.46 
(0.15)* 
1.25 
(0.91) 
Social Security contribution group (ref. Skilled 
clerks) 
        
Engineers and other university graduates 0.72 (0.06)**
0.76 
(0.23)
 0.68 
(0.06)**
1.40 
(0.60)
 0.85 
(0.12) 
0.37 
(0.14)**
Engineering technicians and other skilled workers 0.90 (0.06) 
1.01 
(0.25) 
 0.84 
(0.07)* 
1.06 
(0.32) 
 1.00 
(0.14) 
0.79 
(0.32) 
Administrative chiefs and managers 0.64 (0.07)** 
1.19 
(0.28) 
 0.58 
(0.08)** 
1.51 
(0.55) 
 0.84 
(0.15) 
0.90 
(0.28) 
Assistants and other semi-skilled workers 0.73 (0.07)** 
1.34 
(0.29) 
 0.71 
(0.08)** 
2.04 
(0.77) 
 0.82 
(0.14) 
0.92 
(0.27) 
Semi-skilled clerks 0.78 (0.06)**
1.17 
(0.18)
 0.78 
(0.07)**
1.65 
(0.32)*
 0.84 
(0.11) 
0.81 
(0.19)
Assistant clerks 1.13 (0.07)* 
1.12 
(0.16) 
 1.04 
(0.06) 
1.21 
(0.20) 
 1.22 
(0.15) 
0.84 
(0.21) 
Skilled labourers 0.79 (0.05)** 
1.43 
(0.17)** 
 0.67 
(0.05)** 
1.56 
(0.27)* 
 1.01 
(0.10) 
1.16 
(0.22) 
Semi-skilled labourers 0.83 (0.05)** 
1.46 
(0.18)** 
 0.73 
(0.05)** 
1.67 
(0.26)** 
 1.08 
(0.12) 
1.15 
(0.23) 
Unskilled labourers 0.83 (0.05)**
1.47 
(0.18)**
 0.67 
(0.04)**
1.56 
(0.24)**
 1.13 
(0.12) 
1.20 
(0.24)
Economic activity (ref. Manufacturing)         
Primary sector 0.67 (0.11)* 
0.98 
(0.21) 
 0.70 
(0.19) 
0.90 
(0.43) 
 0.69 
(0.13) 
1.04 
(0.25) 
Construction 0.71 (0.03)**
0.94 
(0.06)
 0.45 
(0.06)**
0.78 
(0.22)
 0.73 
(0.04)** 
0.93 
(0.07)
Wholesale and retail trade 0.81 (0.04)** 
0.92 
(0.07) 
 0.72 
(0.05)** 
0.85 
(0.12) 
 0.89 
(0.06) 
0.96 
(0.09) 
Hotels, restaurants and transport 0.72 (0.04)** 
0.92 
(0.07) 
 0.65 
(0.05)** 
0.94 
(0.13) 
 0.81 
(0.06)** 
0.85 
(0.08) 
Finance and other business activities 0.72 (0.04)** 
0.90 
(0.07) 
 0.71 
(0.05)** 
0.90 
(0.13) 
 0.71 
(0.05)** 
0.93 
(0.10) 
Other services 0.87 (0.05)*
0.80 
(0.08)*
 0.80 
(0.06)**
0.78 
(0.13)
 0.90 
(0.09) 
0.80 
(0.12)
Type of employer (ref. Limited corporation 
(S.L)) 
        
Corporation (S.A.) 1.11 (0.04)** 
1.03 
(0.05) 
 1.12 
(0.05)* 
0.96 
(0.09) 
 1.13 
(0.05)* 
1.09 
(0.07) 
NGO or association 1.01 (0.07) 
0.78 
(0.10)* 
 1.02 
(0.08) 
0.83 
(0.17) 
 1.00 
(0.11) 
0.74 
(0.12) 
Local government 0.76 (0.06)**
1.19 
(0.19)
 0.76 
(0.07)**
1.41 
(0.32)
 0.90 
(0.12) 
1.11 
(0.25)
Public organization 1.18 (0.10) 
0.75 
(0.17) 
 1.22 
(0.11)* 
0.87 
(0.26) 
 1.13 
(0.20) 
0.62 
(0.20) 
Central or regional government 0.61 (0.06)** 
0.85 
(0.27) 
 0.66 
(0.07)** 
1.05 
(0.36) 
 0.58 
(0.09)** 
0.44 
(0.23) 
Other kind of organization 0.75 (0.05)** 
0.87 
(0.10) 
 0.74 
(0.06)** 
0.92 
(0.17) 
 0.82 
(0.10) 
0.88 
(0.13) 
Physical person 0.68 (0.03)**
0.76 
(0.06)**
 0.73 
(0.05)**
0.93 
(0.14)
 0.65 
(0.04)** 
0.72 
(0.06)**
Number employees of the firm (ref. 1,001 – 
5,000) 
        
0-50 0.63 (0.05)** 
0.85 
(0.10) 
 0.66 
(0.05)** 
0.70 
(0.11)* 
 0.60 
(0.07)** 
1.00 
(0.17) 
51-100 0.73 (0.06)** 
0.94 
(0.12) 
 0.77 
(0.07)** 
0.74 
(0.14) 
 0.70 
(0.09)** 
1.13 
(0.20) 
101-300 0.69 (0.05)**
0.94 
(0.11)
 0.74 
(0.06)**
0.75 
(0.12)
 0.64 
(0.08)** 
1.17 
(0.20)
301-600 0.80 (0.07)** 
0.88 
(0.12) 
 0.85 
(0.07) 
0.79 
(0.15) 
 0.75 
(0.10)* 
1.00 
(0.19) 
601-1,000 0.97 (0.09) 
0.98 
(0.15) 
 1.01 
(0.10) 
0.99 
(0.20) 
 0.89 
(0.14) 
0.99 
(0.22) 
More than 5,000 1.03 (0.14) 
0.84 
(0.21) 
 1.01 
(0.15) 
0.72 
(0.23) 
 1.07 
(0.21) 
1.14 
(0.35) 
Type of contract and work time (ref. fixed-term 
and full-time)   
      
Open-ended and full-time 0.95 (0.03) 
1.00 
(0.05) 
 0.94 
(0.04) 
1.10 
(0.11) 
 1.01 
(0.04) 
1.01 
(0.06) 
Open-ended and part-time 0.82 (0.04)** 
0.97 
(0.09) 
 0.85 
(0.05)** 
1.02 
(0.12) 
 0.90 
(0.09) 
1.11 
(0.17) 
Fixed-term and part-time 1.18 (0.05)** 
0.86 
(0.08) 
 1.19 
(0.06)** 
0.90 
(0.11) 
 1.14 
(0.10) 
0.88 
(0.12) 
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Other kind of contract 0.98 (0.08) 
1.05 
(0.38) 
 0.97 
(0.10) 
0.98 
(0.60) 
 1.13 
(0.15) 
1.29 
(0.56) 
Wage quintile (ref. Quintile 3)         
Quintile 1 0.89 (0.04)** 
1.04 
(0.08) 
 0.96 
(0.05) 
0.93 
(0.12) 
 0.84 
(0.06)* 
1.13 
(0.12) 
Quintile 2 0.94 (0.04) 
1.08 
(0.06) 
 0.96 
(0.05) 
1.15 
(0.13) 
 0.95 
(0.05) 
1.07 
(0.08) 
Quintile 4 1.07 (0.04)
1.01 
(0.06)
 1.06 
(0.07)
0.94 
(0.13)
 1.10 
(0.06) 
1.02 
(0.07)
Quintile 5 1.01 (0.05) 
1.00 
(0.07) 
 1.08 
(0.07) 
1.02 
(0.18) 
 0.99 
(0.06) 
1.00 
(0.08) 
Region of residence (ref. Andalucía)         
Aragón 1.35 (0.13)**
0.57 
(0.08)**
 1.42 
(0.17)**
0.77 
(0.18)
 1.33 
(0.18)* 
0.54 
(0.09)**
Asturias 1.18 (0.11) 
0.56 
(0.09)** 
 1.20 
(0.16) 
0.53 
(0.18) 
 1.14 
(0.15) 
0.54 
(0.10)** 
Baleares 1.56 (0.11)** 
1.32 
(0.16)* 
 1.60 
(0.16)** 
1.32 
(0.28) 
 1.50 
(0.15)** 
1.37 
(0.21)* 
Canarias 1.31 (0.08)** 
1.31 
(0.15)* 
 1.33 
(0.10)** 
1.66 
(0.35)* 
 1.29 
(0.10)** 
1.24 
(0.17) 
Cantabria 1.80 (0.18)**
0.49 
(0.13)**
 1.75 
(0.26)**
0.74 
(0.39)
 1.86 
(0.27)** 
0.42 
(0.12)**
Castilla y León 1.34 (0.10)** 
0.98 
(0.10) 
 1.50 
(0.15)** 
1.50 
(0.27)* 
 1.23 
(0.12)* 
0.86 
(0.11) 
Castilla- La Mancha 1.11 (0.08) 
1.11 
(0.10) 
 1.10 
(0.11) 
1.38 
(0.26) 
 1.17 
(0.12) 
1.11 
(0.12) 
Cataluña 1.18 (0.06)** 
0.93 
(0.06) 
 1.23 
(0.08)** 
1.14 
(0.15) 
 1.12 
(0.07) 
0.89 
(0.07) 
Valencia 0.65 (0.03)**
0.62 
(0.04)**
 0.71 
(0.05)**
0.86 
(0.11)
 0.60 
(0.04)** 
0.57 
(0.05)**
Extremadura 0.96 (0.12) 
0.96 
(0.14) 
 1.00 
(0.14) 
1.24 
(0.49) 
 0.98 
(0.18) 
0.88 
(0.14) 
Galicia 0.72 (0.04)** 
0.51 
(0.05)** 
 0.69 
(0.06)** 
0.63 
(0.13)* 
 0.75 
(0.06)** 
0.48 
(0.06)** 
Madrid 1.76 (0.09)** 
1.21 
(0.09)** 
 1.89 
(0.13)** 
1.43 
(0.20)* 
 1.63 
(0.12)** 
1.18 
(0.10) 
Murcia 0.88 (0.07)
0.54 
(0.06)**
 0.77 
(0.09)*
0.53 
(0.13)*
 0.99 
(0.11) 
0.54 
(0.07)**
Navarra 3.26 (0.32)** 
1.01 
(0.18) 
 3.25 
(0.43)** 
0.95 
(0.40) 
 3.09 
(0.42)** 
1.01 
(0.21) 
País Vasco 1.11 (0.07) 
0.81 
(0.09) 
 1.21 
(0.11)* 
0.89 
(0.21) 
 1.03 
(0.09) 
0.77 
(0.10)* 
La Rioja 1.80 (0.32)** 
1.18 
(0.28) 
 1.40 
(0.32) 
1.01 
(0.41) 
 2.48 
(0.62)** 
1.23 
(0.35) 
Actual to potential experience ratio (ref. 0.76-
1)   
      
Current job is the first one 1.31 (0.07)** 
0.86 
(0.07) 
 1.39 
(0.11)** 
1.08 
(0.18) 
 1.22 
(0.10)* 
0.79 
(0.08)* 
One job before and close to the current one 1.38 (0.07)** 
0.92 
(0.08) 
 1.38 
(0.09)** 
1.23 
(0.20) 
 1.30 
(0.11)** 
0.80 
(0.09) 
One short job and ended more than 3 years 
before the current one
1.20 
(0.07)** 
0.95 
(0.10) 
 1.25 
(0.10)** 
1.11 
(0.21) 
 1.15 
(0.11) 
0.90 
(0.12) 
Less than 0.25 1.12 (0.07)
0.89 
(0.09)
 1.23 
(0.09)**
0.84 
(0.13)
 0.99 
(0.11) 
1.02 
(0.13)
From 0.26 to 0.5 1.01 (0.04) 
0.98 
(0.07) 
 1.07 
(0.05) 
1.09 
(0.14) 
 1.00 
(0.06) 
0.94 
(0.08) 
From 0.51 to 0.75 0.98 (0.03) 
0.96 
(0.05) 
 0.97 
(0.04) 
1.06 
(0.11) 
 1.01 
(0.05) 
0.92 
(0.06) 
From 1.1 to 2 or more 0.93 (0.05) 
0.77 
(0.07)** 
 0.92 
(0.06) 
0.94 
(0.17) 
 0.97 
(0.07) 
0.72 
(0.08)** 
Number of contract signed before current one 
(ref. from 0 to 10)   
      
From 11 to 20 1.02 (0.03) 
1.10 
(0.06) 
 1.02 
(0.04) 
0.92 
(0.09) 
 1.02 
(0.05) 
1.21 
(0.08)** 
More than 20 contracts 1.05 (0.04) 
1.09 
(0.07) 
 1.06 
(0.05) 
0.81 
(0.09) 
 1.06 
(0.05) 
1.26 
(0.09)** 
Day of entry into sick leave (ref. Wednesday)         
Saturday, Sunday and Monday 0.81 (0.03)** 
0.82 
(0.05)** 
 0.97 
(0.04) 
0.99 
(0.11) 
 0.67 
(0.03)** 
0.78 
(0.05)** 
Tuesday 0.97 (0.04) 
1.02 
(0.06) 
 1.00 
(0.05) 
0.94 
(0.12) 
 0.94 
(0.05) 
1.05 
(0.08) 
Thursday 0.87 (0.04)** 
0.93 
(0.06) 
 0.92 
(0.05) 
1.11 
(0.14) 
 0.82 
(0.05)** 
0.89 
(0.07) 
Friday 0.69 (0.03)**
0.56 
(0.04)**
 0.75 
(0.04)**
0.91 
(0.11)
 0.65 
(0.04)** 
0.46 
(0.04)**
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Month of entry into sick leave (ref. March)         
January 0.90 (0.04)* 
0.97 
(0.10) 
 0.93 
(0.06) 
0.98 
(0.18) 
 0.88 
(0.07) 
0.94 
(0.11) 
February 0.94 (0.05) 
0.95 
(0.09) 
 0.98 
(0.07) 
1.03 
(0.19) 
 0.90 
(0.07) 
0.90 
(0.10) 
April 0.78 (0.04)** 
1.19 
(0.12) 
 0.84 
(0.06)* 
1.19 
(0.23) 
 0.72 
(0.06)** 
1.17 
(0.14) 
May 0.69 (0.04)**
1.19 
(0.11)
 0.72 
(0.05)**
1.20 
(0.21)
 0.67 
(0.05)** 
1.17 
(0.13)
June 0.66 (0.04)** 
1.20 
(0.11) 
 0.72 
(0.05)** 
1.44 
(0.25)* 
 0.61 
(0.05)** 
1.12 
(0.12) 
July 0.68 (0.04)** 
1.15 
(0.11) 
 0.72 
(0.05)** 
1.27 
(0.22) 
 0.64 
(0.05)** 
1.08 
(0.12) 
August 0.66 (0.04)** 
1.02 
(0.10) 
 0.68 
(0.05)** 
1.30 
(0.23) 
 0.66 
(0.06)** 
0.90 
(0.10) 
September 0.68 (0.04)**
0.99 
(0.09)
 0.64 
(0.05)**
1.20 
(0.21)
 0.73 
(0.06)** 
0.93 
(0.11)
October 0.74 (0.04)** 
0.98 
(0.09) 
 0.72 
(0.05)** 
0.87 
(0.16) 
 0.78 
(0.06)** 
0.99 
(0.11) 
November 0.81 (0.04)** 
1.00 
(0.09) 
 0.82 
(0.05)** 
1.04 
(0.18) 
 0.79 
(0.06)** 
0.96 
(0.11) 
December 0.80 (0.04)** 
0.87 
(0.09) 
 0.83 
(0.06)** 
0.81 
(0.15) 
 0.76 
(0.06)** 
0.88 
(0.11) 
Job tenure until sick leave (ref. Quantile 1)         
Quantile 2 1.01 (0.04) 
0.90 
(0.05) 
 0.93 
(0.04) 
0.94 
(0.10) 
 1.11 
(0.06)* 
0.88 
(0.06) 
Quantile 3 0.88 (0.03)** 
0.90 
(0.05) 
 0.86 
(0.04)** 
0.89 
(0.09) 
 0.92 
(0.04) 
0.92 
(0.06) 
Quantile 4 0.73 (0.02)** 
0.85 
(0.05)** 
 0.68 
(0.03)** 
0.97 
(0.10) 
 0.78 
(0.04)** 
0.82 
(0.05)** 
Entity responsible for payment (ref. 
MATEPSS)   
      
National Social Security Institute 0.60 (0.02)**  
 0.61 
(0.02)**  
 0.58 
(0.02)** 
 
Number of observations 43,017 15,038  21,988 3,621  21,029 11,417 
Log-likelihood value -74,943.2 -20,833.4  -38,749.3 -4,853.5  -35,976.5 -15,882.4 
Notes: Standard Errors in parentheses. Significance levels: *significant at 5 per cent; **significant at 1 per 
cent. 
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CHAPTER  3 Th e impact of  worker’s age o n the con sequen ces of  o ccu patio nal  acciden ts:  Empirical  evidence using Spanish data 
The impact of worker’s age on the consequences of workplace 
accidents: Empirical evidence using Spanish data 
1. Introduction 
In the coming years, the Spanish labour force will age significantly. From 2012 to 2020, the 
economically active population aged 60 and over will increase by 33 per cent13. Moreover, by 
2020, workers aged 60 and over will represent 6.2 per cent of the labour force, while they 
accounted for 4.7 per cent in 2012. As a result, older workers will be called on to remain 
productive later in life and to assume more strenuous jobs. In fact, the demographic pressure has 
led the European Union to develop some measures to foster what has been called active ageing, 
within the Stockholm and Barcelona targets (von Nordheim, 2004; Walker, 2008). The main goal 
is to achieve an increase in the participation rate of the elderly. These measures have been 
followed by complementary decisions by national governments. For example, in 2011, Spain 
delayed the mandatory retirement age from 65 to 67 years old (through a gradual increase from 
2013 to 2027). If all of these measures succeed, the most visible result will be an increased 
number of older workers in the labour market. This ageing of the labour force may have 
important consequences for workplace accidents.  
When the relationship between age and the consequences of the work-related injuries is analysed, 
it is important to take into account that older workers may exhibit certain characteristics that 
may exert opposite effects. On the one hand, these workers are generally more experienced and 
have a greater concern for the risks related to their job. This tends to reduce the number of 
injuries suffered by this group. On the other hand, given their age, these workers have a 
decreased ability to avoid unexpected accidents, suffer from diminished hearing and sight, and 
exude excessive confidence due to their experience, which could lead them to disregard the 
prevention measures for certain risks (Root, 1981; Blanch et al., 2009). Therefore, a priori, it is 
not easy to disentangle the ways in which ageing affects consequences of occupational injuries.  
The evidence about the relationship between age and workplace accidents has been highly 
contradictory. Nevertheless, the most common finding is that accident frequency tends to 
decrease as age increases (Root, 1981; Mitchell, 1988), but that accident severity tends to increase 
with age (Landen and Hendricks, 1992; Truchon and Fillion, 2000). However, a negative 
relationship between age and accident severity was found in the case of temporary disabilities 
(Root, 1981; Mitchell, 1988), as well as to the average number of lost working days for white-
                                                            
13 Author’s calculations based on Economically Active Population, Estimates and Projections database (ILO, Department of 
Statistics).  
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collar and service workers (Dillingham, 1981). Additionally, a U-shaped relationship between age 
and the number of lost days per injury has also been reported (Blanch et al., 2009).  
This chapter sheds light on this debate by providing empirical evidence regarding the effect of 
the worker’s age on the severity of work-related injuries. Using data from the Spanish Statistics 
on Accidents at Work (Estadística de Accidentes de Trabajo in Spanish, EAT), an administrative 
record of all of the workplace accidents that cause sick leave, we assess if, once the accident has 
happened, the age of the worker has a significant effect on the severity of his or her injury, as 
well as on the duration of the sick leave. We add to the literature in several respects. First, 
previous authors who have examined this issue have generally used survey data. This type of data 
involve several limitations, among them the possibility of bias since the data on risk factors and 
workplace injuries are collected in the same questionnaire. The bias could occur because certain 
risk factors could make subjects more likely to remember work-related injuries and vice versa. 
We solve this limitation by using administrative data that contains information about all the work 
accidents that have occurred during a whole year and where all the information related to the 
accident is collected when the accident occurred. Second, the other important advantage of the 
database is that it includes a wide set of variables related to how the accident happened and its 
consequences. This allows us to take into account unobserved accident heterogeneity, a fact that, 
as discussed in next section, is especially relevant because older workers are more prone to suffer 
some type of accident or injury. Finally, the analysis takes into account two aspects of the 
consequences of workplace accidents: the degree of the injury and the duration of the sick leave. 
This allows us to study if there are differences in both dimensions across workers classified 
according to their age.  
In this context the chapter is organised as follows. Section 2 describes the data used and 
summarises a descriptive analysis. Section 3 provides an econometric analysis of the impact of 
age on the severity of injuries, while Section 4 presents the results of the estimation of a model 
explaining the impact of age on the duration of the sick leave caused by workplace injuries. 
Finally, Section 5 presents the main conclusions.  
2. Data and descriptive statistics 
In this section, we present the data used in the chapter and summarise the main descriptive 
statistics. In turn, this will serve to characterise the workplace accidents suffered by individuals 
classified according to their age.  
The data used are the administrative microdata from the Spanish Statistics on Accidents at Work 
(Estadística de Accidentes de Trabajo in Spanish, EAT), compiled by the Spanish Ministry of Labour. 
This database is based on administrative registrations of all of the workplace accidents that cause 
sick leave. Thus, the database includes every accident that cause the injured person to miss at 
least one day of work (excluding the day when the accident occurred) after a medical report is 
issued. In the event that an accident occurs, employers (or workers themselves when the injured 
person is self-employed) must fill in a form where they report (through the so-called parte de 
accidents de trabajo con baja, PAT) all of the information related to the accident.  
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The EAT provides information on personal characteristics of each individual who has suffered 
an accident –such as gender, age, and place of birth– and also information about their 
professional characteristics –such as job seniority, type of contract, occupation, and daily 
earnings. Moreover, the EAT also contains information related to employer’s characteristics, 
such as industry, sector (public versus private), province where the firm operates, and number of 
workers in the firm. The EAT includes information on the establishment where the accident 
happened if the establishment is different from the place that the injured worker belongs. Finally, 
the EAT provides exhaustive information on the causes, circumstances, and consequences of the 
accident.  
Regarding the sample selection we perform for our analysis, we focus on workplace accidents 
that occurred between 2004 and 2010. This is because a new notification procedure was fully 
implemented in 2004 and some relevant variables not considered previously were included in the 
files. Still, 2010 is the last year for which there is fully available information. In order to reduce 
heterogeneity associated with the labour supply side, we limit our sample to those workers 
covered by the Social Security General Regime. We also exclude self-employed workers from the 
sample because they are likely to have different incentives and possibilities to report work-related 
injuries. Moreover, observations corresponding to commuting accidents (i.e., those that occurred 
while the worker was commuting to or from his or her workplace) and to relapses have been 
deleted. Our selected sample, therefore, consists of 5,104,179 workplace accidents, of which 
5,053,188 (99 per cent) are minor and 50,991 (1 per cent) are severe or fatal.  
Figure 3.1 provides descriptive statistics to compare the consequences of workplace accidents 
across workers grouped by age. We observe that the injuries of older workers are substantially 
more likely to be severe or fatal than those of younger workers. Indeed, the more severe cases 
and fatalities account for larger proportions of the accidents among older workers than among 
younger ones. Conversely, minor accidents are more prevalent among younger workers.   
Figure 3.1   Distribution of the severity of workplace accidents by age 
Source: Own elaboration based on EAT. 
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Figure 3.1 suggests that a work-related accident to an older worker would more likely result in 
greater severity of injury than it would if the same accident happened to a younger worker. As a 
result, it is expected that the average duration of the sick leave caused by a work-related injury 
would increase with age. In fact, Figure 3.2 shows that the highest average in lost working days 
due to work-related injury is found for higher age intervals. In particular, the average number of 
non-working days among workers aged 65 and over (36.6 days) is twice as high as for workers 
aged 16 to 24 (17.3 days).  
Figure 3.2   Mean lost working days due to workplace accidents by age 
 
Source: Own elaboration based on EAT. 
Differences in the consequences of work-related injuries between older and younger workers 
could reflect the physical effects of ageing. For instance, declining bodily coordination among 
older workers could likely contribute to a greater number of injuries due to falling. Table 3.1 
provides the distribution of work-related injuries according to the worker’s specific physical 
activity at the moment the accident occurred as well as how the injury was incurred, both broken 
down by the worker’s age. A look at the events leading to workplace accidents suggests that the 
relative risks of some types of events jump for the oldest group of workers. For instance, injuries 
due to bodily motion among workers aged 65 and over account for 42.1 per cent of all their 
injuries, but for workers aged 16-24 they represent only 23.6 per cent. Conversely, injuries 
associated with handling of objects are significantly higher for younger workers. The frequency 
declines from 32.5 per cent among 16-24 year-olds to 22.4 per cent for workers aged 65 and 
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for younger workers (9.5 per cent). Conversely, injuries due to contact with sharp, pointed, 
rough, or coarse objects are markedly more frequent for younger workers. For workers aged 16 
to 24, the contact with a sharp object produces 15.9 per cent of injuries compared with about 9.7 
per cent for workers aged 65 and over (see Table 3.1).   
Table 3.1   Distribution of the characteristics of workplace accidents by age (percentage) 
  16‐24  25‐39 40‐49 50‐59  60‐64  65 and 
over 
Specific physical activity             
Bodily motion  23.6  26.9  30.3  32.9  35.2  42.1 
Handling of objects  32.5  30.6  29.3  28.2  26.6  22.4 
Working with hand‐held tools  15.7  14.3  13.6  13.6  14.0  11.9 
Carrying by hand  14.2  13.7  13.4  12.2  11.6  9.9 
Driving/being onboard a means of transport  5.8  5.7  4.8  3.9  4.0  5.3 
Operating machinery  5.9  6.1  5.7  6.1  5.5  4.0 
Other  2.4  2.7  2.9  3.0  3.2  4.4 
Mode of injury             
Suffered acute overloading of body  31.9 38.4 40.5 37.8  33.6  27.3
Fall  9.5 10.0 11.6 14.3  17.1  23.4
Struck by or collided with something  21.4 18.5 16.7 16.5  17.0  17.5
Crashed into something  10.1 9.9 10.1 10.7  11.4  11.4
Came into contact with sharp, pointed, 
rough, or coarse object  15.9 12.5 10.7 10.2  10.7  9.7
Contact with electric voltage, temperature 
extreme, or hazardous substance  3.7 3.5 3.3 3.1  2.9  2.6
Trapped, crushed  3.6 3.1 2.9 3.0  2.8  2.6
Kicked or bitten  1.0 1.3 1.3 1.0  1.0  1.4
Heart attacks, strokes, or other non‐
traumatic pathologies  0.0 0.1 0.2 0.5  0.7  1.0
Drowning, buried  0.3 0.4 0.3 0.3  0.3  0.3
Other  2.6 2.4 2.4 2.5  2.6  2.8
Source: Own elaboration based on EAT. 
69 
 
Beyond the fact that older workers are more likely to be injured when they are performing 
physical activity (i.e., movement) or are more prone to certain type of accidents (i.e., falls), they 
will remain absent from their job more days than their younger counterparts who suffer the same 
work-related injury. Figure 3.3 depicts the mean lost working days due to a fall in the workplace 
for workers in elementary occupations in the manufacturing sector, separated by 11 age intervals. 
Once a worker has been injured by a fall in the workplace, the average number of lost working 
days is higher among the oldest group of workers than among other workers. Thus, workers 
aged 16-24 show an average of 23 days, while the mean lost working days among workers aged 
65 and over is 51 days. This finding might indicate that older workers require a longer period of 
recuperation of a workplace accident when considering the same industry, occupation, and type 
of accident because of physiological changes associated with age that affect the body’s capacity 
to heal. 
Figure 3.3   Mean lost working days due to a fall in the workplace for manufacturing workers in 
elementary occupations by age group 
Source: Own elaboration based on EAT. 
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analysis suggests that age effects are not simply the result of job differences between older and 
younger workers, because the findings hold even when we consider the same occupation, 
industry, and type of accident. In the next section, we analyse econometrically if age remains as a 
determinant of the severity of work-related injuries once we control for the worker’s personal 
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3. The impact of worker’s age on the severity of work-related injuries 
3.1. Empirical Strategy  
The aim of this section is to evaluate empirically the impact of worker’s age on the severity of 
work-related injuries. In particular, we want to identify if, once the accident has happened, the 
age of the injured worker has a significant effect on the severity of the injury. The basic 
estimating equation in the analysis is: 
௜ܻ௝௞ ൌ ߙ ൅ ߚଵܣ݃݁௜௝௞ ൅ ߚଶ ௜ܺ௝௞ ൅ ߚଷ ௝ܸ௞ ൅ ߚସܼ௞ ൅ ߝ௜௝௞     (1) 
where ݅ indexes individuals, ݆ corresponds to a given workplace and ݇ reflects a particular 
accident; ܣ݃݁ is worker’s age, ܺ is a vector of worker’s characteristics, ܸ is a vector of 
workplace’s characteristics and ܼ is a vector of variables capturing how the accident occurred.  
The probability of a worker suffering a severe or fatal accident rather than minor can be written 
as a function of a series of covariates as:  
ݕ௜௝௞∗ ൌ Pr൫ݕ௜௝௞ ൌ 1൯ ൌ ܨሺܣ݃݁௜௝௞, ௜ܺ௝௞, ௝ܸ௞, ܼ௞, ߚሻ      (2) 
At the individual level we would observe ݕ௜௝௧ ൌ 1 if ܨ൫ܣ݃݁௜௝௞, ௜ܺ௝௞, ௝ܸ௞, ܼ௞, ߚ൯ ൐ ݖ∗ and 
ݕ௜௝௧ ൌ 0 otherwise. Given the dichotomous nature of the dependent variable, the proper model 
is a linear probability model (either a logit or a probit). 
The explanatory variables in the empirical analysis include several personal characteristics of the 
workers, job attributes and establishment characteristics, as well as covariates capturing specific 
characteristics of the accident.  
■ Worker’s personal characteristics: 
As discussed in the introduction, although the economic literature has stressed that worker’s age 
is important in determining the severity of work-related accidents, there is no consensus about 
its effect. Indeed, some studies suggest that the severity of work-related injuries increases with 
age (Landen and Hendricks, 1992; Truchon and Fillion, 2000) and others, in contrast, find a 
negative relationship (Root, 1981; Mitchell, 1988, both in the case of temporary disabilities). 
Additionally, a U-shaped relationship between age and the number of lost days per injury has 
also been reported (Blanch et al., 2009). To isolate the importance of worker’s age as a factor to 
explain the consequences of work-related accidents, we have introduced five dummy variables to 
represent age group: aged 25-39; aged 40-49; aged 50-59; aged 60-64; and aged 65 and over. The 
omitted category in this case is aged 16-24. 
The age of the worker is strongly correlated with length of service. Older workers generally are 
more experienced and are therefore more mindful of workplace hazards. But at the same time, 
they might be exposed to more dangerous jobs that require greater experience. In order to 
reduce the heterogeneity among workers due to different levels of experience at the same job, we 
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have added 5 additional dummy variables: from 3 to 6 months; from 6 months to 1 year; from 1 
to 3 years; from 3 to 10 years; and 10 or more years. The group of reference is less than 3 
months of job seniority. Moreover, age by tenure interaction has been included as an explanatory 
variable. Finally, regressions have also been run for employees with 3 years of job seniority or 
less.  
Regarding worker’s personal characteristics, we also have controlled for worker’s gender and 
place of birth.  
■ Worker’s professional characteristics: 
From the dataset, we observe the worker’s status in employment (employed in the private sector 
versus employed in the public sector), type of contract (open-ended or fixed-term), occupation, 
and earnings. 
Information about the occupations of workers is an extremely important element in the analysis 
of work-related injuries. Moreover, we can consider this variable as a proxy for educational 
attainment. We have included nine dummy variables, one for each one of the occupation groups: 
armed forces; legislators, senior officials and managers; professionals; technicians and associate 
professionals; clerks; service workers and shop and market sales workers; skilled agricultural and 
fishery workers; craft and related trade workers; and plant and machine operators and 
assemblers. The omitted category for comparison is elementary occupations.   
As indicated in Chapter 1, a worker’s earnings may have an impact on the incentive to report a 
work-related injury. In particular, the impact of wages on absenteeism is ambiguous due to the 
income and substitution effects. When the paid sick leave represents 100 per cent of the wage, 
the substitution effect disappears and the effect of wage on sick leave is therefore positive. 
However, in the Spanish system the paid sick leave due to work-related injury represents 75 per 
cent of the wage (as described in Section 2 of Chapter 2). To study which of the two effects has 
a higher impact, we have introduced a dummy variable for each one of the four salary quantiles 
with quantile 3 as the omitted category. 
■ Establishment characteristics: 
One of the reasons that the consequences of workplace accidents vary among workers’ age 
groups could be that the establishments where the accidents occur also differ. To uncover 
potential relationships between the consequences of accidents and the characteristics of 
establishments, a set of covariates has been included in the estimation: a dummy variable to 
indicate if the establishment belongs to the worker’s firm, economic activity (grouped into ten 
categories: agriculture, forestry and fishing; mining and quarrying; manufacturing; construction; 
transportation and storage; accommodation and food service activities; public administration, 
defence and compulsory social security; education; human health, social work and veterinary 
activities; and other service activities), the size of the establishment, and its geographic location 
(coded according to the 17 Spanish regions).  
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As in many other countries, Spanish health and safety regulations fix certain requirements for 
safety equipment and procedures in terms of the number of workers employed. The Occupational 
Risk Prevention Act (ORPA) of 1995 requires firms with 500 employees or more in all industries 
and with 250-499 workers in certain industries to establish their own programmes for the 
prevention of occupational injuries, including the formation of health and safety committees 
involving both management and workers. Therefore, the size of the establishment where the 
accident occurred is a potentially relevant factor in explaining the consequences of workplace 
accidents, and it can be taken as a proxy of the prevention system that the firms carry out. We 
have included seven dummy variables to describe the size of the establishment: 5-9 employees, 
10-24 employees, 25-49 employees, 50-99 employees, 100-249 employees, 250-499 employees, 
and 500 and more employees. The group of reference is less than 5 employees. We also have 
included a dummy variable to indicate if the establishment realised evaluation of workplace risks.  
■ Accident characteristics: 
Additionally, we have included a set of covariates capturing specific characteristics of the 
accident: type of location (in the usual establishment, on work-related travel, or somewhere else); 
year, day of the week, hours worked (grouped in 8 levels, from “0 to 3 hours of work” to “more 
than 22”), and time of day (day versus night work) when the accident occurred; if the type of 
activity carried out by the worker constitutes his or her usual task; place of occurrence (industrial 
site; construction site; farming, breeding, fish farming, or forest zone; tertiary activity area; health 
establishment; public area; in the home; sports area; in the air; underground; on/over water; in 
high pressure environments; and other); type of task the worker was performing (production, 
manufacturing, processing and storing; excavation, construction, repair and demolition; 
agricultural type work, forestry, horticulture, fish farming and work with live animals; service 
provided to enterprises and/or to the general public; movement, sport, and artistic activity; and 
other); and specific physical activity (operating machinery; working with hand-held tools; driving 
or being on board a means of transport or handling equipment; handling of objects; carrying by 
hand; movement; and other). 
Finally, we have added a set of control variables related to how the injury incurred. In particular, 
we observe the mode of injury (contact with electrical voltage, extreme temperatures, or 
hazardous substances; drowning, buried; crashed into something; fall; struck by or collided with 
something; came into contact with sharp/pointed/rough/coarse object; trapped, crushed; 
suffered acute overloading of body; kicked or bitten; heart attacks, strokes and other non-
traumatic pathologies; and other); the type of injury (superficial injuries and open wounds; 
fractures; dislocations, sprains and strains; traumatic amputations; concussion and internal 
injuries; burns, corrosions, scalds and frostbite; acute poisonings and infections; asphyxiation, 
drowning and non-fatal submersion; effects of noise, vibration, and pressure; effects of heat, 
light and radiation; psychological trauma, traumatic shock; multiple injuries; heart attacks, strokes 
and other non-traumatic pathologies; and other) and the part of the body injured (head; neck; 
back; trunk and internal organs; upper extremities; lower extremities; whole body and multiple 
sites; and other). 
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3.2. Summary of results 
The results of the estimation of the probit model14 are summarised in Table 3.2. The values in 
the table represent the coefficients of the categories of the variables. A positive coefficient 
indicates that the corresponding category increases the probability of suffering a severe or fatal 
accident, while a negative coefficient indicates the opposite. Estimates that reach a significant 
probability level are denoted by asterisks; the standard errors are shown in parentheses. As 
evidenced by the large value of the likelihood ratio test, the overall explanatory power of the 
models is highly significant. The first column contains estimates based on the full sample and the 
second column offers the results for those workers with three or fewer years of job seniority. To 
conserve space, Table 3.2 reports the results involving only our main variables of interest; the full 
results are shown in Table A3.1 of the Appendix.  
Table 3.2   Estimation results of probit models on the probability of suffering a severe or fatal 
workplace accident. Main variables 
 All employees 
Employees with 3 years  
of seniority or less 
Gender (ref. Women)  
Men 0.216**(0.008) 
0.223** 
(0.010) 
Age (ref. 16-24)   
25-39 0.075** (0.007) 
0.072** 
(0.008) 
40-49 0.183**(0.008) 
0.181** 
(0.009) 
50-59 0.245**(0.009) 
0.245** 
(0.011) 
60-64 0.288** (0.013) 
0.290** 
(0.019) 
65 and over 0.326** (0.045) 
0.337** 
(0.068) 
Age*Tenure 
0.000* 
(0.000) 
0.000 
(0.000) 
Job seniority (ref. Fewer than 3 months)   
From 3 to 6 months -0.034** (0.008) 
-0.036** 
(0.008) 
From 6 months to 1 year -0.030** (0.008) 
-0.035** 
(0.008) 
From 1 to 3 years -0.010(0.007) 
-0.024* 
(0.011) 
From 3 to 10 years -0.002(0.009)  
10 or more years 0.021(0.014)  
Number of observations 5,104,179 3,446,587  
Log-likelihood value -186,479.9 -125,909.6  
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses. Significance levels: *significant at 5 per cent; **significant at 1 per 
cent. 
                                                            
14 A probit model is estimated because the probistic regression is the natural model when the outcome is 1 exactly 
when a hidden Gaussian variable ܼ଴ ൌ ܺ′ߚ଴ ൅ ߝ଴ exceeds a threshold ܿ, with ߝ~ܰሺ0, ߪଶሻ. 
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From the results reported in Table 3.2, we may conclude that the probability that a work-related 
injury is severe or fatal clearly increases with the age of the injured worker. Taking the group of 
the youngest workers (from 16 to 24) as a reference, we observe that for every age group, the 
probability of a more severe accident increases from 7.5 per cent for the group aged 25 to 39 to 
32.6 per cent for workers aged 65 and older. We observe that job seniority is significant only 
when the worker has been working less than 1 year at the same job. In particular, the injuries of 
workers who have been working at the same job from 3 months to 1 year are 3 per cent less 
likely to be severe or fatal than those of workers with less than 3 months of experience. Thus, 
the results suggest that after one year on the job, workers acquire enough tenure to avoid 
workplace hazards related to the lack of experience. Furthermore, we observe that the age by 
tenure interaction variable is insignificant. 
Findings are remarkably similar when we look at the estimated results for the sample of accidents 
involving workers with 3 years of tenure or less, so we can safely consider that the fact of having 
a large number of experienced workers in the full sample does not hinder the effect of the 
worker’s age in our study.  
Given these results, we conclude that the impact of age on the severity of work-related injuries is 
mainly determined by the physiological characteristics of the worker. In other words, being a 
more experienced worker does not affect the severity of a work-related injury.  
3.3. Sample selection bias correction 
The EAT database presents an important limitation: it contains data only on workers that have 
experienced an accident, not data on all workers potentially at risk of having an accident. The 
main consequence is that the sample is highly selected. The variables that influence the 
probability of having an accident (among them, the age of the worker) determine whether or not 
an individual is included in the data set. To circumvent this problem, we follow the strategy 
proposed by García-Serrano et al. (2010) to estimate the impact of worker’s age on the 
consequences of work-related injuries, in spite of the presence of sample selection15. The strategy 
consists of using an even more selected sample. On some occasions, when a worker suffers a 
work-related accident, other workers are involved in this accident. These workers are included in 
the data set as well and we can identify them through the variable multiple accidents. 
Figure 3.4 presents evidence for the validity of the identification strategy. If multiple accidents 
capture the changes in the accident proneness composition of different groups, then the ratio of 
multiple to total accidents should be stable over time, everything else equal. In fact, Figure 3.4 
shows that this ratio remains stable over the period of study. The strategy appears valid and, by 
focusing on this subset of accidents, the link between a worker’s age and his or her inclusion in 
the sample is eliminated (García-Serrano et al., 2010). Our selected sample, therefore, consists of 
39,108 work-related injuries, of which 37,130 (94.9 per cent) are minor and 1,978 (5.1 per cent) 
are severe or fatal. 
                                                            
15 This strategy in turn is based on the identification strategy proposed by Levitt and Porter (2001) in the context of 
the study of seat belt and air bag effectiveness.  
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Figure 3.4   Ratio multiple accidents to total accidents, 2004‐2010 
 
Source: Own elaboration based on EAT. 
After limiting the sample to multiple accidents, the positive effect of age on the severity of work-
related injuries survives. Further, controlling for sample selection significantly increases the 
impact of being an older worker (i.e. aged 65 and over) on the consequences of a workplace 
accident. In fact, controlling for sample selection, the injuries of workers aged 65 and over are 90 
per cent more likely to be severe or fatal than those of their counterparts aged 16 to 24 (see 
Table 3.3).  
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Table 3.3    Estimation results of probit models on the probability of suffering a severe or fatal 
workplace accident correcting for sample selection. Main variables 
 
Sample correcting for 
sample selection 
Gender (ref. Women) 
Men
0.228**
(0.057) 
Age (ref. 16-24)   
25-39
0.115* 
(0.047) 
40-49
0.207**
(0.053) 
50-59
0.275** 
(0.062) 
60-64
0.365**
(0.104) 
65 and over
0.896* 
(0.385) 
Age * Tenure 
0.000
(0.000) 
Job seniority (ref. Fewer than 3 months) 
0.001 
(0.052) 
From 3 to 6 months
-0.010
(0.052) 
From 6 months to 1 year -0.020 (0.049) 
From 1 to 3 years
-0.019
(0.058) 
From 3 to 10 years -0.039 
(0.094) 
10 or more years
0.001
(0.052) 
Number of observations 38,974  
Log-likelihood value -4,675.7  
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses. Significance levels: *significant at 5 per cent; **significant at 1 per 
cent. 
Throughout this section, we have observed that, once we control for the main personal 
characteristics of the worker, his or her workplace, and the way the accident took place, the 
variable age significantly increases the probability that a given injury is severe or fatal. 
Furthermore, the analysis of work-related injuries and its determinants is strongly related to a 
rather different issue: the length of the sick leave associated to each injury. The expected result is 
that more severe injuries should be related to longer sick leave spells. The next section deals with 
this issue, analysing if age is a significant variable in the explanation of the duration of the sick 
leave caused by work-related injuries. 
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4. The impact of worker’s age on the duration of sick leave caused by 
work-related injuries  
Our previous results in Section 3 suggest that the older a worker is, the greater the probability 
that if he or she suffers a work-related injury, it will be severe or fatal. The expected result in 
terms of the duration of sick leave is that older workers will be out of work for longer periods of 
time. This fact would have an immediate impact on the health care cost (either public or private), 
and therefore should be added to the relevant information set in the debate regarding, for 
instance, the delay of the mandatory retirement age. In this section, we econometrically assess 
the impact of age on the duration of sick leave caused by work-related injuries. Our main 
objective is to analyse the number of days between when a worker suffers workplace accident 
until he or she returns to the workplace, and assess the effect of personal and job characteristics 
on such length.  
In the first step, a preliminary descriptive analysis of the sick leave spells is produced using 
hazard functions. The hazard ratio, or the probability of failure at a certain time, is the 
conditional probability of returning to work after sick leave at that time, given that an individual 
has not had this event just prior to that time. Figure 3.5 plots these hazard rates for workers aged 
16 to 24 and workers aged 65 and over.  
Looking at Figure 3.5, we can observe that institutional settings play a crucial role in the duration 
of sickness absence. In fact, Figure 3.5 reveals that many exits from activity occur at seven-day 
intervals starting on the 8th day, corresponding to the day after the medical certificate needs to be 
reissued. On the other hand, most sick leave spells end within the first 20 days. Given the shapes 
of these estimated baseline hazards, it seems clear that fitting a Weibull hazard would be 
appropriate16.  
Further, Figure 3.5 shows that there are strong differences between younger (16-24) and older 
(65 and over) workers in the duration of sick leave spells due to work-related injuries. In fact, 
during the first 15 days, the hazard rate of returning to work after a workplace accident is higher 
for younger than for older workers. This means that the duration of sick leave spells is generally 
longer for older workers. 
                                                            
16 The Weibull distribution is suitable for modelling data with monotone hazard rates that either increase or decrease 
exponentially with time.  
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Figure 3.5   Hazard rates of returning to work after a workplace accident by age group 
 
Source: Own elaboration based on EAT. 
This study applies a duration model to estimate the hazard of ending the spell of sick leave due 
to work-related injury. Specifically, we study how a set of covariates have an impact on the 
probability of returning to the workplace when a worker has a sickness absence due to a work-
related accident. We follow the methodology described in Chapter 2, Section 5.1.  
As before, we have estimated the model for total sample, as well as for those workers who have 
been working at the same job for less than 3 years. We also have run the model controlling for 
sample selection. From our data, we select those observations with a sick leave of at least one 
day. We exclude the observations for fatal injuries. Our sample consists of 5,099,464 
observations, for which we observe 4,241,796 complete durations (83.2%). We have included the 
same explanatory variables as the model for analysing the severity of work-related injuries. 
Nevertheless, we have also controlled for accident severity by including one dummy variable to 
indicate if the accident was severe or fatal.  
The regression results for the total sample, for workers with 3 or fewer years of job seniority and 
correcting for sample selection can be found in Table 3.4. This table provides the estimated 
hazard ratios. Hazard ratios at each survival time are related to absolute differences in 
characteristics: 
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So, hazard ratios are interpreted as follows. A value below (above) 1 means that the likelihood of 
a transition from sick leave back to work is lower (higher) than that of a worker in the 
comparison group with all others covariates held constant. As in the previous section, we will 
focus exclusively on the main variables affecting age differences on sick leave duration and omit 
the effects of other explanatory variables. The full estimation results for all variables are available 
in Table A3.2 of Appendix. 
Table 3.4   Estimation results of models on the duration of sick leave after a workplace accident. 
Main variables 
 Full Sample 
Sample 
correcting for 
sample selection
 All employees 
Employees 
with 3 or fewer 
years of tenure 
All employees 
Gender (ref. Women)    
Men
1.074** 
(0.002) 
1.075** 
(0.002) 
1.159** 
(0.023) 
Age (ref. 16-24)  
25-39
0.866**
(0.002) 
0.868**
(0.002) 
0.799** 
(0.017) 
40-49
0.743** 
(0.002) 
0.744** 
(0.002) 
0.706** 
(0.017) 
50-59
0.651**
(0.002) 
0.650**
(0.002) 
0.611** 
(0.019) 
60-64
0.588** 
(0.003) 
0.578** 
(0.004) 
0.531** 
(0.032) 
65 and over
0.567**
(0.011) 
0.569**
(0.017) 
0.498* 
(0.060) 
Age*Tenure 
0.999** 
(0.000) 
0.999** 
(0.000) 
0.999 
(0.000) 
Job seniority (ref. Fewer than 3 months)  
From 3 to 6 months 1.026** 
(0.002) 
1.027** 
(0.002) 
1.073** 
(0.027) 
From 6 months to 1 year 1.030** (0.002) 
1.034** 
(0.002) 
1.050* 
(0.026) 
From 1 to 3 years
1.024**
(0.002) 
1.041**
(0.003) 
1.040 
(0.024) 
From 3 to 10 years
1.004 
(0.002)  
0.994 
(0.026) 
10 or more years
0.975**
(0.004)  
0.942 
(0.041) 
Number of observations 5,099,464 3,443,734 38,708 
Log-likelihood value -7,160,347.7 -4,814,933.2 -53,442.0 
Notes: Standard Errors in parentheses. Significance levels: *significant at 5 per cent; **significant at 1 per 
cent. 
Ignoring sample selection, our empirical results suggest that the duration of sick leave increases 
clearly with age. The hazard rate of returning to the workplace after sick leave for workers aged 
65 and over is 0.57 times the hazard rate of workers aged 16 to 24. In other words, older workers 
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remain absent from work more days after a work-related injury than younger workers. Regarding 
job seniority, we find a U-shaped relationship between the number of lost working days due to a 
workplace accident and the length of service. Thus, the highest durations of sick leave are 
predicted for workers with fewer than 3 months of experience and for those with 10 or more 
years, while the lowest durations are rather found in the groups of workers with moderate 
experience – i.e. from 3 months to 3 years.  
These results are observed in the three samples, but more clearly so when sample selection is 
controlled for. In fact, when sample selection is controlled, the expected absence duration for 
workers aged 65 and over is twice the duration expected for workers aged 16 to 24. In sum, our 
empirical evidence suggests that age is an important determinant in the explanation of sick leave 
duration related to workplace accidents. Once we control for the remaining determinants, we 
find a positive relationship between age and sick leave duration, which implies a greater cost in 
health care.  
5. Conclusions 
The current debate regarding the recent extension of the mandatory retirement age from 65 to 
67 years has attracted the public attention, both from the media and academia, with strong 
opposite arguments between those defending the political decision and those opposed to it. In 
any case, and given the public statements of the main agents involved in this decision 
(government, worker’s and employer’s organizations, etc.) it seems that the main underlying 
concern is the sustainability of the public pension system. This chapter, however, brings to light 
different aspects of the decision of delaying the retirement age (or in other terms, increasing the 
number of older workers in activity), which remain hidden in the debate. Specifically, in this 
chapter we analyse the impact of age on the severity of work-related injuries, as well as on the 
duration of the sick leave related to them. If severity and the duration of the sick leave increase 
with age, we should expect that the delay of the retirement age would bring a greater number of 
severely injured workers. This may increase the cost of healthcare and thus compromise the 
potential gains from the delay in the retirement age. If, on the contrary, severity of injuries does 
not depend on age, there would not be special risks derived from this political decision. In order 
to clarify this fact, we need a detailed account of the impact of age on the severity of the injuries 
and the duration of the sick leave related to them; this is the contribution of the chapter. 
We have developed our task in two steps. First, we have estimated a probit model, in which we 
explain the severity of a given injury as a function of the personal and professional characteristics 
of the injured worker, as well as of his or her workplace and of the accident itself. Our results 
allow us to assert that once the accident has happened, the probability that it results in a severe 
or fatal injury clearly increases with age. Second, we have applied a duration model to estimate 
the hazard of returning to work after a sick leave spell due to work-related injury. Our empirical 
analysis allows us to conclude that the duration of sick leave increases significantly with age, once 
we have controlled for the personal characteristics of the worker, the workplace, the type of 
accident, and the way in which it took place. 
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workers in certain industries to establish their own programmes for the prevention of workplace 
accidents, including the formation of health and safety committees involving both management 
and workers. The ORPA was a legislative reaction to the high level of incidence of workplace 
accidents in the 1990s, with a special emphasis on the immediate physical determinants of work-
related injuries, such as the manipulation of hazardous materials, body protection, signalling, etc. 
Age was not specifically considered as a determinant of work-related injuries, and our 
econometric results suggest that some legal reform is needed in this regard, given that the effect 
of this variable on the probability that an accident results in more severe injuries is as important 
as the usual suspects (for example, if the accident took place in the main workplace or not). In 
any case, our work suggests that age is an important variable to explain workplace accidents in 
Spain, and therefore should be taken into account in the empirical studies. 
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Appendix 
Table A3.1   Estimation results of probit models on the probability of suffering a severe or fatal 
workplace accident. All variables 
 Full Sample Sample correcting 
for sample selection 
 All employees 
Employees with 3 
or less years of 
tenure 
All employees 
Gender (ref. Women)   
Men
0.216** 
(0.008) 
0.223** 
(0.010) 
0.228** 
(0.057) 
Age (ref. 16-24)    
25-39
0.075** 
(0.007) 
0.072** 
(0.008) 
0.115* 
(0.047) 
40-49
0.183** 
(0.008) 
0.181** 
(0.009) 
0.207** 
(0.053) 
50-59
0.245** 
(0.009) 
0.245** 
(0.011) 
0.275** 
(0.062) 
60-64
0.288** 
(0.013) 
0.290** 
(0.019) 
0.365** 
(0.104) 
65 and over
0.326** 
(0.045) 
0.337** 
(0.068) 
0.896* 
(0.385) 
Age*Tenure 
0.000* 
(0.000) 
0.000 
(0.000) 
0.000 
(0.000) 
Place of birth (ref. Spain)    
EU-15
0.117** 
(0.018) 
0.122** 
(0.019) 
-0.051 
(0.109) 
Rest of Europe
0.158** 
(0.014) 
0.145** 
(0.015) 
0.225* 
(0.096) 
Africa
0.070** 
(0.012) 
0.066** 
(0.013) 
0.030 
(0.085) 
Latin America
0.018 
(0.011) 
0.012 
(0.012) 
-0.044 
(0.075) 
Rest of the world
0.208** 
(0.028) 
0.227** 
(0.029) 
0.297 
(0.209) 
Missing
0.039 
(0.079) 
0.081 
(0.091)  
Professional situation (ref. Employee private 
sector)    
Employee public sector
0.103** 
(0.012) 
0.098** 
(0.016) 
-0.175* 
(0.080) 
Occupation (ref. Elementary occupations)    
Armed Forces
0.072* 
(0.034) 
0.076 
(0.043) 
0.045 
(0.226) 
Legislators, senior officials and managers
0.211** 
(0.030) 
0.149** 
(0.049) 
0.343 
(0.186) 
Professionals
0.208** 
(0.017) 
0.228** 
(0.024) 
0.385** 
(0.104) 
Technicians and associate professionals
0.142** 
(0.014) 
0.181** 
(0.018) 
0.197* 
(0.086) 
Clerks
-0.037* 
(0.015) 
-0.126** 
(0.021) 
0.107 
(0.110) 
Service workers and shop and market sales workers
-0.067** 
(0.01) 
-0.060** 
(0.013) 
-0.082 
(0.070) 
Skilled agricultural and fishery workers
0.013 
(0.024) 
0.002 
(0.030) 
-0.023 
(0.177) 
Craft and related trades workers 0.040** 0.038** 0.024 
84 
 
(0.006) (0.007) (0.042) 
Plant and machine operators, and assemblers
0.048** 
(0.007) 
0.042** 
(0.009) 
0.153** 
(0.049) 
Type of contract (ref. Fixed-term contract)    
Open-ended contract
-0.017** 
(0.006) 
-0.015* 
(0.007) 
0.019 
(0.042) 
Job seniority (ref. Less than 3 months)    
From 3 to 6 months -0.034** (0.008) 
-0.036** 
(0.008) 
0.001 
(0.052) 
From 6 months to 1 year -0.030** (0.008) 
-0.035** 
(0.008) 
-0.010 
(0.052) 
From 1 to 3 years -0.010 (0.007) 
-0.024* 
(0.011) 
-0.020 
(0.049) 
From 3 to 10 years -0.002 (0.009)  
-0.019 
(0.058) 
10 or more years 0.021 (0.014)  
-0.039 
(0.094) 
Earnings (ref. Quantile 3)    
Quantile 1
0.006 
(0.007) 
0.009 
(0.008) 
0.032 
(0.050) 
Quantile 2 0.004 (0.006) 
0.003 
(0.007) 
0.024 
(0.044) 
Quantile 4 0.009 (0.007) 
0.028** 
(0.009) 
0.077 
(0.043) 
Does the establishment belong to the worker's 
firm? (ref. No)    
Yes -0.128** (0.007) 
-0.119** 
(0.008) 
-0.170** 
(0.044) 
Economic activity (ref. Construction)    
Agriculture, forestry and fishing 0.034 
(0.022) 
0.045 
(0.027) 
0.070 
(0.135) 
Mining and quarrying 0.123** 
(0.022) 
0.103** 
(0.029) 
0.434** 
(0.131) 
Manufacturing
0.028** 
(0.008) 
0.032** 
(0.009) 
0.005 
(0.049) 
Transport and storage -0.013 
(0.011) 
0.012 
(0.014) 
0.057 
(0.072) 
Accommodation and food service activities
-0.090** 
(0.015) 
-0.116** 
(0.017) 
0.019 
(0.124) 
Public administration and defence; compulsory 
social security
-0.071** 
(0.015) 
-0.075** 
(0.020) 
-0.102 
(0.099) 
Education
-0.037 
(0.024) 
-0.070* 
(0.033) 
-0.268 
(0.191) 
Human health, social work and veterinary activities
0.055** 
(0.020) 
0.064* 
(0.026) 
-0.210 
(0.131) 
Other service activities
-0.055** 
(0.009) 
-0.058** 
(0.010) 
-0.052 
(0.054) 
Location of the establishment (ref. Andalucía)    
Aragón -0.307** (0.015) 
-0.305** 
(0.018) 
-0.305** 
(0.093) 
Asturias -0.237** 
(0.016) 
-0.221** 
(0.020) 
-0.157 
(0.099) 
Baleares -0.192** 
(0.014) 
-0.187** 
(0.017) 
-0.395** 
(0.114) 
Canarias -0.292** 
(0.012) 
-0.281** 
(0.015) 
-0.235** 
(0.085) 
Cantabria -0.221** 
(0.020) 
-0.242** 
(0.026) 
-0.324* 
(0.125) 
Castilla-La Mancha -0.179** -0.177** -0.077 
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(0.011) (0.013) (0.074) 
Castilla y León -0.203** (0.011) 
-0.208** 
(0.013) 
-0.060 
(0.066) 
Cataluña -0.110** (0.008) 
-0.099** 
(0.009) 
-0.073 
(0.053) 
Comunidad Valenciana -0.176** (0.008) 
-0.175** 
(0.010) 
-0.083 
(0.058) 
Extremadura 0.028 (0.015) 
0.014 
(0.018) 
0.129 
(0.100) 
Galicia -0.001 (0.009) 
-0.012 
(0.011) 
-0.000 
(0.063) 
Madrid -0.310** 
(0.008) 
-0.303** 
(0.010) 
-0.238** 
(0.055) 
Murcia -0.217** 
(0.014) 
-0.195** 
(0.017) 
-0.223* 
(0.099) 
Navarra -0.204** 
(0.018) 
-0.188** 
(0.023) 
-0.356** 
(0.130) 
País Vasco -0.311** 
(0.012) 
-0.300** 
(0.015) 
-0.365** 
(0.076) 
La Rioja -0.316** 
(0.028) 
-0.303** 
(0.035) 
-0.072 
(0.148) 
Ceuta y Melilla -0.277** 
(0.051) 
-0.271** 
(0.064) 
-0.133 
(0.233) 
Number employees of the firm (ref. 1-4 
employees)    
5-9 employees -0.053** 
(0.008) 
-0.050** 
(0.009) 
0.029 
(0.058) 
10-24 employees
-0.108** 
(0.007) 
-0.114** 
(0.008) 
-0.078 
(0.053) 
25-49 employees
-0.157** 
(0.008) 
-0.165** 
(0.009) 
-0.069 
(0.056) 
50-99 employees
-0.190** 
(0.009) 
-0.204** 
(0.010) 
-0.116 
(0.061) 
100-249 employees
-0.262** 
(0.009) 
-0.260** 
(0.011) 
-0.149* 
(0.063) 
250-499 employees
-0.262** 
(0.012) 
-0.262** 
(0.016) 
-0.326** 
(0.080) 
More than 500 employees
-0.260** 
(0.011) 
-0.274** 
(0.015) 
-0.215** 
(0.075) 
Did the establishment realised evaluation of 
workplace risks? (ref. No)    
Yes 0.042** (0.005) 
0.052** 
(0.006) 
0.066 
(0.034) 
Location of accident (ref. In the usual 
establishment)    
On work-related travel 0.192** (0.010) 
0.164** 
(0.012) 
0.204** 
(0.055) 
Somewhere else 0.291** (0.007) 
0.278** 
(0.008) 
0.267** 
(0.046) 
Day of the week when the accident occurred 
(ref. Saturday or Sunday)    
Monday -0.084** (0.009) 
-0.088** 
(0.012) 
-0.114 
(0.060) 
Tuesday -0.062** 
(0.009) 
-0.072** 
(0.012) 
0.053 
(0.060) 
Wednesday -0.048** (0.009) 
-0.050** 
(0.012) 
-0.055 
(0.061) 
Thursday -0.037** (0.010) 
-0.037** 
(0.012) 
0.004 
(0.060) 
Friday -0.043** -0.044** -0.061 
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(0.010) (0.012) (0.062) 
Hours worked when the accident occurred (ref. 
1, 2 or 3)    
4, 5 or 6 0.034** (0.005) 
0.034** 
(0.006) 
0.069* 
(0.033) 
7, 8 or 9 0.050** (0.006) 
0.053** 
(0.007) 
0.052 
(0.041) 
10, 11 or 12 -0.017 (0.013) 
-0.030 
(0.017) 
0.044 
(0.088) 
13, 14 or 15 0.098** (0.032) 
0.137** 
(0.040) 
0.145 
(0.202) 
16, 17 or 18 0.044 (0.030) 
0.056 
(0.037) 
0.214 
(0.218) 
19, 20 or 21 0.113* 
(0.051) 
0.149* 
(0.062) 
0.660* 
(0.277) 
22 and over 0.017 
(0.076) 
0.081 
(0.093) 
0.683 
(0.354) 
Time of day when the accident occurred (ref. 
From 8am to 8pm)    
From 8pm to 8am 0.036** 
(0.007) 
0.041** 
(0.008) 
0.020 
(0.041) 
Worker's usual task (ref. Yes)    
No 0.075** (0.01) 
0.050** 
(0.013) 
0.141* 
(0.061) 
Place of occurrence (ref. Industrial site)    
Construction site, construction, opencast quarry, 
opencast mine
0.061** 
(0.009) 
0.062** 
(0.010) 
0.170** 
(0.060) 
Farming, breeding, fish farming, forest zone 0.043 
(0.022) 
0.031 
(0.028) 
0.131 
(0.146) 
Tertiary activity area, office, amusement area, 
miscellaneous
0.036** 
(0.010) 
0.056** 
(0.013) 
-0.265** 
(0.089) 
Health establishment 0.130** 
(0.020) 
0.135** 
(0.027) 
-0.047 
(0.149) 
Public area
-0.013 
(0.010) 
0.007 
(0.013) 
-0.109 
(0.068) 
In the home
0.035* 
(0.014) 
0.050** 
(0.018) 
-0.187 
(0.122) 
Sports area
0.171** 
(0.022) 
0.181** 
(0.027) 
0.152 
(0.143) 
In the air, elevated, excluding construction sites
0.593** 
(0.026) 
0.596** 
(0.032) 
0.962** 
(0.128) 
Underground, excluding construction sites
0.011 
(0.047) 
0.031 
(0.058) 
0.135 
(0.178) 
On/over water, excluding construction sites
-0.009 
(0.044 
-0.037 
(0.054) 
0.326 
(0.247) 
In high pressure environments, excluding 
construction sites
0.244 
(0.170) 
-0.473 
(0.327)  
Other place of occurrence 0.013 (0.021) 
0.014 
(0.026) 
-0.072 
(0.130) 
Type of task the worker was performing (ref. 
Production, manufacturing, processing, storing)    
Excavation, Construction, Repair, Demolition 0.061** (0.008) 
0.066** 
(0.010) 
0.114 
(0.060) 
Agricultural type work, forestry, horticulture, fish 
farming, work with live animals
0.107** 
(0.023) 
0.103** 
(0.029) 
-0.010 
(0.170) 
Service provided to enterprise and/or to the 
general public; intellectual activity
0.028* 
(0.011) 
0.006 
(0.014) 
0.083 
(0.080) 
Movement, sport, artistic activity 0.127** (0.011) 
0.137** 
(0.013) 
0.064 
(0.071) 
Other working process 0.068** 0.075** 0.130** 
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(0.006) (0.008) (0.049) 
Specific physical activity (ref. Operating 
machine)    
Working with hand-held tools -0.211** (0.009) 
-0.215** 
(0.011) 
-0.108 
(0.069) 
Driving/being on board a means of transport or 
handling equipment
-0.107** 
(0.012) 
-0.115** 
(0.015) 
-0.150 
(0.081) 
Handling of objects -0.262** (0.008) 
-0.278** 
(0.010) 
-0.244** 
(0.065) 
Carrying by hand -0.365** 
(0.011) 
-0.387** 
(0.014) 
-0.354** 
(0.093) 
Movement -0.282** 
(0.009) 
-0.286** 
(0.011) 
-0.219** 
(0.071) 
Other specific physical activity -0.085** 
(0.012) 
-0.092** 
(0.015) 
-0.105* 
(0.073) 
Mode of injury (ref. Fall)    
Contact with electric voltage, temperature extreme 
or hazardous substance
-0.290** 
(0.015) 
-0.307** 
(0.018) 
0.227** 
(0.085) 
Drowning, buried -0.300** (0.030) 
-0.294** 
(0.035) 
0.390** 
(0.113) 
Crashed into something -0.401** (0.009) 
-0.418** 
(0.011) 
-0.208** 
(0.074) 
Struck by or collided with something -0.289** (0.007) 
-0.314** 
(0.008) 
-0.224** 
(0.051) 
Came into contact with 
sharp/pointed/rough/coarse object
-0.031** 
(0.009) 
-0.053** 
(0.010) 
-0.060 
(0.093) 
Trapped, crushed 0.170** (0.009) 
0.149** 
(0.011) 
0.430** 
(0.067) 
Suffered acute overloading of body -0.625** (0.009) 
-0.679** 
(0.012) 
-0.922** 
(0.102) 
Kicked or bitten -0.447** (0.020) 
-0.402** 
(0.023) 
-0.667** 
(0.099) 
Heart attacks, strokes and other non-traumatic 
pathologies
0.545** 
(0.063) 
0.591** 
(0.092) 
0.472 
(0.569) 
Other mode of injury -0.314** (0.014) 
-0.358** 
(0.017) 
-0.222 
(0.115) 
Type of injury (ref. Superficial injuries and open 
wounds)    
Fractures 1.345** 
(0.007) 
1.371** 
(0.008) 
1.873** 
(0.058) 
Dislocations, sprains and strains 0.040** 
(0.009) 
0.030** 
(0.011) 
0.241** 
(0.073) 
Traumatic amputation 2.160** 
(0.014) 
2.210** 
(0.017) 
2.580** 
(0.169) 
Concussions and internal injuries 0.804** 
(0.009) 
0.817** 
(0.010) 
1.279** 
(0.065) 
Burns, corrosions, scalds and frostbite 0.857** 
(0.017) 
0.851** 
(0.021) 
1.204** 
(0.089) 
Acute poisonings and infections 0.504** 
(0.040) 
0.480** 
(0.050) 
0.459** 
(0.144) 
Asphyxiation, drowning and non-fatal submersion 0.807** 
(0.037) 
0.793** 
(0.044) 
0.778** 
(0.115) 
Effects of noise, vibration or pressure
0.272** 
(0.073) 
0.320** 
(0.091)  
Effects of extreme temperatures, light and 
radiation
0.282** 
(0.072) 
0.242** 
(0.087) 
0.665 
(0.347) 
Psychological trauma, traumatic shock
0.751** 
(0.031) 
0.754** 
(0.039) 
1.187** 
(0.137) 
Multiple injuries
1.218** 
(0.011) 
1.238** 
(0.013) 
1.441** 
(0.059) 
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Heart attacks, strokes and other non-traumatic 
pathologies
2.089** 
(0.062) 
1.894** 
(0.091) 
1.602** 
(0.547) 
Other injuries
0.503** 
(0.013) 
0.509** 
(0.016) 
0.872** 
(0.092) 
Part of body injured (ref. Head)    
Neck -0.438** 
(0.018) 
-0.408** 
(0.022) 
-0.613** 
(0.091) 
Back -0.340** 
(0.011) 
-0.312** 
(0.013) 
-0.055 
(0.070) 
Trunk and internal organs -0.224** 
(0.011) 
-0.232** 
(0.013) 
-0.037 
(0.068) 
Upper extremities
-0.584** 
(0.008) 
-0.588** 
(0.010) 
-0.591** 
(0.061) 
Lower extremities
-0.322** 
(0.008) 
-0.316** 
(0.010) 
-0.182** 
(0.060) 
Whole body and multiple sites
0.154** 
(0.011) 
0.153** 
(0.013) 
0.372** 
(0.053) 
Other parts of the body
-0.094** 
(0.021) 
-0.107** 
(0.027) 
0.263* 
(0.106) 
Year of the accident (ref. 2010)    
2004
0.175** 
(0.009) 
0.165** 
(0.012) 
0.143* 
(0.059) 
2005 0.122** 
(0.009) 
0.118** 
(0.012) 
0.172** 
(0.058) 
2006 0.079** 
(0.009) 
0.082** 
(0.012) 
0.116* 
(0.059) 
2007 0.065** 
(0.009) 
0.060** 
(0.012) 
-0.125* 
(0.058) 
2008
0.011 
(0.009) 
0.009 
(0.012) 
-0.093 
(0.059) 
2009
0.001 
(0.010) 
-0.003 
(0.013) 
-0.095 
(0.063) 
Constant 
-2.189** 
(0.023) 
-2.190** 
(0.028) 
-2.422** 
(0.162) 
Number of observations 5,104,179 3,446,587 38,974 
Log-likelihood value -186,479.9 -125,909.6 -4,675.7 
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses. Significance levels: *significant at 5 per cent; **significant at 1 per 
cent. 
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Table A3.2   Estimation results of models on the duration of sick leave after a workplace 
accident. All variables 
 Full Sample  
Sample 
correcting for 
sample 
selection 
 All employees
Employees with 
3 or less years of 
tenure 
 All employees 
Gender (ref. Women)   
Men
1.074** 
(0.002) 
1.075** 
(0.002)  
1.159** 
(0.023) 
Age (ref. 16-24)     
25-39
0.866** 
(0.002) 
0.868** 
(0.002)  
0.799** 
(0.017) 
40-49
0.743** 
(0.002) 
0.744** 
(0.002)  
0.706** 
(0.017) 
50-59
0.651** 
(0.002) 
0.650** 
(0.002)  
0.611** 
(0.019) 
60-64
0.588** 
(0.003) 
0.578** 
(0.004)  
0.531** 
(0.032) 
65 and over
0.567** 
(0.011) 
0.569** 
(0.017)  
0.498* 
(0.060) 
Age*Tenure 
0.999** 
(0.000) 
0.999** 
(0.000)  
0.999 
(0.000) 
Place of birth (ref. Spain)     
EU-15
0.722** 
(0.004) 
0.721** 
(0.004)  
0.631** 
(0.047) 
Rest of Europe
0.715** 
(0.003) 
0.718** 
(0.004)  
0.763** 
(0.046) 
Africa
0.772** 
(0.003) 
0.770** 
(0.003)  
0.736** 
(0.034) 
Latin America
0.794** 
(0.007) 
0.794** 
(0.008)  
0.736* 
(0.092) 
Rest of the world
0.780** 
(0.002) 
0.784** 
(0.002)  
0.882** 
(0.031) 
Missing
0.948* 
(0.021) 
0.937* 
(0.024)  
1.210 
(0.192) 
Professional situation (ref. Employee private sector)     
Employee public sector
0.858** 
(0.003) 
0.878** 
(0.004)  
0.777** 
(0.025) 
Occupation (ref. Elementary occupations)     
Armed Forces
0.993 
(0.009) 
0.990 
(0.011)  
0.821* 
(0.077) 
Legislators, senior officials and managers
0.914** 
(0.010) 
0.908** 
(0.016)  
0.840 
(0.089) 
Professionals
0.921** 
(0.005) 
0.898** 
(0.007)  
0.928 
(0.047) 
Technicians and associate professionals
0.951** 
(0.004) 
0.941** 
(0.005)  
0.966 
(0.037) 
Clerks
1.026** 
(0.004) 
1.027** 
(0.005)  
1.020 
(0.041) 
Service workers and shop and market sales workers
1.004 
(0.002) 
1.011** 
(0.003)  
1.054* 
(0.027) 
Skilled agricultural and fishery workers
1.009 
(0.007) 
1.007 
(0.008)  
1.156 
(0.087) 
Craft and related trades workers
0.986** 
(0.002) 
0.987** 
(0.002)  
0.957* 
(0.020) 
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Plant and machine operators, and assemblers
0.979** 
(0.002) 
0.981** 
(0.002)  
0.938** 
(0.023) 
Type of contract (ref. Fixed-term contract)     
Open-ended contract
0.989** 
(0.002) 
0.981** 
(0.002)  
1.027 
(0.020) 
Job seniority (ref. Fewer than 3 months)     
From 3 to 6 months
1.026** 
(0.002) 
1.027** 
(0.002)  
1.073** 
(0.027) 
From 6 months to 1 year
1.030** 
(0.002) 
1.034** 
(0.002)  
1.050* 
(0.026) 
From 1 to 3 years
1.024** 
(0.002) 
1.041** 
(0.003)  
1.040 
(0.024) 
From 3 to 10 years
1.004 
(0.002)   
0.994 
(0.026) 
10 or more years 0.975** (0.004)   
0.942 
(0.041) 
Earnings (ref. Quantile 3)     
Quantile 1 1.018** 
(0.002) 
1.016** 
(0.002)  
1.043 
(0.023) 
Quantile 2 1.012** 
(0.002) 
1.007** 
(0.002)  
1.038 
(0.022) 
Quantile 4 0.987** 
(0.002) 
0.982** 
(0.002)  
1.009 
(0.021) 
Does the establishment belong to the worker's firm? (ref. 
No)     
Yes 0.958** 
(0.002) 
0.942** 
(0.002)  
1.009 
(0.025) 
Economic activity (ref. Construction)     
Agriculture, forestry and fishing 0.979** (0.006) 
0.977** 
(0.007)  
0.982 
(0.067) 
Mining and quarrying 0.957** (0.007) 
0.965** 
(0.009)  
0.891 
(0.079) 
Manufacturing 0.984** (0.002) 
0.985** 
(0.003)  
0.990 
(0.025) 
Transport and storage 0.998 (0.003) 
0.999 
(0.004)  
1.013 
(0.038) 
Accommodation and food service activities 1.031** (0.004) 
1.034** 
(0.004)  
0.977 
(0.046) 
Public administration and defence; compulsory social security 1.096** (0.005) 
1.060** 
(0.006)  
1.142** 
(0.049) 
Education 1.072** (0.007) 
1.070** 
(0.009)  
1.100 
(0.083) 
Human health, social work and veterinary activities 0.924** 
(0.005) 
0.930** 
(0.006)  
0.877** 
(0.044) 
Other service activities 1.007** (0.002) 
1.005 
(0.003)  
0.987 
(0.027) 
Location of the establishment (ref. Andalucía)     
Aragón
0.915** 
(0.003) 
0.927** 
(0.004)  
0.898* 
(0.041) 
Asturias
0.725** 
(0.003) 
0.745** 
(0.004)  
0.676** 
(0.033) 
Baleares 1.168** (0.004) 
1.170** 
(0.005)  
1.116* 
(0.054) 
Canarias 1.038** (0.003) 
1.042** 
(0.004)  
1.059 
(0.037) 
Cantabria 0.813** (0.005) 
0.840** 
(0.006)  
0.741** 
(0.042) 
Castilla-La Mancha 0.856** (0.003) 
0.860** 
(0.003)  
0.901** 
(0.033) 
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Castilla y León
0.891** 
(0.003) 
0.905** 
(0.003)  
0.888** 
(0.030) 
Cataluña
0.887** 
(0.002) 
0.882** 
(0.002)  
0.931** 
(0.023) 
Comunidad Valenciana
0.870** 
(0.002) 
0.878** 
(0.002)  
0.889** 
(0.025) 
Extremadura
0.960** 
(0.004) 
0.963** 
(0.005)  
0.934 
(0.054) 
Galicia
0.814** 
(0.002) 
0.829** 
(0.003)  
0.767** 
(0.026) 
Madrid
0.981** 
(0.002) 
0.980** 
(0.002)  
1.040 
(0.025) 
Murcia 0.771** (0.003) 
0.773** 
(0.003)  
0.724** 
(0.031) 
Navarra 1.114** (0.005) 
1.120** 
(0.007)  
1.004 
(0.055) 
País Vasco 0.943** (0.003) 
0.946** 
(0.003)  
0.919** 
(0.029) 
La Rioja 1.068** (0.007) 
1.095** 
(0.009)  
1.143* 
(0.073) 
Ceuta y Melilla 0.854** (0.011) 
0.860** 
(0.015)  
0.902 
(0.093) 
Number employees of the firm (ref. 1-4 employees)     
5-9 employees 1.049** 
(0.002) 
1.048** 
(0.003)  
1.008 
(0.032) 
10-24 employees
1.082** 
(0.002) 
1.079** 
(0.003)  
1.018 
(0.029) 
25-49 employees
1.104** 
(0.002) 
1.099** 
(0.003)  
1.063* 
(0.031) 
50-99 employees
1.113** 
(0.003) 
1.108** 
(0.003)  
1.042 
(0.032) 
100-249 employees
1.110** 
(0.003) 
1.106** 
(0.003)  
1.048 
(0.032) 
250-499 employees
1.097** 
(0.003) 
1.097** 
(0.004)  
1.017 
(0.035) 
More than 500 employees
1.014** 
(0.003) 
1.024** 
(0.004)  
1.027 
(0.034) 
Did the establishment realised evaluation of workplace 
risks? (ref. No)     
Yes 1.027** 
(0.001) 
1.029** 
(0.002)  
1.007 
(0.016) 
Location of accident (ref. In the usual establishment)     
On work-related travel 0.936** 
(0.003) 
0.945** 
(0.004)  
0.935** 
(0.023) 
Somewhere else 0.979** 
(0.002) 
0.983** 
(0.003)  
0.888** 
(0.025) 
Day of the week when the accident occurred (ref. Saturday 
or Sunday)     
Monday 1.078** 
(0.003) 
1.083** 
(0.003)  
1.097** 
(0.028) 
Tuesday 1.069** 
(0.003) 
1.076** 
(0.003)  
1.063* 
(0.028) 
Wednesday 1.058** 
(0.003) 
1.064** 
(0.003)  
1.079** 
(0.029) 
Thursday 1.013** 
(0.003) 
1.016** 
(0.003)  
1.027 
(0.027) 
Friday
0.975** 
(0.003) 
0.976** 
(0.003)  
0.976 
(0.027) 
Hours worked when the accident occurred (ref. 1, 2 or 3)     
4, 5 or 6 0.991** 0.990**  0.970* 
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(0.001) (0.002) (0.015) 
7, 8 or 9 0.994** (0.002) 
0.992** 
(0.002)  
0.956* 
(0.019) 
10, 11 or 12 0.966** (0.003) 
0.962** 
(0.004)  
0.986 
(0.039) 
13, 14 or 15 1.029** (0.009) 
1.010 
(0.012)  
0.831* 
(0.077) 
16, 17 or 18 1.053** (0.008) 
1.055** 
(0.011)  
0.902 
(0.097) 
19, 20 or 21 1.050** (0.014) 
1.046** 
(0.017)  
1.040 
(0.118) 
22 and over 1.020 
(0.019) 
1.035 
(0.025)  
0.760 
(0.133) 
Time of day when the accident occurred (ref. From 8am 
to 8pm)     
From 8pm to 8am 0.983** 
(0.002) 
0.984** 
(0.002)  
0.979 
(0.017) 
Worker's usual task (ref. Yes)     
No 0.985** (0.003) 
0.979** 
(0.003)  
1.018 
(0.031) 
Place of occurrence (ref. Industrial site)     
Construction site, construction, opencast quarry, opencast 
mine
0.965** 
(0.002) 
0.963** 
(0.003)  
0.944 
(0.031) 
Farming, breeding, fish farming, forest zone 0.983** 
(0.006) 
0.990 
(0.008)  
1.029 
(0.079) 
Tertiary activity area, office, amusement area, miscellaneous 0.990** 
(0.002) 
0.985** 
(0.003)  
0.972 
(0.032) 
Health establishment 0.875** 
(0.004) 
0.881** 
(0.005)  
0.908 
(0.048) 
Public area 0.968** 
(0.003) 
0.965** 
(0.003)  
0.993 
(0.031) 
In the home
0.992* 
(0.004) 
0.989* 
(0.005)  
1.049 
(0.055) 
Sports area
0.878** 
(0.006) 
0.858** 
(0.007)  
0.714** 
(0.058) 
In the air, elevated, excluding construction sites
0.843** 
(0.011) 
0.842** 
(0.014)  
0.733* 
(0.093) 
Underground, excluding construction sites
0.950** 
(0.013) 
0.965* 
(0.016)  
0.952 
(0.111) 
On/over water, excluding construction sites
1.011 
(0.014) 
0.999 
(0.017)  
1.049 
(0.166) 
In high pressure environments, excluding construction sites
0.777** 
(0.048) 
0.713** 
(0.050)  
1.859 
(1.205) 
Other place of occurrence
0.932** 
(0.006) 
0.922** 
(0.007)  
1.039 
(0.067) 
Type of task the worker was performing (ref. Production, 
manufacturing, processing, storing)     
Excavation, Construction, Repair, Demolition 0.982** (0.002) 
0.983** 
(0.003)  
0.906** 
(0.030) 
Agricultural type work, forestry, horticulture, fish farming, 
work with live animals
1.005 
(0.007) 
0.996 
(0.008)  
0.967 
(0.079) 
Service provided to enterprise and/or to the general public; 
intellectual activity
0.984** 
(0.002) 
0.983** 
(0.003)  
0.933* 
(0.029) 
Movement, sport, artistic activity 0.931** (0.003) 
0.934** 
(0.004)  
0.957 
(0.030) 
Other working process 0.988** (0.002) 
0.989** 
(0.002)  
0.961 
(0.023) 
Specific physical activity (ref. Operating machine)     
Working with hand-held tools
1.123** 
(0.003) 
1.127** 
(0.004)  
1.140** 
(0.046) 
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Driving/being on board a means of transport or handling 
equipment
0.895** 
(0.004) 
0.909** 
(0.005)  
0.893* 
(0.039) 
Handling of objects
1.115** 
(0.003) 
1.117** 
(0.004)  
1.155** 
(0.042) 
Carrying by hand
1.117** 
(0.003) 
1.122** 
(0.004)  
1.159** 
(0.049) 
Movement
1.061** 
(0.003) 
1.067** 
(0.004)  
1.164** 
(0.045) 
Other specific physical activity
0.994 
(0.004) 
1.004 
(0.005)  
1.027 
(0.043) 
Mode of injury (ref. Fall)     
Contact with electric voltage, temperature extreme or 
hazardous substance
1.519** 
(0.007) 
1.497** 
(0.008)  
1.604** 
(0.082) 
Drowning, buried 1.519** 
(0.017) 
1.485** 
(0.019)  
1.379** 
(0.123) 
Crashed into something 1.241** 
(0.003) 
1.231** 
(0.004)  
1.331** 
(0.051) 
Struck by or collided with something 1.230** 
(0.003) 
1.222** 
(0.004)  
1.162** 
(0.037) 
Came into contact with sharp/pointed/rough/coarse object 1.339** 
(0.004) 
1.314** 
(0.004)  
1.352** 
(0.054) 
Trapped, crushed 1.153** 
(0.005) 
1.140** 
(0.005)  
0.992 
(0.051) 
Suffered acute overloading of body
1.172** 
(0.003) 
1.187** 
(0.003)  
1.283** 
(0.042) 
Kicked or bitten
1.298** 
(0.007) 
1.282** 
(0.009)  
1.569** 
(0.062) 
Heart attacks, strokes and other non-traumatic pathologies
0.822** 
(0.052) 
0.886 
(0.071)  
0.517 
(0.207) 
Other mode of injury
1.137** 
(0.005) 
1.129** 
(0.006)  
1.075 
(0.066) 
Type of injury (ref. Superficial injuries and open wounds)     
Fractures 0.318** 
(0.001) 
0.313** 
(0.001)  
0.232** 
(0.008) 
Dislocations, sprains and strains 0.870** 
(0.001) 
0.871** 
(0.002)  
0.867** 
(0.016) 
Traumatic amputation 0.292** 
(0.004) 
0.289** 
(0.005)  
0.233** 
(0.049) 
Concussions and internal injuries 0.823** 
(0.002) 
0.835** 
(0.003)  
0.792** 
(0.025) 
Burns, corrosions, scalds and frostbite
0.863** 
(0.005) 
0.871** 
(0.006)  
0.615** 
(0.033) 
Acute poisonings and infections
1.024 
(0.014) 
1.044** 
(0.017)  
1.395** 
(0.107) 
Asphyxiation, drowning and non-fatal submersion
1.018 
(0.017) 
1.045* 
(0.020)  
1.292** 
(0.100) 
Effects of noise, vibration or pressure
0.942** 
(0.017) 
0.932** 
(0.021)  
0.504** 
(0.091) 
Effects of extreme temperatures, light and radiation
1.394** 
(0.031) 
1.419** 
(0.036)  
1.616* 
(0.318) 
Psychological trauma, traumatic shock
0.633** 
(0.009) 
0.666** 
(0.011)  
0.453** 
(0.035) 
Multiple injuries 0.624** (0.004) 
0.624** 
(0.005)  
0.627** 
(0.021) 
Heart attacks, strokes and other non-traumatic pathologies
0.269** 
(0.017) 
0.304** 
(0.024)  
0.953 
(0.349) 
Other injuries 0.865** (0.003) 
0.887** 
(0.004)  
0.848** 
(0.036) 
Part of body injured (ref. Head)     
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Neck
0.600** 
(0.002) 
0.605** 
(0.003)  
0.700** 
(0.024) 
Back
0.683** 
(0.002) 
0.688** 
(0.002)  
0.831** 
(0.027) 
Trunk and internal organs
0.654** 
(0.002) 
0.659** 
(0.003)  
0.801** 
(0.032) 
Upper extremities
0.536** 
(0.001) 
0.552** 
(0.002)  
0.730** 
(0.021) 
Lower extremities
0.543** 
(0.001) 
0.554** 
(0.002)  
0.679** 
(0.021) 
Whole body and multiple sites
0.510** 
(0.002) 
0.522** 
(0.003)  
0.648** 
(0.021) 
Other parts of the body 0.584** (0.005) 
0.597** 
(0.006)  
0.753** 
(0.052) 
Year of the accident (ref. 2010)     
2004
1.078** 
(0.003) 
1.101** 
(0.003)  
1.127** 
(0.031) 
2005
0.978** 
(0.002) 
1.005 
(0.003)  
1.040 
(0.028) 
2006
1.008** 
(0.002) 
1.024** 
(0.003)  
1.064* 
(0.028) 
2007
0.822** 
(0.002) 
0.836** 
(0.002)  
0.899** 
(0.023) 
2008
1.047** 
(0.002) 
1.043** 
(0.003)  
1.088** 
(0.028) 
2009
1.037** 
(0.003) 
1.031** 
(0.003)  
1.150** 
(0.031) 
Accident severity (ref. Minor)     
Severe
0.091** 
(0.001) 
0.089** 
(0.001)  
0.074** 
(0.004) 
People who suffered a fall in the workplace     
Young (16-24) 1.114** 
(0.006) 
1.113** 
(0.006)  
0.950 
(0.063) 
Older (65 and over) 0.931* 
(0.040) 
0.936* 
(0.021)  
0.433 
(0.348) 
Constant 0.097** 
(0.001) 
0.094** 
(0.001)  
0.063** 
(0.005) 
Number of observations 5,099,464 3,443,734  38,708 
Log-likelihood value -7,160,347.7 -4,814,933.2  -53,442.0 
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses. Significance levels: *significant at 5 per cent; **significant at 1 per 
cent. 
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CHAPTER  4 A regional view on workplace accidents in Spain 
A regional view on workplace accidents in Spain 
1. Introduction 
The intense process of economic growth that the Spanish economy experienced from the 1990’s 
through the first decade of the current century was joined by unprecedented levels of 
employment creation. These newly created jobs caused the Spanish economy to narrow the gap 
between itself and its European neighbours in terms of key labour market figures, such as 
activity and unemployment rates. However, the very high incidence of workplace accidents was 
an important dimension of this process that was far from satisfactory. According to data from 
the International Labour Organization, the 2007 incidence rate of non-fatal accidents in Spain 
was 57.5 per 1,000 workers – 1.5 times higher than in France, and 2.1 times higher than in 
Germany. Regarding fatal accidents (those with higher economic and social costs), the incidence 
rate in Spain was of 3.6 per 100,000 workers – 0.2 and 1.5 accidents per 100,000 workers more 
than in France and Germany, respectively. The impact of the global crisis on the labour market 
in Spain has been much stronger than in most advanced countries. However, the incidence rates 
of workplace accidents remain high in comparison with other advanced countries. In 2011, the 
incidence rate of non-fatal accidents in Spain was 35.9 per 1,000 workers – 3.9 and 2.8 times 
higher than in Australia and Canada17, respectively. 
In the Spanish case, there is a further characteristic of the incidence of workplace accidents: a 
strong geographical component. Data from the Estadística de Accidentes de Trabajo (EAT 
hereafter) published by the Spanish Ministry of Labour show substantial regional differences in 
incidence rates for workplace accidents. For instance, in 2011, Guadalajara registered the highest 
incidence rate of minor accidents (48.2 per 1,000 workers), which is 1.8 times greater than in 
Castellón (26.2 per 1,000 workers), the Spanish province with the lowest incidence. If we 
consider the severe and fatal accidents, the differences are even greater. In fact, with 0.8 severe 
and fatal accidents per 1,000 workers, the incidence of workplace accidents in Soria is 9.4 times 
higher than in Ávila (0.1), the province with the lowest incidence of severe and fatal accidents. At 
the same time, the regional analysis allows us to observe that a region exhibiting high incidence 
in a certain type of accident (e.g., non-fatal) does not imply the same high incidence in other type 
of accident (e.g., severe and fatal). 
The existing literature has studied workplace accidents from many different perspectives. The 
evaluation of job safety programs (see inter alia Viscusi, 1979, 1986; McCaffrey, 1983; Curington, 
1986; Lanoie, 1992; Gray and Scholz, 1993), the influence of asymmetric information on 
reporting rates through a moral hazard perspective (see for instance Butler and Worral, 1991; 
                                                            
17 Australia and Canada are the only two advanced economies with recent available data on workplace accidents.  
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Butler et al., 1996; Bolduc et al., 2002) and the effect of the employment contract on job 
accidents (Amuedo-Dorantes, 2002; Guadalupe, 2003; Hernanz and Toharia, 2006; García-
Serrano et al., 2010) are examples of such different approaches. In addition to these studies, 
another interesting aspect for which there is less existing literature is the geographical 
distribution of workplace accidents18.  
This chapter aims to provide a first approach to the economic analysis of workplace accidents 
from a regional perspective in Spain. Specifically, we are interested in identifying through 
descriptive statistical techniques potential regional patterns in the incidence of workplace 
accidents. Moreover, additional information regarding the movements in the relative position of 
each province within the distribution will also be provided. In a second step, we aim to identify 
the economic determinants of the incidence rates of workplace accidents at the provincial level. 
To do so, we estimate by panel data techniques an econometric model that explains the 
incidence rates of workplace accidents based on a set of explanatory variables, which include 
both labour market variables and a set of variables that serve as a proxy for the efforts developed 
by the authorities to avoid job accidents primarily through workplace inspections. Finally, the 
effect of these two sets of variables on the characteristics of the geographical distribution of 
workplace accidents in Spain is analysed. In order to assess the extent to which the features 
observed in the spatial distribution of the workplace accidents can be explained by variables 
potentially affecting the incidence of workplace accidents, we follow the methodology applied by 
López-Bazo et al. (2005) to study the distribution of unemployment rates in Spain. 
The chapter is organized as follows. Section 2 analyses the evolution in the spatial distribution of 
workplace accidents in Spain between 1995 and 2011. Section 3 provides empirical evidence 
regarding the determinants of workplace accidents incidence at the regional level in Spain. The 
fourth section assesses how the geographical distribution of workplace accidents in Spain is 
explained by variables potentially affecting the incidence of workplace accidents. Finally, Section 
5 summarizes the main results and presents the conclusions.   
2. Workplace accidents in Spain: regional dynamics 
In this section, we analyse the evolution of workplace accidents in Spain in the spatial 
distribution. Our key variable will be the provincial incidence rates for workplace accidents. The 
incidence rate is defined as the number of accidents at work per 1,000 persons in employment. 
The use of incidence rates instead of the total number of accidents at work allows abstraction 
from the evolution of total employment. Data on accidents are based on the Spanish Statistics 
on Accidents at Work (Estadística de Accidentes de Trabajo in Spanish, EAT), compiled by the 
Spanish Ministry of Labour. This database includes all those accidents that take the injured 
person from the workplace for at least one day (excluding the day when the accident occurred) 
and after a medical report is issued. We limit our sample to those workers covered by the Social 
Security General Regime. In order to calculate incidence rates for accidents at work, the 
                                                            
18 In this vein, Corrales Herrero et al. (2008) analysed the differences in the duration of absences as a consequence 
of workplace accidents among Spanish regions. Their results show unreasonably longer durations in the regions 
situated in the North of Spain.  
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reference population is the number of workers covered by the Social Security General Regime.  
Our territorial unit of reference is the province, which corresponds to the level 3 of the 
Nomenclature of Territorial Units for Statistics (NUTS3) of Eurostat. There are 52 Spanish 
provinces. We have chosen this spatial category because the Spanish Labour and Social Security 
Inspectorate (Inspección de Trabajo y Seguridad Social, ITSS), which is the administrative 
organisation responsible for controlling and monitoring the Law on the Prevention of 
Occupational Risks (Ley de Prevención de Riesgos Laborales, LPRL) is divided territorially into 
provinces. Our data runs from 1995 to 2011; 1995 is the year when the Law on the Prevention 
of Occupational Risks19 was adopted, and 2011 is the latest year with available information.  
Figure 4.1 shows provincial incidence rates of workplace accidents in 1995 and 2011 by level of 
severity. This comparison of incidence rates of workplace accidents by province provides a clear 
picture of the magnitude of the spatial differences. The most recent figures indicate that the 
incidence rate of minor accidents in Guadalajara (the province with the highest incidence) at 48.2 
is 1.8 times greater than in Castellón (26.2), where the incidence of minor accidents is the lowest 
(Figure 4.1-Panel A). The differences are even more pronounced when we look at the severe and 
fatal accidents. In fact, with 0.8 severe and fatal accidents per 1,000 workers, the incidence of 
workplace accidents in Soria is 9.4 times higher than in Ávila (0.1), the province with the lowest 
incidence of severe and fatal accidents (Figure 4.1-Panel B).  
The sharp drop in workplace accidents observed between 1995 and 2011 had an uneven impact 
on the regional disparities. While regional differentials in the incidence of minor accidents 
decreased, the spatial differences in the incidence of severe and fatal accidents widened. Between 
1995 and 2011, both the ratio between the maximum and the minimum value and the ratio 
between the ninth and the first decile decreased in the case of minor accidents. By contrast, both 
ratios actually increased in the case of the severe and fatal accidents.  
                                                            
19 The Law on the Prevention of Occupational Risks was a legislative reaction to the high level of incidence of 
occupational injuries in the 90s, with a special emphasis on the immediate physical determinants of workplace 
accidents, such as the manipulation of hazardous materials, body protection, signalling, etc. Moreover, this law 
changed the general attitude of authorities with respect to workplace accidents and risk prevention. Indeed, since the 
Law was passed in 1995, the incidence of workplace accidents has been markedly reduced, especially for the most 
severe cases. 
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Estimates are based on calculations using Gaussian kernel functions20. It is well known that the 
results of density estimations depend on the bandwidth of the kernel. Following Silverman 
(1986), the optimal bandwidth is estimated by: 
෠݄ ൌ 0.9ܣ݊ିଵ/ହ          (1) 
where 
ܣ ൌ min	ሺߪො, ܫܴܳ/1.349ሻ         (2) 
where ߪ is the standard deviation and ܫܴܳ is the interquartile range of the series.  
The results reveal the presence of significant differences in the external shape of the distribution 
of the relative incidence rates of minor accidents between 1995 and 2011, showing that the initial 
situation does not remain stable throughout time. In 1995, the shape of the distribution was 
bimodal, characterised by the existence of a group of regions with values just below the national 
average and a second group of regions situated just above. However, the probability mass 
concentrated just above the average increased sharply between 1995 and 2011. In other words, 
the number of provinces with incidence rates just above the average has increased during the 
sixteen years considered. As a result, the bimodality observed in 1995 has largely diminished. 
Simultaneously, there has been a reduction in the distance between the extreme values of the 
distribution (Figure 4.2-Panel A).  
The distribution of the relative incidence rates of severe and fatal accidents has also undergone 
several notable changes between 1995 and 2011. First, the slight signs of bimodality already 
observed in 1995 have clearly increased. In particular, the distribution has gained mass around 
the national average. Thus, in 2011, there were two clusters of provinces: one around the 
Spanish average and other group of provinces with incidence rates that are 1.5 times the national 
average (Figure 4.2-Panel B).  
The results suggest a convergence in the regional incidence rates of minor accidents in Spain to a 
value just above the national average. By contrast, there seems to have been a trend towards 
polarization in two groups of regions as regards incidence rates of severe and fatal accidents. 
However, the analysis does not provide any information regarding the movements in the relative 
position of each province within the distribution. In order to identify these dynamics, we carry 
out two further exercises: we first estimate the transition matrices, and next we estimate 
stochastic kernels for the regional distribution of relative incidence rates of workplace accidents 
over the period under analysis.   
                                                            
20 We use the Gaussian kernel density function, but we experimented with other kernels. For example, using the 
Epanechnikov kernel function delivers exactly the same results, as long as the bandwidth is held constant across 
estimation methods. 
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in 2011. Therefore, those provinces located in the diagonal remain with a similar relative 
incidence rate between 1995 and 2011. Cells above the diagonal suggest upward mobility, while 
cells below the diagonal suggest downward mobility. Of course, every province ends in one 
column range or another, so the probabilities along each row sum up to 100 per cent. The first 
row and the first column show the number of provinces in each of the intervals in 1995 and 
2011, respectively.  
Table 4.1 reports the transition probability matrix linking the 1995 and 2011 distribution of 
Spanish relative incidence rates of minor workplace accidents. We observe a strong degree of 
mobility throughout the time span studied. Indeed, few provinces in 2011 show the same relative 
incidence rate as in 1995. More specifically, we observe that the provinces with the lowest and 
highest incidence rates experienced much greater mobility. By 2011, only 27.3 per cent of the 
provinces below 0.86 times the national average remained in this range, while 55 per cent of 
them moved to between 0.86 and 1.04 times the national average. Likewise, of the regions with 
an initial incidence rate above 1.13 times the national average, only 18.2 remained in this interval 
while 64 per cent moved to between 0.93 and 1.13 times the national average. However, 
provinces with incidence rates close to the national average experienced much greater persistence 
– the bulk of the provinces with initial incidence rates between 0.86 and 1.13 times the average 
ended up in one of the three intervals between 0.86 and 1.13 times the average. The results in 
Table 4.1 confirm the convergence to the national average in the incidence rates of minor 
workplace accidents already observed in Figure 4.2.  
Table 4.1   Transition probability matrix from 1995 to 2011 for relative incidence rates of minor 
workplace accidents 
   2011 ranges of relative incidence rate 
   0.00-0.86 0.86-0.93 0.93-1.04 1.04-1.13 1.13-1.40 
   N=5 N=9 N=16 N=14 N=8 
19
95
 r
an
ge
s 
of
 r
el
at
iv
e 
in
ci
d
en
ce
 r
at
e 
0.00-0.86 N=1
1 
27.3 27.3 27.3 18.2 0.0 
0.86-0.93 N=9 0.0 33.3 44.4 22.2 0.0 
0.93-1.04
N=1
1 
9.1 18.2 18.2 36.4 18.2 
1.04-1.13 N=1
0 
0.0 0.0 30.0 30.0 40.0 
1.13-1.40 
N=1
1 9.1 9.1 36.4 27.3 18.2 
Source: Own elaboration based on EAT and Ministry of Labour. 
Table 4.2 reports the transition probability matrix for the relative incidence rates of severe and 
fatal accidents. In this table, we observe two facts. First, most of the provinces with initial 
incidence rates below 1.51 times the national average ended up between 0.79 and 1.21 times the 
national average. Second, we see strong persistence among the regions with highest incidence 
rates: of the regions with an initial incidence rate above 1.51 times the national average, 45.5 per 
cent remained above 1.51 times the average, while 45.5 per cent moved just one class down. 
These results confirm the polarization in terms of the incidence of severe and fatal workplace 
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accidents also observed Figure 4.2.  
Table 4.2   Transition probability matrix from 1995 to 2011 for relative incidence rates of severe 
and fatal workplace accidents 
   2011 ranges of relative incidence rate 
   (0.00-0.79) (0.79-1.05) (1.05-1.21) (1.21-1.51) (1.51-2.40) 
   N=6 N=17 N=7 N=10 N=12 
19
95
 r
an
ge
s 
of
 r
el
at
iv
e 
in
ci
de
nc
e 
ra
te
 
0.00-0.79 
N=1
0 30.0 40.0 10.0 10.0 10.0 
0.79-1.05
N=1
1 
9.1 63.6 9.1 9.1 9.1 
1.05-1.21 
N=1
0 10.0 40.0 10.0 20.0 20.0 
1.21-1.51 
N=1
0 
10.0 20.0 30.0 10.0 30.0 
1.51-2.40
N=1
1 0.0 0.0 9.1 45.5 45.5 
Source: Own elaboration based on EAT and Ministry of Labour. 
Relative incidence rates of workplace accidents are a continuous variable and this means that any 
categorization of them into specific intervals is arbitrary. Therefore, the conclusions derived 
from transitions matrices are highly dependent on the amplitude of the intervals. In order to 
circumvent this caveat, we estimate the stochastic kernels, which are the representation of the 
transition matrices when the number of ranges tends to infinity. A stochastic kernel shows in a 
three-dimensional diagram how the distribution observed at period t evolves towards the 
observed distribution in period t+s. We also provide the two-dimensional contour map, which 
are the projections of the kernel in the t, t+s plane. From this type of graphs we may identify i) 
persistence in the distribution when the density is located along the 45º line, ii) convergence, 
when the density is parallel to the X-axis, and iii) overtaking, when most of the graph is turned 
90º back clockwise from the 45º diagonal (Quah, 1997). 
Figure 4.3 depicts the stochastic kernel for the incidence rates differentials in minor accidents for 
the period of 1995-2011. The estimated kernel suggests that the regional distribution of minor 
accidents in the Spanish provinces was characterized mainly by convergence. Although the 
estimated kernel does not show a strong convergence, most of the density is located parallel to 
the X-axis. This suggests that all provinces tend to show more similar incidence rates of minor 
accidents in 2011 than in 1995. Moreover, the figure also confirms that this convergence is 
mainly to a value just above the national average.  
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provinces in the incidence of workplace accidents. Moreover, the geographical distribution of 
minor accidents is characterized by convergence to a value just above the national average, while 
there is a trend towards polarization in two groups of regions in regards to incidence rates of 
severe and fatal accidents. In this context, the following sections aim to explain why provinces 
have different incidence rates of workplace accidents, as well as the causes of the dynamics 
observed so far.  
3. An empirical model of regional workplace accidents 
3.1. Specification of the workplace accidents equation and data 
In this section, we will provide evidence regarding the determinants of workplace accidents at 
the regional level in Spain. As indicated in Chapter 1, the risk of sickness absence due to work-
related injury is determined by the interplay of incentives faced by workers and firms. 
Nevertheless, the probability of sickness absence is also influenced by government regulation. 
For example, as described by Lanoie (1991), the intensification of government prevention 
policies, such as increasing the penalty in case of non-compliance with safety standards, may 
exert opposite effects on workplace accidents. On the one hand, these measures could lead to a 
reduction in the risk of accident since it would increase the expected cost of an accident for 
employers, inducing them to devote more resources to safety. On the other hand, workers might 
become less careful due to feeling they work under safer conditions resulting from this 
intensification in workplace injury prevention. Hence, the present empirical model of regional 
workplace accidents (ܴܫܵܭ௜௧) considers prevention variables (ܴܲܧܸܧܰܶܫܱ ௜ܰ௧) and labour 
market variables often encountered in the literature (ܮܣܤܱܷܴ௜௧), all of them for province ݅ in 
period ݐ:  
ܴܫܵܭ௜௧ ൌ ݂ሺܴܲܧܸܧܰܶܫܱ ௜ܰ௧; 	ܮܣܤܱܷܴ௜௧ሻ       (3) 
In selecting the particular set of variables for these broad categories, previous contributions to 
the analysis of workplace accidents, particularly those by Viscusi (1986) and Lanoie (1992) have 
been taken into account. However, the final set of explanatory variables has been conditioned by 
data availability at the provincial level for the period under analysis. Table 4.3 provides a precise 
definition of all the variables used in the analysis, their mean, standard deviation and source. 
Two different data series are used as the dependent variable: the incidence rate of minor 
accidents and the incidence rate of severe and fatal accidents. As in the previous section, the 
incidence rate is defined as the number of accidents at work per 1,000 persons in employment. 
Data on accidents are based on the Spanish Statistics on Accidents at Work (Estadística de 
Accidentes de Trabajo in Spanish, EAT), compiled by the Spanish Ministry of Labour. We limit our 
sample to those workers covered by the Social Security General Regime. In order to calculate 
incidence rates for accidents at work, the reference population is the number of workers covered 
by the Social Security General Regime. 
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Table 4.3   Definition, mean, standard deviation and source of variables used in the regression analysis 
Variable Definition Mean
Standard 
Deviation
Source 
Dependent variables 
ܯܫܱܴܰ Number of minor accidents at work per 1,000 employees 62.3 16.4 EAT and Ministry of Labour 
ܵܧܸܧܴܧ Number of severe and fatal accidents at work per 1,000 employees 0.94 0.48 EAT and Ministry of Labour 
Independent variables 
ܫܰܵܲܧܥܱܴܶܵ Number of labour inspectors per 1,000 employees 0.17 0.06 
Labour and Social Security 
Inspectorate Statistics 
ܫܰܵܲܧܥܶܫܱܰ Number of inspections per 1,000 employees 41.1 26.2 
Labour and Social Security 
Inspectorate Statistics 
ܫܰܨܴܣܥܶܫܱܰ 
Number of penalties, standstills and 
injunctions imposed as percentage of 
total inspections 
0.41 0.13 Labour and Social Security 
Inspectorate Statistics 
ܨܧܯܣܮܧ Percentage of female workers in the female labour force 80.1 9.3 Labour Force Survey (EPA) 
ܧܦܷܥܣܶܫܱܰ Percentage of workers with a university degree 9.5 3.3 
Fundación Bancaja e Ivie 
(Instituto Valenciano de 
Investigaciones Económicas) 
ܫܰܦܷܴܻܵܶ Percentage of workers in industry 17.3 7.0 Labour Force Survey (EPA) 
ܥܱܴܷܰܵܶܥܶܫܱܰ Percentage of workers in construction 11.6 2.9 Labour Force Survey (EPA) 
ܵܧܴܸܫܥܧܵ Percentage of workers in services 61.7 8.6 Labour Force Survey (EPA) 
ܯܣܥܪܮܣܤ Capital in machinery and equipment per employee 24.7 5.6 Fundación BBVA 
ܷܴܣܶܧ Ratio of the unemployed to the labour force 14.5 7.1 Labour Force Survey (EPA) 
 
Regarding the independent variables, the intensity of workplace inspections by the Job Safety 
Agency (Inspección de Trabajo) is taken into account. This public agency is concerned with the 
prevention of accidents, the investigation of severe accidents and the proposition of sanctions to 
those firms that do not comply with the regulations. Even though the main regulation is 
nationwide, the decisions regarding the number of inspections, the type and number of firms to 
be inspected, the sanctions regime, etc. is under the control of regional governments. Therefore, 
it is likely that regional differences on the inspection intensity could also be a factor behind the 
different impact of workplace accidents at the regional level. The empirical model includes three 
prevention measures: the number of labour inspectors per 1,000 employees (ܫܰܵܲܧܥܱܴܶܵ); the 
number of inspections per 1,000 employees (ܫܰܵܲܧܥܶܫܱܰ); and the number of penalties, 
standstills and injunctions imposed as percentage of total inspections (ܫܰܨܴܣܥܶܫܱܰ). 
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According to Viscusi (1986) and Lanoie (1992), it is plausible that the impact of safety-enforcing 
measures on accidents occurs with a lag because, among other things, there can be a lag involved 
in making capital investment decisions required for compliance with standards.  
The selection of variables often encountered in the literature that account for labour market 
conditions was largely conditioned by the availability of data at the provincial level for the entire 
period under study. In regards to workforce’s characteristics, it is expected that, ceteris paribus, 
jobs with a higher fraction of female and educated workers should involve less physical effort 
and, therefore, lower risk of workplace accidents (Viscusi, 1986; Lanoie, 1992). Therefore, 
differences in the share of the female workers in the labour force (ܨܧܯܣܮܧ) and in the share of 
workers that have a university degree (ܧܦܷܥܣܶܫܱܰ) across provinces are expected to influence 
regional incidence of workplace accidents.  
To control for the industrial mix, the shares of employment in industry (ܫܰܦܷܴܻܵܶ), 
construction (ܥܱܴܷܰܵܶܥܶܫܱܰ) and services (ܵܧܴܸܫܥܧܵ) are included. The share of 
employment in agriculture is omitted to avoid perfect co-linearity. Thus, coefficients of the other 
shares are referred to as deviations from the base category. We are aware that this sectoral 
disaggregation does not allow us to control for differences across provinces in the activities 
within each broad category. However, these are the most detailed data available at the level of 
provinces for the period under analysis.  
The ratio of capital in machinery and equipment to labour (ܯܣܥܪܮܣܤ) is also considered in 
this empirical model. This ratio is expected to have a positive impact on workplace accidents 
since workers usually face more risk as their contact with machinery increases (Curington, 1986; 
Lanoie, 1992). If the average ratio of machinery and equipment to labour in the Spanish 
provinces differs, this might explain some of the inequality in the geographical distribution of 
workplace accidents.  
The unemployment rate (ܷܴܣܶܧሻ is included to capture business cycle effects. As described in 
Chapter 1, it has been argued that workplace accident rates exhibit a pro-cyclical nature. There 
are two explanations to this fact. Terrés de Ercilla et al. (2004) and Martín-Román (2006) argue 
that during economic upturns workers increase their effort level, which makes them less cautious 
regarding job safety. This fact would increase the total number of accidents as well as the 
incidence rate of accidents. On the other hand, Boone and van Ours (2006) argue that during the 
upturns workers are more likely to report job accidents because it would be easier to find a new 
job if they are fired for absenteeism. This increases reporting rates, and therefore incidence rates. 
As a result, a negative relationship between unemployment rate and the incidence of workplace 
accidents is expected. 
Finally, following Viscusi (1986) and Lanoie (1992), a lagged dependent variable is included in 
each equation to serve as a proxy for the safety conditions that prevailed in the previous period.  
The analysis draws on a cross-sectional time-series econometric model based on a panel of 51 
provinces with annual data during the period 1995 to 2011. However, because of lagged 
variables, the regressions are based on the 1997-2011 period. Hence, the sample contains 714 
observations.  
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3.2. Estimation results 
From (3) and the collection of variables described above, the following equations are estimated: 
ܯܫܱܴܰ௜௧ ൌ ߚଵܫܰܵܲܧܥܱܴܶ ௜ܵ,௧ିଵ ൅ ߚଶܫܰܵܲܧܥܶܫܱ ௜ܰ,௧ିଵ ൅ ߚଷܫܰܨܴܣܥܶܫܱ ௜ܰ,௧ିଵ ൅
ߚସܨܧܯܣܮܧ௜௧ ൅ ߚହܧܦܷܥܣܶܫܱ ௜ܰ௧ ൅ ߚ଺ܫܰܦܷܴܵܶ ௜ܻ௧ ൅ ߚ଻ܥܱܴܷܰܵܶܥܶܫܱ ௜ܰ௧ ൅
ߚ଼ܵܧܴܸܫܥܧ ௜ܵ௧ ൅ ߚଽܯܣܥܪܮܣܤ௜௧ ൅ ߚଵ଴ܷܴܣܶܧ௜௧ ൅ ߚଵଵܯܫܱܴܰ௜,௧ିଵ ൅ ߤ௜ ൅ ߬௧ ൅ ߝ௜௧ (4) 
ܵܧܸܧܴܧ௜௧ ൌ ߚଵܫܰܵܲܧܥܱܴܶ ௜ܵ,௧ିଵ ൅ ߚଶܫܰܵܲܧܥܶܫܱ ௜ܰ,௧ିଵ ൅ ߚଷܫܰܨܴܣܥܶܫܱ ௜ܰ,௧ିଵ ൅
ߚସܨܧܯܣܮܧ௜௧ ൅ ߚହܧܦܷܥܣܶܫܱ ௜ܰ௧ ൅ ߚ଺ܫܰܦܷܴܵܶ ௜ܻ௧ ൅ ߚ଻ܥܱܴܷܰܵܶܥܶܫܱ ௜ܰ௧ ൅
ߚ଼ܵܧܴܸܫܥܧ ௜ܵ௧ ൅ ߚଽܯܣܥܪܮܣܤ௜௧ ൅ ߚଵ଴ܷܴܣܶܧ௜௧ ൅ ߚଵଵܵܧܸܧܴܧ௜,௧ିଵ ൅ ߤ௜ ൅ ߬௧ ൅ ߝ௜௧ (5) 
where ߤ௜ is an unobservable fixed effect for province ݅, ߬௧ reflects omitted fixed influences that 
vary across time but not across provinces and ߝ is the perturbance. The fixed provincial effects 
are included in the model to measure time-invariant unobservable effects on the incidence rates 
of workplace accidents. Fixed time effects are included to account for shifts in the incidence rate 
of workplace accidents that are common to all provinces as a result of cyclical effects. According 
to Viscusi (1986) and Lanoie (1992), time dummy variables could capture technological trends 
and aspects of the prevention policies that are not captured in the independent variables but that 
are time-dependent.  
The model was estimated first using the least-squares dummy variables estimator following the 
results in favour of this estimator by the Hausman test. However, several tests were performed 
to check the suitability of this estimator. First, following Pesaran (2004), a test (CD) was 
performed to detect potential problems of cross-sectional dependence. This test accepts the null 
hypothesis of cross-sectional independence in both equations (CD= 1.295 with p= 0.1955 for 
equation 4; and CD=-0.129 with p= 0.8975 for equation 5). Second, following Wooldridge 
(2002), a test was computed to check for serial correlation in the two equations. The test accepts 
the null hypothesis of no serial correlation at the usual levels for the minor accidents equation 
(F=3.308 with p=0.075). However, the test rejects the null hypothesis for the equation on severe 
and fatal accidents (F=  19.392 with p=0.0001). Therefore, equation on minor accidents was 
estimated using the ordinary least-squares (OLS) method adjusted by White’s (1980) 
heteroskedastic-consistent covariance matrix to correct the estimates for unknown forms of 
heteroskedasticity, while the equation on severe and fatal accidents was estimated using 
generalized least-squares (GLS) estimator. The latter is obtained by subtracting the first-order 
correlation coefficient for the residuals times the observation of each province in the previous 
period from the observation of each province in each period for each variable.  
When a fixed-effects model is performed with panel data, lagged dependent variables will be 
correlated with the error term giving rise to endogeneity (Hsiao, 1986). To address this concern, 
we estimate the previous models using a Generalized Method of Moments (GMM) estimator, 
instrumenting for the lagged dependent variable using the dependent variable lagged two 
periods. This instrument was found to be valid according to the Hansen-Sargan test.  
109 
 
Table 4.4   Estimation results of the risk equations 
 Dependent variables 
 
ܯܫܱܴܰ௜௧  ܵܧܸܧܴܧ௜௧ 
(OLS  
estimates) 
(GMM  
estimates) 
(GLS  
estimates) 
(GMM  
estimates) 
ܫܰܵܲܧܥܱܴܶ ௜ܵ,௧ିଵ -32.390 -17.846 0.064 2.602 (12.22)** (25.22) (0.210) (0.907) 
ܫܰܵܲܧܥܶܫܱ ௜ܰ,௧ିଵ 0.044 0.087 -0.001 -0.001 (0.024)* (0.040)** (0.005)* (0.001)* 
ܫܰܨܴܣܥܶܫܱ ௜ܰ,௧ିଵ 6.966 7.217 -0.033 -0.049 (3.591)* (5.981)* (0.059)* (0.054)* 
ܨܧܯܣܮܧ௜,௧ -0.806 -1.102 -0.007 -0.023 (0.448)* (0.371)*** (0.004)* (0.017) 
ܧܦܷܥܣܶܫܱ ௜ܰ,௧ 0.855 1.029 -0.001 -0.075 (0.402) (0.546) (0.003) (0.015) 
ܫܰܦܷܴܵܶ ௜ܻ,௧ 0.435 0.436 -0.008 -0.090 (0.219)* (0.505)* (0.002)*** (0.014)***
ܥܱܴܷܰܵܶܥܶܫܱ ௜ܰ,௧ -0.060 0.027 -0.008 -0.034 (0.146) (0.484) (0.004)** (0.016)** 
ܵܧܴܸܫܥܧ ௜ܵ,௧ 0.371 0.723 -0.009 -0.031 (0.154)** (0.473)* (0.002)*** (0.011)***
ܯܣܥܪܮܣܤ௜,௧ -0.210 0.016 -0.002 -0.011 (0.351) (0.340) (0.002) (0.0162) 
ܷܴܣܶܧ௜,௧ -1.545 -2.448 -0.002 -0.009 (0.522)*** (0.453)*** (0.006) (0.021) 
Lagged dependent variable 
0.346 0.028 0.517 -0.180 
(0.112)*** (0.039)* (0.026)** (0.041)***
Constant 104.394  1.874  
(43.44)**  (0.455)**  
തܴଶ 0.864  0.881  
Number of observations 714 714 
Notes: Each equation also includes a set of province and time dummies. Standard errors in parentheses. 
Significance levels: *significant at 10 per cent; **significant at 5 per cent; ***significant at 1 per cent. 
Table 4.4 summarises estimations for the whole period for the 51 Spanish provinces. The first 
and the second column correspond to the OLS and GMM estimation, respectively, of the 
determinants of minor workplace accidents, while the third and fourth summarise the GLS and 
GMM estimation, respectively, for severe and fatal accidents incidence. The explanatory power is 
satisfactory since our model is able to explain 86.4 and 88.1 per cent of the variations in the 
incidence of minor and severe or fatal workplace accidents, respectively.  
A number of interesting results arise from the analysis. Regarding safety-enforcing variables, the 
inspection and the infraction rate have a positive and significant coefficient in the minor 
accidents equation. Provinces with a higher number of inspections per 1,000 workers and a 
higher percentage of infractions have a higher incidence of minor accidents. However, the 
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coefficients of these two variables have the expected negative sign on the incidence of severe and 
fatal accidents. These results suggest that an increase in the intensity of workplace inspections 
would be followed by an important reduction in the incidence rate of severe and fatal accidents, 
but would have the opposite effect on the workplace accidents of less severity. A plausible 
explanation is that the investment in resources for safety due to the intensification of 
government prevention measures has a successful impact on the rate of severe and fatal 
accidents. However, at the same time, workers might become less careful since they might feel 
they work under safer conditions because of this intensification in prevention leading to an 
increase in the incidence of minor accidents. These results are in accordance with those found by 
Viscusi (1986) and Lanoie (1992). Furthermore, provinces that have a higher number of labour 
inspectors per 1,000 workers enjoy lower incidence rates of minor accidents, though this variable 
became insignificant in explaining the incidence of severe and fatal accidents.  
As for the labour market variables, provinces with a higher percentage of female workers have a 
lower incidence of minor and severe or fatal accidents. These results are consistent with those 
observed in Chapter 2, where we found that women have lower risk of sick leave due to 
occupational disease or injury than men. Furthermore, most of the sectoral employment shares 
are significant, confirming that the industrial mix affects provincial incidence rates of workplace 
accidents. Provinces with a higher percentage of workers in industry and services have a higher 
incidence of minor accidents than those provinces with a higher percentage of workers in 
agriculture. However, provinces with a higher percentage of workers in agriculture have the 
highest incidence of severe and fatal accidents. In addition, the unemployment rate, as a business 
cycle variable, has a negative effect on the incidence of workplace accidents, which is coherent 
with some theoretical models discussed in Chapter 1; an economic upturn (reflected in a 
decrease of the unemployment rate) is usually followed by an increase in the incidence of 
workplace accidents, as discussed in Boone and van Ours (2006), Terrés de Ercilla et al. (2004) 
and Martín-Román (2006). Finally, neither human capital nor investment in machinery and 
equipment show significant coefficients.  
4. What caused regional workplace accidents to converge/polarize?  
Our previous results in Section 3 confirm that prevention and labour market variables are jointly 
significant in explaining the incidence rate of workplace accidents in the Spanish provinces. This 
section aims to analyse the effect of these two sets of variables in regard to the characteristics of 
the geographical distribution of workplace accidents in Spain. In order to assess the extent to 
which the features observed in the spatial distribution of the workplace accidents can be 
explained by variables potentially affecting the incidence of workplace accidents, we follow the 
methodology applied by López-Bazo et al. (2005) to study the distribution of unemployment 
rates in Spain.   
Following López-Bazo et al. (2005), the effect of a factor ܺ (prevention or labour market 
variables) on the incidence rate of workplace accidents of province ݅ in period ݐ (ܴ_ ௜ܺ௧) relative 
to the Spanish average incidence rate is computed as: 
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ܴ_ ௜ܺ௧ ൌ ሺ ௜ܺ௧ െ തܺ௧ሻߚመ௑          (6) 
where ௜ܺ௧ is a vector with observation for the variables included in factor ܺ for province ݅ and 
period ݐ, തܺ௧ is the vector of averages across provinces for those variables in period ݐ, and ߚመ௑ is 
the vector of coefficients of the variables estimated in the previous section. Next, differentials 
for conditional incidence rates are computed by subtracting the effect of the factor from the 
incidence rate differentials: 
ܴܥܱܰܦ௜௧ ൌ ሺܴ௜௧ െ തܴ௧ሻ െ 	ܴ_ ௜ܺ௧        (7) 
where തܴ௧ is the national average incidence rate of workplace accidents in period ݐ.  
Following this methodology, we will obtain conditional distributions under the assumption that 
all provinces would show the same values for the variables included in each set of variables. If 
the factor had no effect on the distribution for a particular year, then the real and conditional 
distributions should not differ (López-Bazo et al., 2005). The difference between the actual and 
the conditional distribution can be displayed using stochastic kernels. From these charts we may 
identify that: i) the specific factor does not affect the observed distribution when the density is 
located along the 45º line, and ii) the dispersion in the real distribution is mostly caused by the 
factor when the density is parallel to the X-axis. 
Figure 4.5 and Figure 4.6 show the changes between the actual distribution and the distribution 
conditioned to (no difference across provinces in) the prevention and to the labour market 
variables, respectively, for 2011. A number of interesting results arise from this analysis. First, the 
contribution of the different categories of variables to explain the geographical distribution of 
workplace accidents differs between minor and severe or fatal accidents. Secondly, while the 
prevention variables did not exert any significant influence on the provincial distribution of 
minor accidents, they account for a large part of the characteristics of the distribution of severe 
and fatal accidents. In fact, the stochastic kernel for the effect of the prevention variables on the 
distribution of the incidence of minor accidents (Figure 4.5-Panel A) depicts how the mass of 
probability runs along the diagonal defining no change between the actual and the conditional 
distribution. By contrast, Figure 4.5-Panel B shows that, when we simulate no difference across 
provinces in government prevention policies, all provinces show similar incidence rates of severe 
and fatal accidents since most of the density is located parallel to the X-axis. 
Likewise, the contribution of the labour market variables to the geographical distribution of 
workplace accidents is also far from homogeneous (Figure 4.6). In the case of minor accidents, 
the kernel is placed parallel to the X-axis suggesting that the distribution is much more 
concentrated when the effect of the labour market variables is netted out (Figure 4.6-Panel A). 
By contrast, the labour market variables do not significantly affect the distribution of severe and 
fatal accidents. In fact, the kernel is located along the diagonal, which suggests no change 
between the actual distribution and the distribution conditioned to the labour market variables 
(Figure 4.6-Panel B). 
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5. Conclusions 
This chapter has examined, through descriptive statistical techniques, the regional distribution of 
the incidence of workplace accidents in Spain, as well as its performance over the last two 
decades. It also has analysed the contribution of government prevention measures and labour 
market variables in giving rise to spatial differences in the incidence of workplace accidents. The 
results show the existence of a large differential across Spanish provinces in the incidence of 
workplace accidents. Moreover, the evolution in the geographical distribution of minor accidents 
is characterized by convergence to a value just above the national average, while there is a trend 
towards polarization in two groups of regions in regards to incidence rates of severe and fatal 
accidents.  
The econometric analysis carried out in this chapter confirms that government prevention 
measures and labour market variables are jointly significant in explaining the incidence rate of 
workplace accidents in the Spanish provinces. However, the contribution of the different 
categories of variables to explain the geographical distribution of workplace accidents differs 
between minor and severe or fatal accidents. While the large dispersion in the provincial 
distribution of labour market variables explains most of the observed inequality in the incidence 
rate of minor accidents, the differences across provinces in the government prevention measures 
account for a large part of the characteristics of the distribution of severe and fatal accidents. 
These results call for a modification of the current framework that would reduce the regional 
disparities in the intensity of inspection and sanction regimes in order to prevent severe and fatal 
workplace accidents with higher economic and social costs. The Inspectorate of Labour and 
Social Security plans its interventions according to the objectives fixed by the relevant 
authorities, which may be at general or territorial level. The establishment of general objectives 
for the interventions regarding occupational health and safety that may be incorporated in the 
territorial programmes would take into account the current regional imbalance in the intensity of 
the inspection and could thus contribute to their reduction. 
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CONCLUSIONS 
This thesis has examined absence from work due to sickness in Spain. The main findings 
confirm that labour supply factors such as gender and age are important in determining sickness 
absence, as shown by the conventional income-leisure choice model. However, labour demand 
factors and labour market institutions also play a role. This thesis confirms that government 
prevention measures are significant in explaining the incidence rate of workplace accidents in the 
Spanish provinces. Moreover, the differences across provinces in the government prevention 
measures explain most of the observed inequality in the incidence of severe and fatal accidents. 
In the first chapter, the review of the current state of knowledge confirms an upsurge of research 
both theoretical and empirical on the factors determining worker absenteeism. The traditional 
approach to explaining absenteeism is based on the conventional income-leisure choice model, 
where the difference between the number of contractual working hours and the number of 
desired working hours by workers at the going wages provides the motivation for absence. 
According to the income-leisure choice model, some labour supply factors are important drivers 
of sickness absence. In fact, the main findings of Chapter 2 demonstrate that both incidence and 
duration of sick leave are higher for women than for men. In the same vein, Chapter 3 has 
showed that the probability of suffering a severe or fatal accident, as well as the duration of the 
sick leave, increases with the worker’s age.  
More specifically, Chapter 2 has analysed gender differences in the incidence of sickness absence, 
as well as in the duration of sick leave. In this chapter we have considered two types of causes 
for sick leave: common disease or accident and occupational illness or injury. This distinction has 
revealed essential differences between men and women in the incidence and duration of sick 
leave in Spain. Our results confirm that women have a higher incidence of sick leave due to 
common disease or accident than men. But the reverse is true when the reason for absence from 
work is occupational illness or injury. We find that the presence of children under 3 years old in 
the household is one of the most important variables explaining the differences in sickness 
absence between women and men. Indeed, when there are children under 3 years in the 
household, the probability of sick leave due to common illness or injury for open-ended workers 
aged 25 to 39 within first 400 days of employment is roughly 10 per cent for men, but increases 
to 15 per cent in the case of women. Furthermore, we find that 8 per cent of the open-ended 
male workers aged 25 to 39 with children less than 3 years old return to work after a sick leave 
spell due to common illness or injury before the 5th day, while this percentage decreases to less 
than 6 per cent in the case of women. 
In the third chapter, we have examined the impact of worker’s age on the consequences of 
workplace accidents. The analysis has showed that the probability of suffering a severe or fatal 
accident increases with the worker’s age once personal, job, and accident characteristics are 
controlled for. In particular, taking the group of the youngest workers (from 16 to 24) as a 
reference, we observe that for every age group, the probability of a more severe accident 
increases from 7.5 per cent for the group aged 25 to 39 to 32.6 per cent for workers aged 65 and 
older. Likewise, the results reveal that the duration of sick leave increases clearly with age. 
119 
 
Indeed, the expected absence duration for workers aged 65 and over is twice the duration 
expected for workers aged 16 to 24.  
As indicated in Chapter 1, the traditional approach interprets sickness absence exclusively from a 
labour supply perspective. However, the exclusion of labour demand considerations leads to a 
poorly specified model. Indeed, the costlier absence is to employers, the more likely they are to 
respond. Though some progress has been made in incorporating demand side aspects to the 
analysis, this approach is still somewhat underdeveloped. To fill this void, Chapter 4 has analysed 
the contribution of government intervention in occupational health and safety (OSH) in giving 
rise to spatial differences in the incidence of workplace accidents. Our results confirm that 
government prevention measures and labour market variables are jointly significant in explaining 
the incidence rate of workplace accidents in the Spanish provinces. However, the contribution of 
the different categories of variables to explain the geographical distribution of workplace 
accidents differs between minor and severe or fatal accidents. While the large dispersion in the 
provincial distribution of labour market variables explains most of the observed inequality in the 
incidence rate of minor accidents, the differences across provinces in the government prevention 
measures account for a large part of the characteristics of the distribution of severe and fatal 
accidents. 
Like most European countries, Spain’s public sickness insurance scheme is a major component 
of its social security system. Moreover, the cost of sick leave is larger than the amount paid to 
the sick worker while he or she is absent from work; production losses and health care outlays 
are also socioeconomic costs of sickness absence. Furthermore, we should bear in mind that 
some temporary sick or injured workers could become permanently disabled and hence leave the 
labour force. Therefore, the knowledge regarding the determinants of incidence and duration of 
absence from work due to illness is very relevant for public policy. Some interesting policy 
implications arise from this thesis: 
First, the findings of this thesis imply that various factors can assist workers with the care of 
their dependants and, in turn, reduce their absence from work. The need for facilities for the care 
of children is emphasized because their presence in the household is associated with a high 
probability of employee absence. Some potential policies to address the problem include longer 
maternity leaves, improving the access to subsidized day-care facilities for children, and 
preferential tax treatment for hiring help in the house. 
Second, the results suggest that the decision regarding increasing the total number of older 
workers in the labour market should be made with caution. If the retirement age is delayed, the 
ceteris paribus effect must be an increase in the total number of severely injured workers with 
prolonged sick leave, which may increase the total public health cost expenses. From a policy 
perspective, the results point out the importance of a proper match between the capabilities of 
the worker and the demands of the job. Therefore, decisions about delaying the retirement age 
require additional measures, such as the occupational reallocation of these older workers to tasks 
with lower incidence rates and provide them with continuous prevention training programmes.  
Finally, the results of this thesis call for a modification of the current framework that would 
reduce the regional disparities in the intensity of inspection and sanction regimes in order to 
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prevent severe and fatal workplace accidents with higher economic and social costs. The 
Inspectorate of Labour and Social Security plans its interventions according to the objectives 
fixed by the relevant authorities, which may be at general or territorial level. The establishment of 
general objectives for the interventions regarding occupational health and safety that may be 
incorporated in the territorial programmes would take into account the current regional 
imbalance in the intensity of the inspection and could thus contribute to their reduction. 
Until very recently, sickness absence has received less attention than other areas of labour 
economics. However, there has been an upsurge of research both theoretical and empirical on 
the factors determining worker absenteeism. Given the socioeconomic costs of sickness absence, 
further research in this area is expected in the near future. Indeed, there are quite a few 
interesting avenues for future research. First of all, multiple spells of sick leave need to be 
addressed once the study of a single spell has provided enough elements to design the empirical 
strategy. Secondly, the nature of the employment relationship, open-ended or fixed-term, has 
been identified as key to analyse the incidence of sick leave, but very little has been done to 
investigate its impact. Finally, equally or more useful for public policy is to research the 
consequences of sick leave for the labour market outcomes of all workers, but more particularly 
of women with children and older workers. 
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RESUMEN 
Esta tesis analiza el absentismo laboral por enfermedad o accidente en España. El primer 
capítulo repasa el estado actual del conocimiento relacionado con la teoría y evidencia empírica 
sobre absentismo laboral por enfermedad dentro de un contexto económico. La literatura 
económica ha destacado que factores relacionados con la oferta de trabajo, como por ejemplo el 
género y la edad, son importantes a la hora de explicar el absentismo laboral por enfermedad. No 
obstante, según la evidencia empírica, el efecto de estas variables es incierto. Los capítulos 2 y 3 
de esta tesis tienen como objetivo contribuir a este debate ofreciendo evidencia empírica en 
relación al impacto del género y la edad, respectivamente, sobre el absentismo laboral por 
enfermedad. Finalmente, el capítulo 4 analiza la contribución de la intervención gubernamental 
en materia de salud y seguridad en el trabajo al aumento de las disparidades territoriales en la 
incidencia de los accidentes de trabajo. 
En concreto, el capítulo 2 se centra en la explicación de las diferencias de género en el 
absentismo laboral. Los datos utilizados proceden de la Muestra Continua de Vidas Laborales del 
año 2006, a la que se ha añadido información sobre todos los episodios de incapacidad temporal 
cubiertos por el sistema de Seguridad Social español durante el periodo 2005-2006. El análisis 
empírico realizado en este capítulo está divido en dos partes. En primer lugar, estimamos un 
modelo de riesgos en competencia para estudiar el impacto de las características del trabajador 
sobre el tiempo transcurrido desde el comienzo de una relación laboral hasta que aparece el 
primer episodio de incapacidad temporal. En segundo lugar, estimamos un modelo de duración 
simple para examinar como esas mismas características afectan al tiempo de baja laboral. Los 
resultados muestran que la incidencia, así como la duración de las bajas laborales, es más elevada 
en las mujeres que en los hombres. Más concretamente, la presencia de niños menores de 3 años 
en el hogar es una de las variables más importantes a la hora de explicar las diferencias en 
absentismo laboral por enfermedad entre mujeres y hombres.  
El capítulo 3 examina el impacto de la edad del trabajador sobre las consecuencias de los 
accidentes de trabajo. En base a datos procedentes de la Estadística de Accidentes de Trabajo 
para el periodo 2004-2010, estimamos un modelo multinomial para analizar el impacto de la edad 
del trabajador en la probabilidad de sufrir un accidente grave o mortal. Además, estimamos un 
modelo de duración simple para calcular el efecto de la edad del trabajador sobre la duración de 
la baja laboral ocasionada por un accidente de trabajo. El análisis muestra que la probabilidad de 
sufrir un accidente grave o mortal, al igual que la duración de la baja laboral causada por el 
mismo, aumenta con la edad del trabajador una vez que se ha controlado por las características 
personales y profesionales del individuo, así como por las propias circunstancias del accidente. 
Desde una perspectiva política, los resultados destacan la importancia de que exista un vínculo 
adecuado entre las capacidades del trabajador y las exigencias del puesto de trabajo. Por lo tanto, 
prolongar la edad activa de los trabajadores exige medidas adicionales para evitar o minimizar sus 
efectos negativos. Por ejemplo, la reubicación funcional de estos trabajadores hacia tareas en las 
que la incidencia de los accidentes (o la gravedad de los mismos) sea menor, contribuiría a paliar 
los efectos mencionados.  
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Finalmente, el capítulo 4 analiza la distribución regional de la incidencia de los accidentes de 
trabajo en España, así como su evolución a lo largo de las dos últimas décadas. Este capítulo 
también analiza la contribución de factores socioeconómicos y de medidas de prevención de 
riesgos laborales al aumento de las disparidades territoriales en la incidencia de los accidentes de 
trabajo. Los resultados sugieren la modificación del actual marco legal bajo el cual se rige la 
actividad de la Inspección Laboral, en la medida en que estos cambios reducirían la magnitud de 
las diferencias territoriales.   
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